A study and analysis of lack of enforcement against criminal actions in corporate America and what can be done to fix it. In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn’t happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don’t have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. “We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks,” he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, “it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings.” All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice. “Professor Coffee’s compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime.” —Robert Jackson, professor of Law, New York University, and former commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission “A great book that more than any other recent volume deftly explains why effective prosecution of corporate senior executives largely collapsed in the post-2007–2009 stock market crash period and why this creates a crisis of underenforcement. No one is Professor Coffee’s equal in tying together causes for the crisis.” —Joel Seligman, author, historian, former law school dean, and president emeritus, University of Rochester

Punishing Corporate Crime: Legal Penalties for Criminal and Regulatory Violations provides a practical discussion of criminal punishment trends directed at the corporate entity. Corporate punishment, for the most part, has traditionally occurred either in the form of a fine or, in the extreme, a heavy sanction that terminates the business. This timely book analyzes the historical and statutory bases of corporate punishment and reviews the latest remedies now employed by the government, including receivership and monitoring, disgorgement of profits, restitution, integrity agreements, and disbarment from regulated fields. Punishing Corporate Crime explores the new and evolving area of corporate criminal punishment that has emerged in the post- Enron era. This book offers key advice in addressing the new and evolving punishments that face corporations, as well as a consideration of preventative programs.

A comprehensive and state-of the-art overview from internationally-recognized experts on white-collar crime covering a broad range of topics from many perspectives Law enforcement professionals and criminal justice scholars have debated the most appropriate definition of “white-collar crime” ever since Edwin Sutherland first coined the phrase in his speech to the American Sociological Society in 1939. The conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term has challenged efforts to construct a body of science that meaningfully informs policy and theory. The Handbook of White-Collar Crime is a unique re-framing of traditional discussions that discusses common topics of white-collar crime—who the offenders are, who the victims are, how these crimes are punished, theoretical explanations—while exploring how the choice of one definition over another affects research and scholarship on the subject. Providing a one-volume overview of research on white-collar crime, this book presents diverse perspectives from an international team of both established and newer scholars that review theory, policy, and empirical work on a broad range of topics. Chapters explore the extent and cost of white-collar crimes, individual- as well as organizational- and macro-level theories of crime, law enforcement roles in prevention and intervention, crimes in Africa and South America, the influence of technology and globalization, and more. This important resource: Explores diverse implications for future theory, policy, and research on current and emerging issues in the field Clarifies distinct characteristics of specific types of offences within the general archetype of white-collar crime Includes chapters written by researchers from countries commonly underrepresented in the field Examines the real-world impact of ambiguous definitions of white-collar crime on prevention, investigation, and punishment Offers critical examination of how definitional decisions steer the direction of criminological scholarship Accessible to readers at the undergraduate level, yet equally relevant for experienced practitioners, academics, and researchers, The Handbook of White-Collar Crime is an innovative, substantial contribution to contemporary scholarship in the field.

Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regulating aren’t subject to the same checks and balances that civil regulatory agencies are. Prosecutors in the Boardroom explores the questions raised by this practice by compiling the insights of the leading lights in the field, including criminal law professors who specialize in the field of corporate criminal liability and criminal law, a top economist at the SEC who studies corporate wrongdoing, and a leading expert on the use of monitors in criminal law. The essays in this volume move beyond criticisms of the practice to closely examine exactly how regulation by prosecutors works. Broadly, the contributors consider who should police corporate misconduct and how it should be policed, and in conclusion offer a policy blueprint of best practices for federal and state prosecution. Contributors: Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, Mark A. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Richard A. Epstein, Brandon L. Garrett, Lisa Kern Griffin, and Vikramaditya Khanna

Punishing Corporate Crime: Legal Penalties for Criminal and Regulatory Violations provides a practical discussion of criminal punishment trends directed at the corporate entity. Corporate punishment, for the most part, has traditionally occurred either in the form of a fine or, in the extreme, a heavy sanction that terminates the business. This timely book analyzes the historical and statutory bases of corporate punishment and reviews the latest remedies now employed by the government, including receivership and monitoring, disgorgement of profits, restitution, integrity agreements, and disbarment from regulated fields. Punishing Corporate Crime explores the new and evolving area of corporate criminal punishment that has emerged in the post- Enron era. This book offers key advice in addressing the new and evolving punishments that face corporations, as well as a consideration of preventative programs.

