A study and analysis of lack of enforcement against criminal actions in corporate America and what can be done to fix it. In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn’t happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don’t have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. “We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks,” he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, “it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings.” All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice. “Professor Coffee’s compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime.” —Robert Jackson, professor of Law, New York University, and former commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission “A great book that more than any other recent volume deftly explains why effective prosecution of corporate senior executives largely collapsed in the post-2007–2009 stock market crash period and why this creates a crisis of underenforcement. No one is Professor Coffee’s equal in tying together causes for the crisis.” —Joel Seligman, author, historian, former law school dean, and president emeritus, University of Rochester

From the lead prosecutor on the Enron investigation, an eye-opening examination of the explosion of American white-collar crime. If “corporations are people too,” why isn’t anyone in jail? A serious defect in a GM car causes accidents; Enron scams investors out of their money; banks bet on the housing market crash and win. In the race to maximize profits, corporations can behave in ways that are morally outrageous but technically legal. In Capital Offenses, Samuel Buell draws on the unique pairing of his expertise as a Duke University law professor and his personal experience leading the investigation into Enron—the biggest white-collar crime case in U.S. history—to present an in-depth examination of business crime today At the heart of it sits the limited liability corporation, simultaneously the bedrock of American prosperity and the reason that white-collar crime is difficult to prosecute—a brilliant legal innovation that, in its modern form, can seem impossible to regulate or even manage. By shielding employees from legal responsibility, the corporation encourages the risk-taking that drives economic growth. But its special legal status and its ever-expanding scale place daunting barriers in the way of federal and local investigators. Detailing the complex legal frameworks that govern both corporations and the people who carry out their missions, Buell shows that deciphering business crime is rarely black or white. In lucid, thought-provoking prose, he illuminates the depths of the legal issues at stake—delving into fraudulent practices like Ponzi schemes, bad accounting, insider trading, and the art of “loopholing”—showing how every major case and each problem of law further exposes the ambivalence and instability at the core of America’s relationship with its corporations. An expert in criminal law, Buell masterfully examines the limits of too permissive or overzealous prosecution of business crimes. Capital Offenses invites us to take a fresh look at our legal framework and learn how it can be used to effectively discipline corporations for wrongdoing, without dismantling the corporation.

A comprehensive and state-of the-art overview from internationally-recognized experts on white-collar crime covering a broad range of topics from many perspectives Law enforcement professionals and criminal justice scholars have debated the most appropriate definition of “white-collar crime” ever since Edwin Sutherland first coined the phrase in his speech to the American Sociological Society in 1939. The conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term has challenged efforts to construct a body of science that meaningfully informs policy and theory. The Handbook of White-Collar Crime is a unique re-framing of traditional discussions that discusses common topics of white-collar crime—who the offenders are, who the victims are, how these crimes are punished, theoretical explanations—while exploring how the choice of one definition over another affects research and scholarship on the subject. Providing a one-volume overview of research on white-collar crime, this book presents diverse perspectives from an international team of both established and newer scholars that review theory, policy, and empirical work on a broad range of topics. Chapters explore the extent and cost of white-collar crimes, individual- as well as organizational- and macro-level theories of crime, law enforcement roles in prevention and intervention, crimes in Africa and South America, the influence of technology and globalization, and more. This important resource: Explores diverse implications for future theory, policy, and research on current and emerging issues in the field Clarifies distinct characteristics of specific types of offences within the general archetype of white-collar crime Includes chapters written by researchers from countries commonly underrepresented in the field Examines the real-world impact of ambiguous definitions of white-collar crime on prevention, investigation, and punishment Offers critical examination of how definitional decisions steer the direction of criminological scholarship Accessible to readers at the undergraduate level, yet equally relevant for experienced practitioners, academics, and researchers, The Handbook of White-Collar Crime is an innovative, substantial contribution to contemporary scholarship in the field.

Nearly six decades have passed since the concept of white-collar crime was introduced and systematic scholarly investigation of it began. Although it has proven to be one of the most challenging and controversial topics in sociology, the concept has taken firm root in lay and scholarly lexicons where it is widely understand and used to denote a type of crime that differs fundamentally from street crime. One way it is different is the backgrounds and characteristics of it perpetrators; the poor and disreputable fodder routinely encountered in police stations and in studies of street crime are seldom in evidence here. Most if not all white-collar offenders by contrast are distinguished by lives by privilege, much of it with origins in class inequality. This reader begins together under a unifying theoretical approach the current state of knowledge about and debate over white-collar crime. Editors' introductions preface each of the six chapters in the book, and each of the thirty-one carefully chosen selections --- both classic and contemporary -- has been significantly edited for readability and suitability for the college student. The readings address conceptual conflicts as well as empirical studies of the strucutre of opportunities, the characteristics of white-collar offenders and their decision making, and the various approaches to controlling white-collar offering. Additionally, the book includes twenty-one specially designed panels that call-out particular issues from the readings by offering case examples taken from local and regional newspapers. Together, the readings and the panels offer the student both analysis and examples of white-collar crime.

