The years from 2000 to 2010 were bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

'Judging by the academic post-mortems, the 2008 economic collapse was triggered by a financial sector gone wild. But the collapse was also made possible by defects in corporate governance. At last, this volume offers a serious investigation into the role corporate governance played in getting the world into that mess and can play in getting it out. Offering diverse perspectives from some of the world's preeminent corporate scholars, the volume deserves a place on the desk of anyone seeking to understand the collapse and how to avoid the next one.' Kent Greenfield, Boston College Law School, US 'This excellent collection from a highly distinguished group of scholars focuses on three intertwined and overlapping "aftermaths", the pressing concerns of corporate governance reform arising out of the financial crisis since 2008, the state of corporate governance reform since the spectacular failures of Enron, Worldcom and others, and, finally, the prospects of what since the early 1980s has been a global debate over the convergence and divergence of corporate law debates. Drawing on numerous country studies, this book greatly advances our understanding of where corporate governance reform is headed.' Peer Zumbansen, York University, Canada 'This volume addresses a range of important issues that were relevant before the global financial crisis and have, in many ways, become more so since the crisis. The book contains the work of a number of renowned commentators who have given the issues considered in the book much thought over an appreciable period of time. This volume is one that all scholars interested in corporate governance, no matter what their academic discipline is, would be interested in reading. I am eagerly awaiting its publication.' Andrew Keay, University of Leeds, UK 'The governance needle now swings to and fro like a windscreen wiper, no longer fast upon the goal of shareholder primacy and wealth maximization. "The aim of this volume is to introduce the new ideas animating. . . governance in the post-financial crisis world". This book does a superb job of accomplishing that objective. Probing discussions of sustainability, stakeholder models, globalization, ethical behavior, soft law, independent directors, and family capitalism coalesce around the antipode toward which the windscreen wiper increasingly swings, and not which "may be" but will be "the shape of things to come".' Douglas M. Branson, University of Pittsburgh, US The financial crisis of 200809 raises questions about the assumptions that underpin corporate governance. Shareholder value and private ordering may not in fact be the best means of promoting efficiency and corporate responsibility and the mechanisms used to ensure management accountability may not be effective. In this fascinating study, experts from around the world draw on the experience of the financial crisis to explore topical issues ranging from shareholder primacy and the corporate objective to the stakeholder principle, business ethics, and globalization of corporate governance principles. The chapters are provocative, acknowledging that our understanding of fundamental questions of corporate governance is still developing and demonstrating that the corporate governance debate is far from over. This informative book will appeal to researchers in corporate governance and corporate law including graduate students, policymakers, lawyers, accountants, and management consultants. Chambers of commerce and trade associations will also find much to interest them in this book.

Over the last two decades there has been a notable increase in the number of corporate governance codes and principles, as well as a range of improvements in structures and mechanisms. Despite this, corporate governance failed to prevent a widespread default of fiduciary duties of corporate boards and managerial responsibilities in the finance industry, which contributed to the 2007–10 global financial crisis. This book brings together leading scholars from North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to provide fresh and critical analytical insights on the systemic failures of corporate governance linked to the global financial crisis. Contributors draw from a range of disciplines to demonstrate the severe limitations of the dominant corporate governance framework and its associated market-oriented approach. They provide suggestions on how the governance problems could be tackled to prevent or mitigate any future financial crisis and explore new directions for post-crisis corporate governance research and reforms.

Corporate governance, the internal policies and leadership that guide the actions of corporations, played a major part in the recent global financial crisis. While much blame has been targeted at compensation arrangements that rewarded extreme risk-taking but did not punish failure, the performance of large, supposedly sophisticated institutional investors in this crisis has gone for the most part unexamined. Shareholding organizations, such as pension funds and mutual funds, hold considerable sway over the financial industry from Wall Street to the City of London. Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis exposes the misdeeds and lapses of these institutional investors leading up to the recent economic meltdown. In this collection of original essays, edited by pioneers in the field of fiduciary capitalism, top legal and financial practitioners and researchers discuss detrimental actions and inaction of institutional investors. Corporate Governance Failures reveals how these organizations exposed themselves and their clientele to extremely complex financial instruments, such as credit default swaps, through investments in hedge and private equity funds as well as more traditional equity investments in large financial institutions. The book's contributors critique fund executives for tolerating the "pursuit of alpha" culture that led managers to pursue risky financial strategies in hopes of outperforming the market. The volume also points out how and why institutional investors failed to effectively monitor such volatile investments, ignoring relatively well-established corporate governance principles and best practices. Along with detailed investigations of institutional investor missteps, Corporate Governance Failures offers nuanced and realistic proposals to mitigate future financial pitfalls. This volume provides fresh perspectives on ways institutional investors can best act as gatekeepers and promote responsible investment.

