This monograph highlights key factors in South Asia imperiling U.S. interests, and suggests how and where the U.S. military might play an expanded, influential role. It suggests seven steps the military might take to better advance and defend U.S. interests in South Asia, the Middle East, and Asia at large. Washington should intensify involvement in South Asia and become more influential with the governments there. Given the area's potential for violence, it should also shape part of the U.S. military to meet potential crises.

The research reported here was part of a study called War and Escalation in South Asia, which was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Director of Plans (XOX); Commander Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF/CC); and Commander, Pacific Air Force (PACAF/CC); and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF). This monograph focuses on the highlights that emerged from an examination of the potential for regional conflicts, tensions, and instability in South Asia to endanger U.S. goals and objectives in the region and more broadly, U.S. equities in the Middle East and greater Asia. Because India and Pakistan are both nuclear weapon states with a long history of tensions and sporadic violence between them, much of the monograph focuses on their relations and the potential for future trouble. This study deals with other sources of friction and conflict, although in a more limited scope. The research should be of interest to anyone concerned with regional stability issues. Other recent RAND research on South Asia includes the following: The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, C. Christine Fair (MG-141-AF, 2004). This monograph examines U.S. strategic relations with India and Pakistan both historically and in the current context of the global war on terrorism. It concludes that the intractable dispute over the disposition of Kashmir remains a critical flashpoint between India and Pakistan and a continual security challenge and offers five policy options on how the United States might proceed.

This book focuses on the 2001-2002 crisis that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. Authors focus on: the political history that led to the crisis; the conventional military environment, the nuclear environment and coercive diplomacy and de-escalation during the crisis; and how South Asia can avoid similar crises in the future.

A unique account of military conflict under the shadow of nuclear escalation, with access to the soldiers and politicians involved.

The Mumbai blasts of 1993, the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, Mumbai 26/11—cross-border terrorism has continued unabated. What can India do to motivate Pakistan to do more to prevent such attacks? In the nuclear times that we live in, where a military counter-attack could escalate to destruction beyond imagination, overt warfare is clearly not an option. But since outright peace-making seems similarly infeasible, what combination of coercive pressure and bargaining could lead to peace? The authors provide, for the first time, a comprehensive assessment of the violent and non-violent options available to India for compelling Pakistan to take concrete steps towards curbing terrorism originating in its homeland. They draw on extensive interviews with senior Indian and Pakistani officials, in service and retired, to explore the challenges involved in compellence and to show how non-violent coercion combined with clarity on the economic, social and reputational costs of terrorism can better motivate Pakistan to pacify groups involved in cross-border terrorism. Not War, Not Peace? goes beyond the much discussed theories of nuclear deterrence and counterterrorism strategy to explore a new approach to resolving old conflicts.

"In May 1998, India and Pakistan put to rest years of speculation about whether they possessed nuclear technology and openly tested their weapons. Some believed nuclearization would stabilize South Asia; others prophesized disaster. Authors of two of the most comprehensive books on South Asia's new nuclear era, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, offer competing theories on the transformation of the region and what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators." "With these two major interpretations, Ganguly and Kapur tackle all sides of an urgent issue that has profound regional and global consequences. Sure to spark discussion and debate, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb thoroughly maps the potential impact of nuclear proliferation."--Cubierta.

The balance of power in South Asia is tenuous. Neighbouring states with nuclear arsenal pose a serious threat in times of conflict and the danger of escalation into a nuclear holocaust in South are ever-present. This book locates the change in India’s war doctrine at the turn of the century, following the Kargil War in 1999 between India and Pakistan. It examines how war policy was shaped by the threat posed by India’s neighbours and the need for greater strategic assertion. It also reveals that this change was forced by the military’s need to adapt itself to the nuclear age. Finally, it raises questions of whether the Limited War doctrine has made India more secure. An astute analysis of not only India’s military strategy but also of military doctrine in general, this book will be valuable to scholars and researchers of defence and strategic studies, international relations, peace and conflict studies, South Asia studies as well as government and military institutions.

Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.

The essys in this collection explore and analyze how to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. Contributors work to introduce the theory and methodology of nuclear risk reduction, to provide specific measures that might work best in the region, and to consider the consequences of missile defense options for stability in Asia. Much work is needed to recduce nuclear dangers between India and Pakistan. While the fact that both countries possess nuclear weapons may prevent a full-blown conventional or nuclear war, the presence of these weapons in the region may also encourage the use of violence at lower levels expecting escalation to be contained by a mutual desire to avoid the nuclear threshold. One only needs to look at the Kashmir conflict for confirmation of this paradox, with serious crises coming more frequently with more severity since the nuclear tests of 1998. Sustained efforts along the line suggested by the contributors of this volume are a crucial step toward reducing nuclear risk on the Subcontinent.