"Major topics covered in this volume include: 1) U.S. efforts to maintain the cohesion of the NATO alliance by avoiding outbreaks of violence on Cyprus that would provoke clashes between Greece and Turkey; 2) attempts of U.S. policymakers to devise a compromise solution for Cyprus that would meet the requirements of its major regional partners; 3) a growing U.S. involvement in Greece's internal politics as a result of a major constitutional crisis between political forces led by George and Andreas Papandreou on one side and a conservative coalition under the leadership of King Constantine II on the other; and 4) the U.S reaction to the Greek military coup of April 1967 and imposition of a dictatorship in Greece. Coverage of bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations focuses on the Cyprus issue"--Overview.

The Cyprus conflict was for long an inactive volcano, but it erupted violently in 1955, 1963 and 1974. Now more of a smouldering fire, its persistence is a serious obstacle on Turkey's route to EU accession. Uniquely utilizing Turkish sources, this book looks at how the conflict has developed since 1978.

The Republic of Cyprus was placed under British administration in 1878 until independence in 1960 (The Zurich and London Agreements). With these agreements, Cyprus became a constitutional democracy and is now a member of both the United Nations and the European Union. The Republic of Cyprus is recognized internationally as it's government is considered to be the legitimate government of the whole island. In the years after the recognition of Cyprus as a democracy, inter-communal violence broke out and UN forces were deployed in Cyprus. An attempted invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1964 was put to an end by the US President Lyndon Johnson. In 1967, Rauf Denktas and Glafkos Klerides tried to negotiate a settlement, which led to a temporary relief of the tension between both parties. However, a coup d'etat of 1974 led to extreme violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, resulting in the invasion and occupation by Turkey in July 1974. From that moment on, Turkey controls the northern part of the island. This part of the island is not under effective control of the republic and is recognized by Turkey since 1983 as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRC), but is not recognized by the international community. UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) does not recognize the TNRC as lawful and called upon Turkey to retreat from northern Cyprus. The resolution furthermore called upon others not to support and recognize the TNRC. The last major effort to settle the dispute dates from 2004, when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan tried to negotiate reunification of both sides of the Island. Direct reason to start these negotiations was Cyprus' upcoming membership of the EU. This UN Comprehensive Settlement of The Cyprus Problem, known as the 'Annan (Peace) Plan, ' organized referenda in both the north and the south, but gained support of the Turks only, as it was rejected by the Greeks. At present, there is a ceasefire between both parties, even though the UN still deploys troups. This book offers a selection of historical documents, including the ones mentioned above, and provides an overview of the international dispute that has been going on for decades. The book will be of interest to those who work on the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey, as well as for those who wish to know more about the involvement of the international community in the Cyprus conflict

This is the first study to present a comprehensive analysis of Greek foreign and internal policy during the Cold War, covering the key period from the country’s accession to NATO in 1952 until the imposition of the colonels’ dictatorship in 1967. Clearly divided into three parts: 1952-55, 1955-63 and 1963-67, this book deals with Greek foreign policy analysis; threat perception; the NATO connection (including Greek-US relations, the rise of anti-Americanism in 1955-58 and in 1964-67, the economic dimension of security and the issue of US military aid); Greek policy towards the Soviet bloc; and the regional dimension, mainly Greek policy towards Turkey and Yugoslavia, and (for the 1964-67 years) the Cyprus crisis which greatly complicated Greek security obligations. This book will be of great interest to students of Greek politics, Balkans history, the Cold War and strategic studies.

From the John Holmes Library collection.

This work casts light on the actions of the United Kingdom during the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64. In particular, the volume concentrates on a very specific period of events, charting the course of British actions from the start of fighting to the moment when UN Security Council Resolution 186 passed responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking over to the United Nations.As is shown, Britain actually undertook several different roles during this period. On the one hand, it was a crisis manager and peacekeeper. Its timely decision, along with Greece and Turkey, to establish a peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, certainly helped to limit the extent of fighting on the island, and thus reduced the chance of direct Turkish intervention. However, as this work shows, it was not an easy role to play and required a significant manpower commitment from the United Kingdom. On the other hand, Britain also tried to act as peacemaker. At first this was done informally on the island, but was later supplemented by a formal peace process in London. Unfortunately, the process failed in its objective and in doing so created a rift between Britain and the Greek Cypriots, which ended all hopes that Britain might be able to broker a compromise between the parties. It also affected Britain's efforts to find an alternative peacekeeping force to replace the Joint Truce Force - an effort that involved looking at the Commonwealth and NATO as possible peacekeepers. In the end, the United Nations was called upon to keep the peace, a role that is forty years old.However, the book also shows that the 1963-64 Crisis is profoundly important for two other reasons. First of all, it was during these months that the Greek Cypriots were accorded international legitimacy as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. As will be shown, this came about partly as a requirement of international peacemaking and peacekeeping. However, it also becomes clear that the actual confirmation of this recognition involved a certain amount of what the Turkish Cypriots see as betrayal - betrayal by Britain, by the United States, and, most surprisingly, by Turkey. Secondly, this period saw the acceptance by the international community of the legality of the Treaty of Guarantee. As a result, Turkey retained an internationally accepted constitutional right to intervene in the island's affairs. This right was put into effect in 1974 after a coup ordered by the then military government in Athens overthrew Archbishop Makarios, the first president of the independent state. As a result the island was divided and the more modern understanding of the 'Cyprus Problem' was created.Drawing on official British government documents and interviews with many of the protagonists of the period, this work is the first in-depth study of Britain's leading role during this critically important juncture in the modern history of Cyprus.

Focusing on the period from September 1964, when Senor Galo Lasso Plaza assumed the UN mediatory role, to the coup d'etat and the Turkish invasion ten years later, Cyprus Before 1974 seeks to unpick the internal conflicts which led to the failure of the peace process in Cyprus. Marilena Varnava studies three phases: Plaza's mediation of 1964-1965; the negotiating impasse on the island during the period 1965-1967; and finally the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. Varnava argues persuasively that each of these successive phases, particularly the latter two, were inextricably tied to political and social developments within the two main communities on the island itself. In particular, Cyprus before 1974 focuses on the events of 1968 - when the Greek-Cypriot political leadership, and the President of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III, failed to grasp the nature of the changes within the island's post-independence arena. Recurrent attempts within both communities during the talks of that year to create faits accomplis favourable to their own bargaining positions served to heighten the barriers to a stable and peaceful outcome. This study enlarges our understanding of the underlying issues which the Turkish invasion of 1974 were to throw into stark relief and is essential reading for all those who study the Cyprus problem and conflict resolution.

In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.