After the global financial crisis, the topic of corporate governance has been gaining momentum in accounting and finance literature since it may influence firm and bank management in many countries. Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance provides emerging research exploring the implications of a good corporate governance system after global financial crises. Corporate governance mechanisms may include board and audit committee characteristics, ownership structure, and internal and external auditing. This book is devoted to all topics dealing with corporate governance including corporate governance characteristics, board diversity, CSR, big data governance, bitcoin governance, IT governance, and governance disclosure, and is ideally designed for executives, BODs, financial analysts, government officials, researchers, policymakers, academicians, and students.

This publication examines the role of corporate governance arrangements in providing right incentives to contribute the value creation process within the private enterprises and the implications of the differences in ownership structures on corporate governance practices and frameworks.

Even in the wake of the biggest financial crash of the postwar era, the United States continues to rely on Securities and Exchange Commission oversight and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set tougher rules for boards, management, and public accounting firms to protect the interests of shareholders. Such reliance is badly misplaced. In Corporate Governance, Jonathan Macey argues that less government regulation--not more--is what's needed to ensure that managers of public companies keep their promises to investors. Macey tells how heightened government oversight has put a stranglehold on what is the best protection against malfeasance by self-serving management: the market itself. Corporate governance, he shows, is about keeping promises to shareholders; failure to do so results in diminished investor confidence, which leads to capital flight and other dire economic consequences. Macey explains the relationship between corporate governance and the various market and nonmarket institutions and mechanisms used to control public corporations; he discusses how nonmarket corporate governance devices such as boards and whistle-blowers are highly susceptible to being co-opted by management and are generally guided more by self-interest and personal greed than by investor interests. In contrast, market-driven mechanisms such as trading and takeovers represent more reliable solutions to the problem of corporate governance. Inefficient regulations are increasingly hampering these important and truly effective corporate controls. Macey examines a variety of possible means of corporate governance, including shareholder voting, hedge funds, and private equity funds. Corporate Governance reveals why the market is the best guardian of shareholder interests.

The Financial Crisis was a cross-sector crisis that fundamentally affected modern society. Regulation, as a concept, was both blamed for allowing the crisis to happen, but also tasked with developing and implementing solutions in the wake of the crash. In this book, a number of specialists from a range of fields have contributed their insights into the effect of the Financial Crisis upon the regulatory frameworks affecting their fields, how regulators have responded to the Crisis, and then what this may mean for the future of regulation within those industries. These analyses are joined by a picture of past financial crises – which reveals interesting patterns – and then analyses of architectural regulatory models that were fundamentally affected by the Crisis. The book aims to allow sector specialists the freedom to share their insights so that, potentially, a broader picture can be identified. Providing an interesting and thought-provoking account of this societally impactful era, this book will help the reader develop a more informed understanding of the potential future of financial regulation. The book will be of value to researchers, students, advanced level students, regulators, and policymakers.

The presence of sound corporate governance in a financial institution is important in maintaining the confidence of both the market and the public. The power that corporate governance holds over the success of some of the largest financial institutions in the world is not to be downplayed. This book methodically assesses the quality of corporate governance and mechanisms of accountability disclosures to various stakeholders. It is further intended to provide fresh insights into some specific corporate governance recommendations to help improve good governance in financial institutions, particularly in the United Kingdom and the EU but will also be applicable to other major economies. It explores what, when and how corporate governance has changed the financial institution functions and corporate executive behaviour by critically reviewing the pre- and post-financial crisis theoretical and empirical literature. Increasingly driven by the nature of complications, complexities and opacity in the operations of financial systems, corporate governance reporting plays an important role in the financial sector. It will provide insights into corporate governance disclosures over a long-term basis. This book should be a valuable asset to support the research of practitioners, students and all academics due to its stimulating and reflective insights into this fascinating topic.

This book presents an overview of corporate governance and risk management, analyzing their interdependence and particularly their relevance in banking. It discusses current trends in corporate governance, such as stakeholder management, financial performance and the cost of equity, compensation schemes, board structures and shareholder activism. Further, it reviews some of the most important regulatory changes introduced since the latest financial crisis and highlights their impact on the annual reports of the banks under analysis. Lastly, the book assesses and compares major banks in Brazil and Germany with special emphasis on the aspects mentioned above, revealing surprising similarities between the banking systems of these otherwise disparate countries.