"Over the last decade, many of the world's biggest companies have been embroiled in legal disputes over corruption, fraud, environmental damage, taxation issues, or sanction violations, ending either in convictions or settlements of record-breaking fines that have surpassed the billion-dollar mark. For critics of globalisation, this turn towards corporate accountability is a welcome change, showing that multinational companies are not above the law. In this book, Cornelia Woll considers how far this turn toward negotiated corporate justice, and the United States' legal action against multinationals in particular, is motivated by geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns. Woll analyses the evolution of corporate criminal prosecutions in the United States, as well as the extraterritorial expansion of its jurisdictions, and demonstrates a notable bias against foreign firms. In extreme cases, she argues, this type of legal action is used for explicitly strategic purposes to further US economic interests at home and abroad, a practice known as 'economic lawfare'. By studying the recent institutional and legal changes within a range of countries that have seen their multinational companies targeted by the threat of US prosecutions - including the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Brazil - Woll draws attention to the impact of this strategy in reshaping both national legal approaches to corporate criminal law and the protocols for business government relations. No government wishes to stand accused of allowing their own multinationals to get away with illegal or unethical practices that have only come to light via US investigations, nor do they wish to see the resulting fines from any legal proceedings paid out to the US justice system alone. Woll discusses the resulting measures taken, and those still needed, to strengthen national capacity to intervene in corporate misconduct cases, and considers the extent to which certain US actions exemplify the weaponisation of interdependence by a hegemonic power"--

The book instructs corporate counsel on how to adopt forward-looking compliance policies that can prevent criminal liability and how to mitigate the severity of penalties when they are unavoidable.

From the lead prosecutor on the Enron investigation, an eye-opening examination of the explosion of American white-collar crime. If “corporations are people too,” why isn’t anyone in jail? A serious defect in a GM car causes accidents; Enron scams investors out of their money; banks bet on the housing market crash and win. In the race to maximize profits, corporations can behave in ways that are morally outrageous but technically legal. In Capital Offenses, Samuel Buell draws on the unique pairing of his expertise as a Duke University law professor and his personal experience leading the investigation into Enron—the biggest white-collar crime case in U.S. history—to present an in-depth examination of business crime today At the heart of it sits the limited liability corporation, simultaneously the bedrock of American prosperity and the reason that white-collar crime is difficult to prosecute—a brilliant legal innovation that, in its modern form, can seem impossible to regulate or even manage. By shielding employees from legal responsibility, the corporation encourages the risk-taking that drives economic growth. But its special legal status and its ever-expanding scale place daunting barriers in the way of federal and local investigators. Detailing the complex legal frameworks that govern both corporations and the people who carry out their missions, Buell shows that deciphering business crime is rarely black or white. In lucid, thought-provoking prose, he illuminates the depths of the legal issues at stake—delving into fraudulent practices like Ponzi schemes, bad accounting, insider trading, and the art of “loopholing”—showing how every major case and each problem of law further exposes the ambivalence and instability at the core of America’s relationship with its corporations. An expert in criminal law, Buell masterfully examines the limits of too permissive or overzealous prosecution of business crimes. Capital Offenses invites us to take a fresh look at our legal framework and learn how it can be used to effectively discipline corporations for wrongdoing, without dismantling the corporation.

Corporate crime in China has garnered worldwide attention and in the recent years we have witnessed positive legislative and administrative efforts by the Chinese government to prevent corporate misconducts. This book first defines the meaning of corporate crime in China and answers the basic questions of what corporate crime is through real life cases. Then, it introduces the history of corporate crime and reviews academic studies through these key questions. The book also discusses the scope of corporate crime, the basis of corporate criminal liability, the criminal liability of State organizations, the corporate compliance programs and corporate criminal liability and the procedural issues. The book also provides suggestions from a comparative perspective by referring to the latest global developments on corporate crime. In the concluding chapter, the book discusses the goals of corporate crime prevention policy and comes up with feasible reform proposals with a brief summary on the existing problems of the current policies through a macro perspective. There is no existing book that deals with the legislation and criminal justice practices of corporate crime in China and this book will help to shed insight into the subject.

Corporate Criminal Liability is on the rise worldwide: More and more legal systems now include genuinely criminal sanctioning for legal entities. The various regulatory options available to national criminal justice systems, their implications and their constitutional, economic and psychological parameters are key questions addressed in this volume. Specific emphasis is put on procedural questions relating to corporate criminal liability, on alternative sanctions such as blacklisting of corporations, on common corporate crimes and on questions of transnational criminal justice.