“Professor Coffee's compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime.” —Robert Jackson, former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn't happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don't have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. “We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks,” he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, “it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings.” All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice.

Professor Coffee's compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime. Robert Jackson, former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn't happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don't have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. "We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks," he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, "it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings." All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice.

"Professor Coffee's compelling new approach to holding fraudsters to account is indispensable reading for any lawmaker serious about deterring corporate crime." --Robert Jackson, former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission In the early 2000s, federal enforcement efforts sent white collar criminals at Enron and WorldCom to prison. But since the 2008 financial collapse, this famously hasn't happened. Corporations have been permitted to enter into deferred prosecution agreements and avoid criminal convictions, in part due to a mistaken assumption that leniency would encourage cooperation and because enforcement agencies don't have the funding or staff to pursue lengthy prosecutions, says distinguished Columbia Law Professor John C. Coffee. "We are moving from a system of justice for organizational crime that mixed carrots and sticks to one that is all carrots and no sticks," he says. He offers a series of bold proposals for ensuring that corporate malfeasance can once again be punished. For example, he describes incentives that could be offered to both corporate executives to turn in their corporations and to corporations to turn in their executives, allowing prosecutors to play them off against each other. Whistleblowers should be offered cash bounties to come forward because, Coffee writes, "it is easier and cheaper to buy information than seek to discover it in adversarial proceedings." All federal enforcement agencies should be able to hire outside counsel on a contingency fee basis, which would cost the public nothing and provide access to discovery and litigation expertise the agencies don't have. Through these and other equally controversial ideas, Coffee intends to rebalance the scales of justice.

Crime is one of the most significant political issues in contemporary American society. Crime control statistics and punishment policies are subjects of constant partisan debate, while the media presents sensationalized stories of criminal activity and over-crowded prisons. In the highly politicized arena of crime and justice, empirical data and reasoned analysis are often overlook or ignored. The Handbook of Crime and Punishment, however, provides a comprehensive overview of criminal justice, criminology, and crime control policy, thus enabling a fundamental understanding of crime and punishment essential to an informed public. Expansive in its coverage, the Handbook presents materials on crime and punishment trends as well as timely policy issues. The latest research on the demography of crime (race, gender, drug use) is included and weighty current problems (organized crime, white collar crime, family violence, sex offenders, youth gangs, drug abuse policy) are examined. Processes and institutions that deal with accused and convicted criminals and techniques of punishment are also examined. While some articles emphasize American research findings and developments, others incorporate international research and offer a comparative perspective from other English-speaking countries and Western Europe. Editor Michael Tonry, a leading scholar of criminology, introduces the 28 articles in the volume, each contributed by an expert in the field. Designed for a wide audience, The Handbook is encyclopedic in its range and depth of content, yet is written in an accessible style. The most inclusive and authoritative work on the topic to be found in one volume, this book will appeal to those interested in the study of crime and its causes, effects, trends, and institutions; those interested in the forms and philosophies of punishment; and those interested in crime control.

Punishing Corporate Crime: Legal Penalties for Criminal and Regulatory Violations provides a practical discussion of criminal punishment trends directed at the corporate entity. Corporate punishment, for the most part, has traditionally occurred either in the form of a fine or, in the extreme, a heavy sanction that terminates the business. This timely book analyzes the historical and statutory bases of corporate punishment and reviews the latest remedies now employed by the government, including receivership and monitoring, disgorgement of profits, restitution, integrity agreements, and disbarment from regulated fields. Punishing Corporate Crime explores the new and evolving area of corporate criminal punishment that has emerged in the post- Enron era. This book offers key advice in addressing the new and evolving punishments that face corporations, as well as a consideration of preventative programs.

First Published in 1995. The Exxon Valdez catastrophe, the savings-and-loan bailout, defense-contractor fraud, and insider trading scandals have inspired a growing number of courses devoted to the subject of corporate criminality. This collection of original essays treats various aspects of a wide-ranging problem, including the evolution of the study of corporate crime, the difficulties of understanding corporate illegality, the nature and extent of corporate crime, financial and social costs, measurement issues, the regulation of corporate behavior, public perceptions, and the punishment of corporate crime.