Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regulating aren’t subject to the same checks and balances that civil regulatory agencies are. Prosecutors in the Boardroom explores the questions raised by this practice by compiling the insights of the leading lights in the field, including criminal law professors who specialize in the field of corporate criminal liability and criminal law, a top economist at the SEC who studies corporate wrongdoing, and a leading expert on the use of monitors in criminal law. The essays in this volume move beyond criticisms of the practice to closely examine exactly how regulation by prosecutors works. Broadly, the contributors consider who should police corporate misconduct and how it should be policed, and in conclusion offer a policy blueprint of best practices for federal and state prosecution. Contributors: Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, Mark A. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Richard A. Epstein, Brandon L. Garrett, Lisa Kern Griffin, and Vikramaditya Khanna

The purchase of this ebook edition does not entitle you to receive access to the Connected eBook on CasebookConnect. You will need to purchase a new print book to get access to the full experience including: lifetime access to the online ebook with highlight, annotation, and search capabilities, plus an outline tool and other helpful resources. Geoffrey Miller’s The Law of Governance, Risk Management and Compliance is widely credited for introducing a new field of legal studies. Compliance and its related subjects of governance and risk management are major sources of jobs and also important developments in legal practice. The billions of dollars of fines paid over the past decade and the burgeoning and seemingly never-ending parade of compliance and risk management breakdowns – recently including the Wells Fargo sales practices scandal, the Volkswagen emissions cheat, and the Boeing 737 MAX crisis – all attest to the importance of the issues treated in this readable and timely book. New to the Third Edition: Comprehensive updates on recent developments New treatment of compliance failures: Wells Fargo account opening scandal, Volkswagen emissions cheat, important developments in Catholic Church sex abuse scandal. New treatment of risk management failures: the Boeing 737 MAX scandal. Professors and students will benefit from: Clear, concise definitions Fun and interesting problems Real-world perspective from an author who has been involved both as a scholar and as a member of a corporate board of directors Highly readable and interesting writing Text boxes containing key concepts and definitions Realistic problems for class discussion and analysis

American courts routinely hand down harsh sentences to individual convicts, but a very different standard of justice applies to corporations. Too Big to Jail takes readers into a complex, compromised world of backroom deals, for an unprecedented look at what happens when criminal charges are brought against a major company in the United States. Federal prosecutors benefit from expansive statutes that allow an entire firm to be held liable for a crime by a single employee. But when prosecutors target the Goliaths of the corporate world, they find themselves at a huge disadvantage. The government that bailed out corporations considered too economically important to fail also negotiates settlements permitting giant firms to avoid the consequences of criminal convictions. Presenting detailed data from more than a decade of federal cases, Brandon Garrett reveals a pattern of negotiation and settlement in which prosecutors demand admissions of wrongdoing, impose penalties, and require structural reforms. However, those reforms are usually vaguely defined. Many companies pay no criminal fine, and even the biggest blockbuster payments are often greatly reduced. While companies must cooperate in the investigations, high-level employees tend to get off scot-free. The practical reality is that when prosecutors face Hydra-headed corporate defendants prepared to spend hundreds of millions on lawyers, such agreements may be the only way to get any result at all. Too Big to Jail describes concrete ways to improve corporate law enforcement by insisting on more stringent prosecution agreements, ongoing judicial review, and greater transparency.

In the years since the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. federal prosecutors have brought dozens of criminal cases against the world's most powerful banks, charging them with manipulating financial indices, helping their customers evade taxes, evading sanctions, and laundering money. To settle these cases, global banks like UBS, Barclays, HSBC and BNP Paribas paid tens of billions of dollars in fines. They also agreed to extensive reforms, hiring hundreds of compliance officers, spending billions on new systems, and installing independent monitors. In effect, they agreed to become worldwide enforcers of U.S. law, including financial sanctions-sometimes despite their own governments' protests. This book examines the U.S. enforcement campaign against global banks across four areas: benchmark manipulation, tax evasion, sanctions violations, and sovereign debt. It shows that U.S. prosecutors have unilaterally carved out a new role as global bank regulators, heralding a fundamental shift in how international finance is overseen. Their ability to do so stems from U.S. control over access to vital hubs of the international financial system. In some areas, unilateral U.S. actions have ushered in important multilateral reforms, such as the rise of automatic tax information exchange and better-regulated financial indices. In other areas, such as financial sanctions, unilateralism has attracted protests from other states and spurred attempts to challenge U.S. dominance of international finance.

Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide explains how multinational corporations should be criminally liable for their role in financing or otherwise supporting atrocities like genocide. This book demonstrates how international criminal jurisdiction should be extended over corporations for atrocities and makes the case that it should be done promptly.

"Over the last decade, many of the world's biggest companies have been embroiled in legal disputes over corruption, fraud, environmental damage, taxation issues, or sanction violations, ending either in convictions or settlements of record-breaking fines that have surpassed the billion-dollar mark. For critics of globalisation, this turn towards corporate accountability is a welcome change, showing that multinational companies are not above the law. In this book, Cornelia Woll considers how far this turn toward negotiated corporate justice, and the United States' legal action against multinationals in particular, is motivated by geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns. Woll analyses the evolution of corporate criminal prosecutions in the United States, as well as the extraterritorial expansion of its jurisdictions, and demonstrates a notable bias against foreign firms. In extreme cases, she argues, this type of legal action is used for explicitly strategic purposes to further US economic interests at home and abroad, a practice known as 'economic lawfare'. By studying the recent institutional and legal changes within a range of countries that have seen their multinational companies targeted by the threat of US prosecutions - including the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Brazil - Woll draws attention to the impact of this strategy in reshaping both national legal approaches to corporate criminal law and the protocols for business government relations. No government wishes to stand accused of allowing their own multinationals to get away with illegal or unethical practices that have only come to light via US investigations, nor do they wish to see the resulting fines from any legal proceedings paid out to the US justice system alone. Woll discusses the resulting measures taken, and those still needed, to strengthen national capacity to intervene in corporate misconduct cases, and considers the extent to which certain US actions exemplify the weaponisation of interdependence by a hegemonic power"--

This report addresses the use of criminal sanctions to control corporate behavior—prosecutions both of corporations and of employees for actions taken on corporations’ behalf. The authors describe the current state of the use of criminal sanctions in controlling corporate behavior, describe how the current regime developed, and offer suggestions about how the use of criminal sanctions to control corporate behavior might be improved.

How to induce corporate compliance with regulations? Harsh punishments will cause companies to disguise violations, and mild punishments will cause companies to report their violations and make weak efforts to avoid them. In this book, Sharon Oded canvasses the history of thinking about corporate compliance, and he proposes his own candidate for the best law. This is a sophisticated account of legal incentives that will repay any reader interested in corporate compliance. Robert Cooter, University of California, Berkeley, US The effective control of corporate misconduct is a vital but elusive task for regulators, given the complexity of organization structures and the need to find the right balance between deterrent- and cooperative-based enforcement policies. In this powerful and comprehensive study, Sharon Oded argues for combining different approaches and boldly advocates, in particular, the use of third-party independent corporate monitoring firms to implement self-policing strategies. This will be essential reading for those involved in the theory or practice of regulatory corporate enforcement. Anthony Ogus, University of Manchester, UK and University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands This book considers how a regulatory enforcement policy should be designed to efficiently induce proactive corporate compliance. It first explores two major schools of thought regarding law enforcement, both the deterrence and cooperative approaches, and shows that neither of these represents an optimal regulatory enforcement paradigm from a social welfare perspective. It provides a critical analysis of recent developments in US Federal corporate liability regimes, and proposes a generic framework that better tailors sanction schemes and monitoring systems to regulatee performance. The proposed framework efficiently induces corporate proactive compliance, while maintaining an optimal level of deterrence. This insightful book will appeal to academics in law and economics, behavioral economics, criminology, and business, as well as to practitioners and policymakers.

Covering over one-hundred topics on issues ranging from Law and Neuroeconomics to European Union Law and Economics to Feminist Theory and Law and Economics, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics is the definitive work in the field of law and economics. The book gathers together scholars and experts in law and economics to create the most inclusive and current work on law and economics. Edited by Francisco Parisi, the Handbook looks at the origins of the field of law and economics, tracks its progression and increased importance to both law and economics, and looks to the future of the field and its continued development by examining a cornucopia of fields touched by work in law and economics. The uniqueness of its breadth, depth, and convenience make the volume essential to scholars, students, and contributors in the field of law and economics.