There are numerous studies on the effectiveness of boards that primarily focus on legal formalities, including gender diversity, board size, remuneration, board evaluation and the role of the chairman of the board. While attempting to design a one-size-fits-all framework, scholars approaching board independence from an agency cost perspective have been less concerned with analyzing board structures that contribute to strategic decision-making and corporate performance. We examine the factors and board strategies that are associated with value creation and innovation by analyzing the composition of high-performance and high-growth companies. The paper shows that venture capitalists, with their specific expertise and experience, continue to play an important role as independent board members in the post-IPO period. We specifically investigate the importance of diversity, showing that there are significant differences between the companies in terms of age, gender diversity and business expertise (which is dependent on the stage in the company life-cycle).

'Judging by the academic post-mortems, the 2008 economic collapse was triggered by a financial sector gone wild. But the collapse was also made possible by defects in corporate governance. At last, this volume offers a serious investigation into the role corporate governance played in getting the world into that mess and can play in getting it out. Offering diverse perspectives from some of the world's preeminent corporate scholars, the volume deserves a place on the desk of anyone seeking to understand the collapse and how to avoid the next one.' Kent Greenfield, Boston College Law School, US 'This excellent collection from a highly distinguished group of scholars focuses on three intertwined and overlapping "aftermaths", the pressing concerns of corporate governance reform arising out of the financial crisis since 2008, the state of corporate governance reform since the spectacular failures of Enron, Worldcom and others, and, finally, the prospects of what since the early 1980s has been a global debate over the convergence and divergence of corporate law debates. Drawing on numerous country studies, this book greatly advances our understanding of where corporate governance reform is headed.' Peer Zumbansen, York University, Canada 'This volume addresses a range of important issues that were relevant before the global financial crisis and have, in many ways, become more so since the crisis. The book contains the work of a number of renowned commentators who have given the issues considered in the book much thought over an appreciable period of time. This volume is one that all scholars interested in corporate governance, no matter what their academic discipline is, would be interested in reading. I am eagerly awaiting its publication.' Andrew Keay, University of Leeds, UK 'The governance needle now swings to and fro like a windscreen wiper, no longer fast upon the goal of shareholder primacy and wealth maximization. "The aim of this volume is to introduce the new ideas animating. . . governance in the post-financial crisis world". This book does a superb job of accomplishing that objective. Probing discussions of sustainability, stakeholder models, globalization, ethical behavior, soft law, independent directors, and family capitalism coalesce around the antipode toward which the windscreen wiper increasingly swings, and not which "may be" but will be "the shape of things to come".' Douglas M. Branson, University of Pittsburgh, US The financial crisis of 200809 raises questions about the assumptions that underpin corporate governance. Shareholder value and private ordering may not in fact be the best means of promoting efficiency and corporate responsibility and the mechanisms used to ensure management accountability may not be effective. In this fascinating study, experts from around the world draw on the experience of the financial crisis to explore topical issues ranging from shareholder primacy and the corporate objective to the stakeholder principle, business ethics, and globalization of corporate governance principles. The chapters are provocative, acknowledging that our understanding of fundamental questions of corporate governance is still developing and demonstrating that the corporate governance debate is far from over. This informative book will appeal to researchers in corporate governance and corporate law including graduate students, policymakers, lawyers, accountants, and management consultants. Chambers of commerce and trade associations will also find much to interest them in this book.

ÔThis book takes us back to the financial crisis and asks: should the directors of the financial institutions that caused the crisis be held responsible to their investors? LoughreyÕs and her contributorsÕ analysis of that question and the suggestions to implement their proposals are insightful and timely. This is a must-read book for those of us who are still trying to determine how to avoid the next financial crisis.Õ Ð Randall Thomas, Vanderbilt Law School, US The financial crisis revealed failings at board level at many financial institutions. But despite calls for bank boards to be held to account, there has been a remarkable paucity of litigation against bank directors for breach of their duties. This book assesses whether the law relating to directorsÕ duties and shareholder litigation has contributed to this, taking into account the changes to both that were introduced by the Companies Act 2006. With contributions from leading academics and practitioners, the book examines the directorÕs duty of care and skill, the s.172 duty, reporting obligations under s.417 of the Companies Act 2006, and shareholder litigation including the derivative action and just and equitable winding up. It concludes that neither the common law nor the statutory duties and derivative action under the Companies Act 2006 function effectively to hold directors to account and analyses why this is so. This detailed book will appeal to academics in company law and corporate governance as well as commercial law practitioners particularly those who specialize in company litigation.

