Volume 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, Strategic Deception, brings the series to an end. Strategic deception depends for its success on the availability of good security and good intelligence. The first three volumes of the series described the intelligence channels that gave the Allies their incomparable insight into enemy capabilities and intentions.

June 1940. The Italians declared war on the British. Completely unprepared for war, the British had only 35,000 troops to defend Egypt. Opposing them, the Italian army in Libya numbered at least 215,000; in East Africa, the Italians could muster another 200,000 men against a meager 19,000 British and commonwealth troops positioned in the Sudan and East Africa. Out-numbered and unlikely to receive sizable reinforcements of men or desperately needed supplies, it is surprising that the British survived. But they did. How? They got creative. Under the leadership of General Archibald P. Wavell, the commander-in-chief of the Middle East, the British set out to greatly exaggerate the size of their forces, supply levels, and state of battle readiness. When their deceitful charades proved successful, Wavell turned trickery into a profession and created an entirely new agency dedicated to carrying out deception. “A” Force: The Origins of British Military Deception during the Second World War looks at how and why the British first employed deception in WWII. More specifically, it traces the development of the "A" Force organization - the first British organization to practice both tactical and strategic deception in the field. Formed in Cairo in 1941, "A" Force was headed by an unconventional colonel named Dudley Wrangel Clarke. Because there was no precedent for Clarke's "A" Force, it truly functioned on a trial-and-error basis. The learning curve was steep, but Clarke was up for the challenge. By the Battle of El Alamein, British deception had reach maturity. Moreover, it was there that the deceptionists established the deception blueprint later used by the London planners used to plan and execute Operation Bodyguard, the campaign to conceal Allied intentions regarding the well-known D-day landing at Normandy. In contrast to earlier deception histories that have tended to focus on Britain’s later deception coups (Bodyguard), thus giving the impression that London masterminded Britain’s deception efforts, this work clearly shows that British deception was forged much earlier in the deserts of Africa under the leadership of Dudley Clarke, not London. Moreover, it was born not out of opportunity, but out of sheer desperation. A” Force explores an area of deception history that has often been neglected. While older studies and documentaries focused on the D-day deception campaign and Britain’s infamous double-agents, this work explores the origins of Britain’s deception activities to reveal how the British became such masterful deceivers.

The first three volumes of the series dealt with the influence of intelligence on strategy and operations. Volume 4 analyzes the contribution made by intelligence to the work of the authorities responsible for countering the threats of subversion, sabotage and intelligence gathering by the enemy in the United Kingdom and British territories overseas, and neutral countries. It describes the evolution of the security intelligence agencies between the wars and the security situation in September 1939. This volume reviews the arguments about security policy regarding enemy aliens, Fascists and Communists in the winter of 1939-1940 and during the Fifth Column panic in the summer of 1940. It describes how the security system, still at that time inadequately organized and poorly informed, was developed into an efficient machine and how, with invaluable help from signals intelligence and other sources and by the skillful use of double agents, the operation of the enemy intelligence services were effectively countered. In conclusion, it notes the consistent subservience of the Communist Party to the interests of the USSR and the likely threat to British security.

In February 1942, intelligence officer Victor Jones erected 150 tents behind British lines in North Africa. "Hiding tanks in Bedouin tents was an old British trick," writes Nicholas Rankin. German general Erwin Rommel not only knew of the ploy, but had copied it himself. Jones knew that Rommel knew. In fact, he counted on it--for these tents were empty. With the deception that he was carrying out a deception, Jones made a weak point look like a trap. In A Genius for Deception, Nicholas Rankin offers a lively and comprehensive history of how Britain bluffed, tricked, and spied its way to victory in two world wars. As Rankin shows, a coherent program of strategic deception emerged in World War I, resting on the pillars of camouflage, propaganda, secret intelligence, and special forces. All forms of deception found an avid sponsor in Winston Churchill, who carried his enthusiasm for deceiving the enemy into World War II. Rankin vividly recounts such little-known episodes as the invention of camouflage by two French artist-soldiers, the creation of dummy airfields for the Germans to bomb during the Blitz, and the fabrication of an army that would supposedly invade Greece. Strategic deception would be key to a number of WWII battles, culminating in the massive misdirection that proved critical to the success of the D-Day invasion in 1944. Deeply researched and written with an eye for telling detail, A Genius for Deception shows how the British used craft and cunning to help win the most devastating wars in human history.

Secret Codes, ciphers, strategic misdirection, and more: Deception was one of the most powerful weapons utilized by the Allies in World War II. Here are all the amazing tricks and leaked misfortunes—many revealed for the first time—that helped lure the Axis powers into false, even dangerous, positions. The collection of incredible codes, surreptitious spies, and false battle plans is made all the more enjoyable by Thaddeus Holt’s masterful writing, as well as the accompanying photos. His novel-like storytelling includes many illuminating profiles of the war’s central figures and the roles they played in specific deceptive operations.

This volume records the transition from planning against any post-war resurgence of German and Japanese militarism to preparations against a possible threat from the Soviet Union. It charts Foreign Office resistance to consideration of even the possibility of Soviet hostility after the war. Changing Direction is likely to remain the standard work of reference on this period, both for scholars and for the wider public.

Told from confidential documents - some of which remain closed for the foreseeable future - here is the precisely detailed story of the British government's campaign of strategic deception of the German High Command. A volume in the British government's Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, the book has been written by a master historian renowned for his narrative and analytical skills. Sir Michael Howard explains how the British were able to deceive the Germans about the strategic intentions of the Allies and make them greatly overestimate Allied resources. Here is the most authoritative account available of such classic deception operations as Operation Mincemeat, which preceded the invasion of Sicily; the nonexistent U.S. Army group that pinned down an entire German Army in the Pas de Calais until Montgomery's forces had achieved a secure foothold in Normandy; and the amazing trick played on the German intelligence authorities by the great double agent Garbo.

In the war against Hitler, the Allies had to use every ounce of cunning and trickery that they possessed. Combining military deceptions with the double-agent network run by the intelligence services, they were able to send the enemy misleading information about Allied troops, plans and operations. From moving imaginary armies around the desert to putting a corpse with false papers floating in the Mediterranean, and from faking successful bombing campaigns to the convoluted deceptions which kept part of the German forces away from Normandy prior to D-Day, Terry Crowdy explores the deception war that combined the double-agent network with ingenious plans to confuse and hoodwink the Führer.

According to the author all aircrews, tacticians and those who direct them have to realise the limitations of air power during conflicts. For years opinion has differed as to whether the aircraft has altered war strategies or merely the tactics of war. This volume explores the limits of airpower.