Book contains over 50 speeches presented or submitted at conferences sponsored by AHI from 1988 to 1999 and submitted articles. It includes important statements from U.S. officials Members of Congress, academics and others. The volume details the responsibility of the U.S. for (1) the illegal coup ordered by the Greek dictator Brigadier General Dimitris Ioannides on July 15, 1974, and (2) Turkey's illegal invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974 and the second phase of Turkey's aggression on August 14-16, 1974.

"Major topics covered in this volume include: 1) U.S. efforts to maintain the cohesion of the NATO alliance by avoiding outbreaks of violence on Cyprus that would provoke clashes between Greece and Turkey; 2) attempts of U.S. policymakers to devise a compromise solution for Cyprus that would meet the requirements of its major regional partners; 3) a growing U.S. involvement in Greece's internal politics as a result of a major constitutional crisis between political forces led by George and Andreas Papandreou on one side and a conservative coalition under the leadership of King Constantine II on the other; and 4) the U.S reaction to the Greek military coup of April 1967 and imposition of a dictatorship in Greece. Coverage of bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations focuses on the Cyprus issue"--Overview.

Anyone approaching the archaeology of Cyprus for the first time cannot fail to be intimidated by the wealth of information available, not only relating to the island of Cyprus itself, but also to other polities with which it interacted from an early period.

In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.