Emory Upton (1839–1881) was “the epitome of a professional soldier,” according to Stephen E. Ambrose. Indeed, his entire adult life was devoted to the single-minded pursuit of a military career. Upton was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Fifth United States Artillery on May 6, 1861, the day of his graduation from the United States Military Academy, and by age twenty-five he had risen to the rank of major general. He distinguished himself in battles at Spotsylvania, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and Charlottesville, in Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley campaign, and in Wilson’s celebrated cavalry raid through Alabama and Georgia at the end of the war. After the war, Upton traveled abroad as an observer for the army, an experience that resulted in his first book, The Armies of Asia and Europe. He also served as commandant of cadets at West Point and finally as commander of the Presidio in San Francisco. He was highly respected as a military tactician, and his Infantry Tactics became a widely used resource. Despite his successes, the ambitious Upton felt that his military talents were insufficiently recognized. His last book, The Military Policy of the United States, which advocated a number of sweeping changes in the organization of the American military system, went unpublished at his death by suicide in 1881. The book was finally published in 1904 at the urging of Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of war. First published in 1964, Ambrose’s thorough and well-researched study of Emory Upton’s career has proven to be an important addition to American military history as well as to the history of the Civil War.

Emory Upton (1839–1881) is widely recognized as one of America’s most influential military thinkers. His works—The Armies of Asia and Europe and The Military Policy of the United States—fueled the army’s intellectual ferment in the late nineteenth century and guided Secretary of War Elihu Root’s reforms in the early 1900s. Yet as David J. Fitzpatrick contends, Upton is also widely misunderstood as an antidemocratic militaristic zealot whose ideas were “too Prussian” for America. In this first full biography in nearly half a century, Fitzpatrick, the leading authority on Upton, radically revises our view of this important figure in American military thought. A devout Methodist farm boy from upstate New York, Upton attended the United States Military Academy at West Point and served in the Civil War. His use of a mass infantry attack to break the Confederate lines at Spotsylvania Courthouse in 1864 identified him as a rising figure in the U.S. Army. Upton’s subsequent work on military organizations in Asia and Europe, commissioned by Commanding General William T. Sherman, influenced the army’s turn toward a European, largely German ideal of soldiering as a profession. Yet it was this same text, along with Upton’s Military Policy of the United States, that also propelled the misinterpretations of Upton—first by some contemporaries, and more recently by noted historians Stephen Ambrose and Russell Weigley. By showing Upton’s dedication to the ideal of the citizen-soldier and placing him within the context of contemporary military, political, and intellectual discourse, Fitzpatrick shows how Upton’s ideas clearly grew out of an American military-political tradition. Emory Upton: Misunderstood Reformer clarifies Upton’s influence on the army by offering a new and necessary understanding of the military’s intellectual direction at a critical juncture in American history.

The harsh realities of Civil War life as seen through the eyes of the hard-fighting upstate New York regiment (the 121st New York State Volunteer Infantry Regiment). Combs letters, diaries, and memoirs to let the soldiers recount the war in their own words, following them from enlistment through combat, and back to civilian life.

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Analyzes the Battle of Spotsylvania, in which Grant attempted to prevent Lee from reaching the Confederate capital of Richmond

From the American Revolution to the global war on terror, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved to regulate the chaos of armed conflict by providing an intellectual basis for organizing, training, equipping, and operating the military. Walter E. Kretchik analyzes the service's keystone doctrine over three centuries to reveal that the army's leadership is more forward thinking and adaptive than has been generally believed. The first comprehensive history of Army doctrine, Kretchik's book fully explores the principles that have shaped the Army's approach to warfare. From Regulations For the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States in 1779 to modern-day field manuals, it reflects the fashioning of doctrine to incorporate the lessons of past wars and minimize the uncertainty and dangers of battle. Kretchik traces Army doctrine through four distinct eras: 1779-1904, when guidelines were compiled by single authors or a board of officers in tactical drill manuals; 1905-1944, when the Root Reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the General Staff; 1944-1962, the era of multiservice doctrine; and, beginning in 1962, coalition warfare with its emphasis on interagency cooperation. He reveals that doctrine has played a significant role in the Army's performance throughout its history-although not always to its advantage, as it has often failed to anticipate accurately the nature of the "next war" and still continues to be locked in a debate between advocates of conventional warfare and those who emphasize counterinsurgency approaches. Each chapter presents individuals who helped define and articulate Army doctrine during each period of its history-including George Washington and Baron von Steuben in the eighteenth century, Emory Upton and Arthur Wagner in the nineteenth, and Elihu Root and William DePuy in the twentieth. Each identifies the "first principles" set down in manuals covering such topics as tactics, operations, and strategy; size, organization, and distribution of forces; and the promise and challenges of technological innovation. Each also presents specific cases that analyze how effectively the Army actually applied a particular era's doctrine. Doctrine remains the basis of instruction in the Army school system, ensuring that all officers and enlisted soldiers share a common intellectual framework. This book elucidates that framework for the first time.

The traditional distinction between military and political affairs in American life has become less significant as military officers increasingly participate with civilians in the formulation of national policies. In an examination of the impact of this change upon professional military education, the authors present a forthright analysis of military responsibility today, the growth of education for policy roles, the form and content of that education, and its relation to the over-all duties of the armed forces. They have used hundreds of interviews and questionnaires and studied carefully the history and programs of the military academies, ROTC, Command and Staff Schools, Armed Forces Staff College, National War College, three service War Colleges, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and other institutions. Originally published in 1957. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.