Realistic appraisal of Soviet defence efforts is crucial to strategic planning and foreign policy analysis. Since Soviet defence expenditure figures are incomplete, however, our knowledge in this area is extremely limited. This study reviews the state of current knowledge in this field, and presents a critical review of the nature and limitation of traditional approaches. The contributors analyse newly available sources of economic, scientific, and technical military information, and conclude with an in-depth consideration of the relevance and impact of historical and cultural influences on current Russian-Soviet military strategy. There emerges a fascinating account, which both extends our knowledge and understanding, and sheds light on what is perhaps the single most important 'unknown' in the study of international affairs and defence needs.

This “riveting account of one of history’s greatest blunders” chronicles Russia’s tragic mishandling of Nazi Germany’s invasion during WWII (William L. O’Neill, The New Leader). On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany’s Operation Barbarossa was launched against Russia. Within days, the invading army had taken hundreds of thousands of Soviet captives while the Luftwaffe bombed a number of Russian cities, including Minsk. Though accurate intelligence about the plan had been available to Stalin before the attack, he chose not to heed the warning. In What Stalin Knew, historian and former chief of the CIA’s Soviet division David E. Murphy illuminates many of the enigmas surrounding the catastrophic invasion, offering keen insights into Stalin’s thinking and the reasons for his fatal error of judgment. A story of successful misinformation campaigns, and a leader more paranoid about threats from within his regime than from an aggressive neighbor, this authoritative history sheds essential new light on the most consequential event in the Eastern Front of World War II. “If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22—comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here—its report might have read a little like [this book]. . . . Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider’s grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used—or not.” —Niall Ferguson, The New York Times Book Review “A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment . . . Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented.” —Henry A. Kissinger

Space-age weapons systems and the end of the Cold War

Here is the first complete account of the incredible intelligence war fought for the mastery of Enigma, the code used by mose branches of the German armed forces in World War II. Beginning ten full years before the eruption of hostilities in September 1939 and increasing in intensity throughout the war, the Engima war was won by the Allies through the success of Ultra, the Allied codebreaking operation at Bletchley Park, England. Ultra remained until recently one of the best-kept secrets of World War II. --

Volume 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, Strategic Deception, brings the series to an end. Strategic deception depends for its success on the availability of good security and good intelligence. The first three volumes of the series described the intelligence channels that gave the Allies their incomparable insight into enemy capabilities and intentions.

This book highlights the impact and relevance of "strategic culture". Each section contains essays contrasting United States and Soviet perceptions on specific topics. Each section closes with a synthesizing commentary, to help readers to get a better sense of differences and similarities.

This work presents eleven studies in the field of Russian/Soviet economic and social history, which have been specially commissioned as a tribute to Professor R.W. Davies. Each chapter highlights a particular area of controversy, and illuminates the process of policy formation in this critical period of Soviet development. Together they provide an overview of the period 1917-1953.

This report examines the defence industries in Central and Eastern Europe as they attempt to restructure in the wake of changes brought about by the end of the cold war and downward trends in both military expenditure and arms exports. Issues addressed include the developing military doctrines in Central and Eastern Europe; the trend in military expenditure; the nature of defence industry restructuring; the international dimensions of industrial restructuring; and the role of arms exports.