Corporate governance, the internal policies and leadership that guide the actions of corporations, played a major part in the recent global financial crisis. While much blame has been targeted at compensation arrangements that rewarded extreme risk-taking but did not punish failure, the performance of large, supposedly sophisticated institutional investors in this crisis has gone for the most part unexamined. Shareholding organizations, such as pension funds and mutual funds, hold considerable sway over the financial industry from Wall Street to the City of London. Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis exposes the misdeeds and lapses of these institutional investors leading up to the recent economic meltdown. In this collection of original essays, edited by pioneers in the field of fiduciary capitalism, top legal and financial practitioners and researchers discuss detrimental actions and inaction of institutional investors. Corporate Governance Failures reveals how these organizations exposed themselves and their clientele to extremely complex financial instruments, such as credit default swaps, through investments in hedge and private equity funds as well as more traditional equity investments in large financial institutions. The book's contributors critique fund executives for tolerating the "pursuit of alpha" culture that led managers to pursue risky financial strategies in hopes of outperforming the market. The volume also points out how and why institutional investors failed to effectively monitor such volatile investments, ignoring relatively well-established corporate governance principles and best practices. Along with detailed investigations of institutional investor missteps, Corporate Governance Failures offers nuanced and realistic proposals to mitigate future financial pitfalls. This volume provides fresh perspectives on ways institutional investors can best act as gatekeepers and promote responsible investment.

Corporate governance, the internal policies and leadership that guide the actions of corporations, played a major part in the recent global financial crisis. While much blame has been targeted at compensation arrangements that rewarded extreme risk-taking but did not punish failure, the performance of large, supposedly sophisticated institutional investors in this crisis has gone for the most part unexamined. Shareholding organizations, such as pension funds and mutual funds, hold considerable sway over the financial industry from Wall Street to the City of London. Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis exposes the misdeeds and lapses of these institutional investors leading up to the recent economic meltdown. In this collection of original essays, edited by pioneers in the field of fiduciary capitalism, top legal and financial practitioners and researchers discuss detrimental actions and inaction of institutional investors. Corporate Governance Failures reveals how these organizations exposed themselves and their clientele to extremely complex financial instruments, such as credit default swaps, through investments in hedge and private equity funds as well as more traditional equity investments in large financial institutions. The book's contributors critique fund executives for tolerating the "pursuit of alpha" culture that led managers to pursue risky financial strategies in hopes of outperforming the market. The volume also points out how and why institutional investors failed to effectively monitor such volatile investments, ignoring relatively well-established corporate governance principles and best practices. Along with detailed investigations of institutional investor missteps, Corporate Governance Failures offers nuanced and realistic proposals to mitigate future financial pitfalls. This volume provides fresh perspectives on ways institutional investors can best act as gatekeepers and promote responsible investment.

The key questions that need to be asked in every corporate governance analysis are 'who is running the firm' and 'how is accountability ensured'. When governance breaks down it is because of too much power concentration or not enough accountability or both. Practitioner or analyst, concerned with the listed firm or the non-listed, the reader of this book will gain a precise understanding of the causes and take away a practical toolbox for preventing future incidents of corporate governance failure.

Corporate Governance Matters gives corporate board members, officers, directors, and other stakeholders the full spectrum of knowledge they need to implement and sustain superior governance. Authored by two leading experts, this comprehensive reference thoroughly addresses every component of governance. The authors carefully synthesize current academic and professional research, summarizing what is known, what is unknown, and where the evidence remains inconclusive. Along the way, they illuminate many key topics overlooked in previous books on the subject. Coverage includes: International corporate governance. Compensation, equity ownership, incentives, and the labor market for CEOs. Optimal board structure, tradeoffs, and consequences. Governance, organizational strategy, business models, and risk management. Succession planning. Financial reporting and external audit. The market for corporate control. Roles of institutional and activist shareholders. Governance ratings. The authors offer models and frameworks demonstrating how the components of governance fit together, with concrete examples illustrating key points. Throughout, their balanced approach is focused strictly on two goals: to “get the story straight,” and to provide useful tools for making better, more informed decisions.

This book is for anyone who wants to know what truly lies behind the scandals and disasters of global business which marred the first few years of the 21st century. It examines why companies fail, finding the reasons few, yet all too common. It also explores what the prudent investor, board member or manager should be alert to but often is not.

Ward reveals ten specific failings that are built into our boardroom model and provides real-world fixes to get boards back on track. Ward mixes tart, insightful analogies (what do boards have in common with volunteer fire departments, the U.S. electoral college . . . and Howard Hughes?) with proven nuts-and-bolts advice for putting any board back on track. Order your copy today!

Why U.S. corporate governance regulation has lost its way, and what must be done to improve it Modern history persuasively demonstrates the inexorable link that binds comprehensive regulation to the global economy. This important book, rather than simply recount a litany of corporate governance failures, persuasively explains why, despite policymakers' best intentions, regulation has failed in the modern era. An objective study intended for a diverse readership, Corporate Governance Regulation unveils the underlying, root causes of regulatory failure. The result: A compelling and original analysis, broadly suited for a global audience of all backgrounds. Written by published, subject-area experts, the authors carefully delineate how U.S. corporate governance regulation, beginning with Sarbanes Oxley, lacks an adequate rational basis, as may be attributed to a non-existent policy dialogue The witnessed result: A conspicuous lack of regulatory efficacy, enormous costs, coupled with paltry benefits The focus is upon reigniting a stalled, non-productive policy dialogue, by eschewing stale, overly-polemicized arguments, as needed to develop a common ground Drawing from an eclectic, analytic framework, governance experts Nicholas Vakkur and Zulma Herrera offer both the professional and global citizen alike a multi-dimensional understanding of issues critical to global economic health. Nuanced and persuasively argued, Corporate Governance Regulation represents a formidable catalyst in the elusive, ongoing quest for global economic stability.

The governance of the modern corporation is broadly understood as the mechanisms, relations, and processes for balancing the interests of stakeholders. It spells out the rules and procedures for decision-making, accountability and transparency, and distributional rights. Corporate governance thus provides the framework in which corporate objectives are set, the means of attaining them, the kind of performance monitoring required, and by whom. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and large-scale corporate failures, the issue of corporate governance has repeatedly received the attention of policy-makers and the wider public. Extending the study of corporate governance beyond that of listed corporations sheds new light on the overall performance of corporations in market economies. These include small to medium-sized corporations, nonprofit organisations and philanthropic foundations, public corporations and public-private partnerships, social enterprises and cooperatives, international organisations, and corporations in cyberspace. A decade after the massive failures in the governance of financial corporations, and with continued governance failures in other parts of the economy since then, this volume takes stock and asks: what has been the performance of corporate governance regimes, and have regulatory changes and corporate governance codes made a difference? What are the strengths and weaknesses of current corporate governance systems and codes? How do corporate forms differ in their governance performance, and what have been the experiences across countries? And, finally, what implications for understanding governance behaviour and for policy-makers and regulators come to mind?

John Coffee traces the evolution of the four main gatekeeping professions: auditors, lawyers, securities analysts and credit-rating agencies, in the wake of corporate governance disasters, such as Enron and WorldCom.