The years from 2000 to 2010 were bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

The corporate governance crisis at the start of this third Millennium and the financial crisis only a few years later, have cast doubts on the way boards of directors of companies function. Lawyers and (financial) economists have developed narrow perceptions of boards and their roles that are unable to explain board performance in reality and the factors that determine it. A comprehensive and integrated approach of boards is required to truly understand what drives board performance. Such an integrated approach necessarily includes behavioural aspects. In this paper we focus on a crucial element in the analysis of board performance: what it means for a board to be On Task. On the basis of an Organisational Role Analysis we describe the interaction between executives and non-executives that constitutes board activity. The concept of the Board On Task helps to understand and assess board performance in practice. It also offers a comprehensive conceptual framework for conducting novel research in understanding board performance. We conclude with some policy implications.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

Several government-mandated committees investigating the financial crisis highlighted four key deficiencies in the composition of bank boards before the crisis: (i) group think among bank board members; (ii) absence of prior banking experience of board members; (iii) inability of board members, especially of the chairperson, to devote time to understanding the bank’s business model, and (iv) inadequate emphasis on risk management. Our empirical analysis compares proxies for these deficiencies between 97 U.S. banks and 1,297 nonbanks before and after the crisis covering the years 2007–2015. We also introduce control variables that would have affected these proxies, regardless of the crisis. Based on such an analysis, we do not find (i) a significant difference in the proportion of directors that has turned over from bank boards since 2007 relative to boards of 1,297 firms in other industries; (ii) that banks are staffed by more successful leaders relative to before the crisis; (iii) evidence of greater gender or racial diversity in bank boards or of a greater split between the chairperson and CEO’s position or of an increase in the number of directors appointed outside of the current CEO’s tenure in the post crisis period, relative to nonbanks; (iv) that the number of outside board seats of bank directors, a measure of time commitment, has fallen after the crisis, and (v) that a bank's chairperson is less likely to sit on at least one outside board, relative to before the crisis. Virtually every bank now has a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) but the CRO is unlikely to feature among the top five most compensated employees of the average bank. The number of banks that have an independent risk committee and a committee devoted to reputation management has increased since the crisis. In sum, bank boards seem to have responded modestly to the financial crisis.

The first decade of the new millennium was bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

Directors: Improve Board Performance The Director's Manual: A Framework for Board Governance offers current and aspiring board members essential up-to-date governance guidance that blends rigorous research-based information with the wisdom found only through practical, direct experience. The book's flexible approach to solving governance issues reflects the authors' belief that no two boards and the cultural dynamics that drive them are the same. As such, the advice offered reflects recognizable leadership dynamics and real world, relevant organizational situations. The book's two authors, Peter C. Browning, an experienced CEO and member of numerous boards and William L. Sparks, a respected organizational researcher, combine their individual experiences and talents to create a book that is both innovative and applicable to directors in any industry sector. Specific best practice guidance is designed to help board members and their directors understand the unique strengths and challenges of their own board while at the same time provide targeted information that drives needed improvements in board performance and efficiency. Specifically, this book will help board members: Explore practical advice on key issues, including selection, meeting schedules, and director succession Consider board performance from multiple perspectives, including cultural and group dynamics Discover how to effectively manage classic problems that arise when making decisions as a group Access a comprehensive set of assessment questions to test and reinforce your knowledge The Director's Manual: A Framework for Board Governance offers practical advice to guide you as you lead your organization's board.

In the wake of the recent global financial collapse the timely new edition of this successful text provides students and business professionals with a welcome update of the key issues facing managers, boards of directors, investors, and shareholders. In addition to its authoritative overview of the history, the myth and the reality of corporate governance, this new edition has been updated to include: analysis of the financial crisis; the reasons for the global scale of the recession the failure of international risk management An overview of corporate governance guidelines and codes of practice; new cases. Once again in the new edition of their textbook, Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow show clearly the role of corporate governance in making sure the right questions are asked and the necessary checks and balances in place to protect the long-term, sustainable value of the enterprise. Features 18 case studies of institutions and corporations in crisis, and analyses the reasons for their fall (Cases include Lehman Brothers, General Motors, American Express, Time Warner, IBM and Premier Oil.)