In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

The second edition of Public Finance and Public Policy retains the first edition's themes of investigation of responsibilities and limitations of government. The present edition has been rewritten and restructured. Public choice and political economy concepts and political and bureaucratic principal-agent problems are introduced at the beginning for application to later topics. Fairness, envy, hyperbolic discounting, and other concepts of behavioral economics are integrated throughout. The consequences of asymmetric information and the tradeoff between efficiency and ex-post equality are recurring themes. Key themes investigated are markets and governments, institutions and governance, public goods, public finance for public goods, market corrections (externalities and paternalist public policies), voting, social justice, entitlements and equality of opportunity, choice of taxation, and the need for government. The purpose of the book is to provide an accessible introduction to the use of public finance and public policy to improve on market outcomes.

Are the way in which governments tax and spend efficient, and are they equitable? These questions are central to public sector economics and this second edition of Public Finance and Public Choice illustrates the controversies which surround them. This new edition continues to focus on both the social optimality and public choice approaches but also includes alternative perspectives. This successful text has been extensively rewritten, offering further microeconomic insight and additional examples of the application of theory. New sections include: The private provision of public goods Privatization The quasi market The EC budget QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years) Public debt The impact of the public sector on economic growth. This clearly written, rigorous text offers a complete course in the economics of the public sector. It will be an indispensable text for students studying public economics, and also for students taking technical public policy or public administration courses.

Argues that public finance--the study of the government's role in economics--should incorporate principles from behavior economics and other branches of psychology.

Chapters include: "Income distribution and welfare programs", "State and local government expenditures" and "Health economics and private health insurance".

Rejecting conventional approaches, the author offers a view of public finance as one element of a broader scheme of social theorizing. The book assumes a working knowledge of the standard conceptual framework within which the theory of public finance is commonly presented.

Globalization and the information revolution have highlighted the catalytic role of local governments for improving economic and social outcomes at the local level as well as growing the national economy by enhancing international competitiveness. This comprehensive account of local public finance and economics brings together principles and better practices for improving quality and access of local public services provision. The volume covers assignment of responsibilities; jurisdictional design; local service delivery; local regulation; local self-financing options such as income, sales, property and environmental taxation, user charges and fees; infrastructure finance options; and higher order government financing of local governments. The treatment is non-technical and suitable for a wide variety of audiences including scholars, instructors, students, media, policy advisers and practitioners.

There is a long-standing difference amongst public economists between those who think that collective choice must be formally acknowledged, and those who derive their policy recommendations from a social planning framework in which politics plays no role. The purpose of this book is to contribute to a meaningful dialogue between these two groups, in the belief that the future of both political economy and of normative public finance lies somewhere between the two approaches. Some of the specific questions addressed in the book include: does public finance need political economy? Should collective choice play a role in the standard of reference used in normative public finance? What is a 'failure' in a non-market or policy process? And what have we learned about the theory and practice of public finance from three decades of empirical research on public choice? The book also provides a practitioner's view of the political economy of redistribution.

This primer succinctly summarises key theoretical concepts in fiscal choice for both practitioners and scholars. The author contends that fiscal choice is ultimately a choice of both politics and economics. The book first introduces budget institutions and processes at various levels of government, which restrict budget decision makers' discretion. It also explains budget decision makers' efforts to make rational resource allocations. It then shows how and why such efforts are stymied by the decision makers' capacity and institutional settings. The book's unique benefit is its emphasis on all the essential topics, with short, module-type chapters which can be read in any order.

This book was prepared mainly for specialists on the assumption that it would provide the background to an important neglected field of discussion in public finance. Since it was first published in 1958, the theory of public goods and its implications for public policy have become incorporated in the main body of the economic analysis of public finance in the literature. A glance at the footnotes of some of the standard textbooks on public finance indicates that this assembly of articles has not been in vain. Probably the most influential part of this collection has been the papers concerned with the theory of public expenditure, which contains two closely related elements. The first is as a part of welfare economics: under what conditions can Pareto optimality be achieved in an economic system in which some goods supplied are indivisible? The other strand of thought is concerned with the positive theory of the public sector: how can economic analysis be used in order to explain how the size and composition of the budget is actually determined?