This Book Is A Most Timely And Welcome Addition To The Growing Body Of Literature On Cbms In South Asia. It Provides Reasons For Hope As There Are Many Reasons To Be Dispirited About The Absence Of Proper Confidence Building Measures In South Asia.

Contributed articles presented at a conference.

This book examines the emerging maritime security scene in Southeast Asia. It considers highly topical implications for the region of possible strategic competition between China and India - the rising naval powers of Asia - with a possible naval "arms race" emerging between these countries both with naval force development and operations. As part of its "Look East" policy, India has deployed naval units to the Pacific Ocean for port visits and exercises both with East Asian navies and the US Navy, but India is also concerned about the possibility of the Chinese Navy operating in the Indian Ocean. Even as the US-India defence relationship continues to deepen, the US and China are struggling to build a closer links. China’s and India’s strategic interests overlap in this region both in maritime strategic competition or conflict – which might be played out in the Bay of Bengal, the Malacca and Singapore Straits and the South China Sea. The sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through Southeast Asian waters constitute vital "choke points" between the Indian and Pacific Oceans carrying essential energy supplies for China and other Northeast Asian countries. Any strategic competition between China and India has implications for other major maritime players in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, especially Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as the US. This book identifies possible cooperative and confidence-building measures that may contribute to enhanced relations between these two major powers and dampen down the risks associated with their strategic competition.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics. Unlike other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how they are employed by India and Pakistan in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape.

This monograph highlights key factors in South Asia imperiling U.S. interests, and suggests how and where the U.S. military might play an expanded, influential role. It suggests seven steps the military might take to better advance and defend U.S. interests in South Asia, the Middle East, and Asia at large. Washington should intensify involvement in South Asia and become more influential with the governments there. Given the area's potential for violence, it should also shape part of the U.S. military to meet potential crises.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation at cisac.stanford.edu/events/recording/7458/2/765.

Kaye (RAND) has written a thorough, thoughtful analysis of track two diplomacy in the two most difficult areas to practice this craft: South Asia and the Middle East. She includes descriptions and comments on a number of such efforts in both regions, which will be invaluable to both scholar and professional negotiators. Her discussion of the roles for track two talks--socializing elites, making others' ideas one's own, and turning ideas into policies--would be useful in any negotiation course. With respect to work in the two regions, Kaye speaks insightfully of projects under way: their potential, constraints, and the role of the regional environment. Her suggestion that each region may learn from the tribulation of the other is arguably thoughtful. Her suggestions for improvement--expand the types of participants, create institutional support and mentors, and localize the dialogues--deserve further study.

Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.