A study of major trends in public finance and fiscal justice in developed capitalist countries since the 1970s.

There is a long-standing difference amongst public economists between those who think that collective choice must be formally acknowledged, and those who derive their policy recommendations from a social planning framework in which politics plays no role. The purpose of this book is to contribute to a meaningful dialogue between these two groups, in the belief that the future of both political economy and of normative public finance lies somewhere between the two approaches. Some of the specific questions addressed in the book include: does public finance need political economy? Should collective choice play a role in the standard of reference used in normative public finance? What is a 'failure' in a non-market or policy process? And what have we learned about the theory and practice of public finance from three decades of empirical research on public choice? The book also provides a practitioner's view of the political economy of redistribution.

The second edition of Public Finance and Public Policy retains the first edition's themes of investigation of responsibilities and limitations of government. The present edition has been rewritten and restructured. Public choice and political economy concepts and political and bureaucratic principal-agent problems are introduced at the beginning for application to later topics. Fairness, envy, hyperbolic discounting, and other concepts of behavioral economics are integrated throughout. The consequences of asymmetric information and the tradeoff between efficiency and ex-post equality are recurring themes. Key themes investigated are markets and governments, institutions and governance, public goods, public finance for public goods, market corrections (externalities and paternalist public policies), voting, social justice, entitlements and equality of opportunity, choice of taxation, and the need for government. The purpose of the book is to provide an accessible introduction to the use of public finance and public policy to improve on market outcomes.

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

How have the most influential political economists of the past three centuries theorized about sovereign borrowing and shaped its now widespread use? That important question receives a comprehensive answer in this original work, featuring careful textual analysis and illuminating exhibits of public debt empirics since 1700. Beyond its value as a definitive, authoritative history of thought on public debt, this book rehabilitates and reintroduces a realist perspective into a contemporary debate now heavily dominated by pessimists and optimists alike.

The ideal introductory textbook to the politics of the policymaking process This textbook uses modern political economy to introduce students of political science, government, economics, and public policy to the politics of the policymaking process. The book's distinct political economy approach has two virtues. By developing general principles for thinking about policymaking, it can be applied across a range of issue areas. It also unifies the policy curriculum, offering coherence to standard methods for teaching economics and statistics, and drawing connections between fields. The book begins by exploring the normative foundations of policymaking—political theory, social choice theory, and the Paretian and utilitarian underpinnings of policy analysis. It then introduces game theoretic models of social dilemmas—externalities, coordination problems, and commitment problems—that create opportunities for policy to improve social welfare. Finally, it shows how the political process creates technological and incentive constraints on government that shape policy outcomes. Throughout, concepts and models are illustrated and reinforced with discussions of empirical evidence and case studies. This textbook is essential for all students of public policy and for anyone interested in the most current methods influencing policymaking today. Comprehensive approach to politics and policy suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students Models unify policy curriculum through methodological coherence Exercises at the end of every chapter Self-contained appendices cover necessary game theory Extensive discussion of cases and applications

'In this very nice volume reputed academics and central bankers discuss recent regulatory reforms in financial governance from a political economy perspective. Therefore it is invaluable for both policymakers and scholars interested in financial governance and market regulation.' - Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, Centre for Economic Policy Research, UK and CESifo Research Network, Munich, Germany This book focuses on recent financial market reforms, and their implications for social, economic and political exclusion. In particular it considers the hitherto under-researched question of whose interests govern the design of regulatory mechanisms and who influences the decision-making process. This process is set out as contested terrain, in which there are winners and losers, and in which there are inevitably circles of exclusion. The authors, comprising financial authority experts and academic specialists, expand the concept of exclusion beyond its typical social dimension to incorporate all actors, be they individuals or institutions not permitted to contribute to financial market regulation as a public good. As they point out, this may take the form of political, economic or indeed cultural exclusion. The book examines the conflicts that arise between various interests and how these are managed within the process of regulation.

The Political Economy of Government Auditing addresses the elusive quest for greater transparency and accountability in the management of public finances in emerging economies; and, more specifically, it examines the contribution of autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) to the fight against corruption and waste. Whilst the role of audit agencies in curbing corruption is increasingly acknowledged, there exists little comparative work on their institutional effectiveness. Addressing the performance of AAAs in emerging economies, Carlos Santiso pursues a political economy perspective that addresses the context in which audit agencies are embedded, and the governance factors that make them work or fail. Here, the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile are examined, as they illustrate the three – parliamentary, court and independent – models of AAAs in modern states, and their three distinct trajectories of reform, or lack of reform. Beyond Latin America, considerations on the reform of government auditing in other countries, developed and developing are also taken up as, it is argued, while institutional arrangements for government auditing matter, political factors ultimately determine the effectiveness of AAAs. Reforming AAAs, it is concluded, must consider the trajectory of state building, the role of law in public administration and the quality of governance. An important contribution to the comparative study of governance institutions, and especially those tasked with overseeing the budget and curbing corruption, The Political Economy of Government Auditing will be of interest to scholars and students of comparative politics, development studies, administrative law, and public finance; as well as to development practitioners and policy-makers in developing countries, donor governments and international institutions.

Collects 28 reprinted essays written by Musgrave (political economy, emeritus, Harvard U. and economics, U. of California-Santa Cruz) dating as far back as 1972 but primarily written in the late 1990s. The initial essays address the larger picture of the nature and function of fiscal institutions, drawing on fiscal thought represented by German Finanzwissenschaft, Wicksell's Scandinavian model, and the utilitarian base of the British model and its Pigouvian synthesis of equitable and efficient taxation. Next, aspects of tax equity and distributive justice are covered. Considerations of fiscal issues posed by the spatial and vertical organization of the state are also presented, followed by treatment of budget growth and the popular claim that budgets tend to be too large. Essays in the concluding section focus on the ever-present problem of tax reform, particularly the norms of "good" policy and how it can best be reached in practice. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Over its lifetime, 'political economy' has had different meanings. This handbook views political economy as a synthesis of the various strands of social science, treating it as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behaviour and institutions.