The Good Neighbor Policy was unique: a great power obligated itself not to use force in its dealings with twenty smaller powers and not to interfere in their domestic politics. It was a policy that lasted, with some perturbations, for twenty years: instituted by President Roosevelt in 1933 and carried out effectively from 1933 to 1943 by word and action, maintained during the Second World War largely as a result of British concern for continuance of Argentine beef exports, codified in the Charter of the Organization of American States in 1948, and reasserted by Truman and Acheson in 1950–51, it was covertly repudiated in Guatemala in 1954 by Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers, and not so secretly by Kennedy in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. Openly shattered in the Dominican Republic by Johnson in 1965, it has since been completely abandoned in favor of the usual relationships between large and small powers. Working with documents from the Public Records Office in London and the National Archives, with recently released materials from the U.S. Department of State, and with secondary sources, Bryce Wood describes the temptations laid before the leaders of one powerful state by its occasionally recalcitrant neighbors, and the ways of reacting that were found. Having told half the story in his The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, Wood now concludes it in the present volume. One of the chief casualties is shown to be the Organization of American States, which since 1954 has found itself badly crippled in its work to promote harmony and continued cooperation among the member states.

Since the early nineteenth century, the United States has repeatedly intervened in the affairs of Latin American nations to pursue its own interests and to “protect” those countries from other imperial powers or from internal “threats.” The resentment and opposition generated by the encroachment of U.S. power has been evident in the recurrent attempts of Latin American nations to pull away from U.S. dominance and in the frequent appearance of popular discontent and unrest directed against imperialist U.S. policies. In Empire and Dissent, senior Latin Americanists explore the interplay between various dimensions of imperial power and the resulting dissent and resistance. Several essays provide historical perspective on contemporary U.S.–hemispheric relations. These include an analysis of the nature and dynamics of imperial domination, an assessment of financial relations between the United States and Latin America since the end of World War II, an account of Native American resistance to colonialism, and a consideration of the British government’s decision to abolish slavery in its colonies. Other essays focus on present-day conflicts in the Americas, highlighting various modes of domination and dissent, resistance and accommodation. Examining southern Mexico’s Zapatista movement, one contributor discusses dissent in the era of globalization. Other contributors investigate the surprisingly conventional economic policies of Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; Argentina’s recovery from its massive 2001 debt default; the role of coca markets in the election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales; and the possibilities for extensive social change in Venezuela. A readers’ guide offers a timeline of key events from 1823 through 2007, along with a list of important individuals, institutions, and places. Contributors: Daniel A. Cieza, Gregory Evans Dowd, Steve Ellner, Neil Harvey, Alan Knight, Carlos Marichal, John Richard Oldfield, Silvia Rivera, Fred Rosen, Jeffrey W. Rubin

A study of how and why US-Latin American relations changed in the 1930s: “Brilliant . . . [A] charming and perceptive work.” ―Foreign Affairs During the 1930s, the United States began to look more favorably on its southern neighbors. Latin America offered expanded markets to an economy crippled by the Great Depression, while threats of war abroad nurtured in many Americans isolationist tendencies and a desire for improved hemispheric relations. One of these Americans was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the primary author of America’s Good Neighbor Policy. In this thought-provoking book, Bolton Prize winner Fredrick Pike takes a wide-ranging look at FDR’s motives for pursuing the Good Neighbor Policy, how he implemented it, and how its themes played out up to the mid-1990s. Pike’s investigation goes far beyond standard studies of foreign and economic policy. He explores how FDR’s personality and Eleanor Roosevelt’s social activism made them uniquely simpático to Latin Americans. He also demonstrates how Latin culture flowed north to influence U.S. literature, film, and opera. This book is essential reading for everyone interested in hemispheric relations.

"Forgotten Foundations is classic interdisciplinary history, drawing on literatures from political science and economics as well as primary sources.... Helleiner has made an important contribution that will permanently re-frame how scholars conceptualize Bretton Woods."― Journal of Interdisciplinary History Eric Helleiner’s new book provides a powerful corrective to conventional accounts of the negotiations at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. These negotiations resulted in the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—the key international financial institutions of the postwar global economic order. Critics of Bretton Woods have argued that its architects devoted little attention to international development issues or the concerns of poorer countries. On the basis of extensive historical research and access to new archival sources, Helleiner challenges these assumptions, providing a major reinterpretation that will interest all those concerned with the politics and history of the global economy, North-South relations, and international development. The Bretton Woods architects—who included many officials and analysts from poorer regions of the world—discussed innovative proposals that anticipated more contemporary debates about how to reconcile the existing liberal global economic order with the development aspirations of emerging powers such as India, China, and Brazil. Alongside the much-studied Anglo-American relationship was an overlooked but pioneering North-South dialogue. Helleiner’s unconventional history brings to light not only these forgotten foundations of the Bretton Woods system but also their subsequent neglect after World War II.

This book provides readers with an insight to a previously unexplored aspect of Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the Second World War.

In this completely revised and updated edition of America and the Americas, Lester D. Langley covers the long period from the colonial era into the twenty-first century, providing an interpretive introduction to the history of U.S. relations with Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada. Langley draws on the other books in the series to provide a more richly detailed and informed account of the role and place of the United States in the hemisphere. In the process, he explains how the United States, in appropriating the values and symbolism identified with "America," has attained a special place in the minds and estimation of other hemispheric peoples. Discussing the formal structures and diplomatic postures underlying U.S. policy making, Langley examines the political, economic, and cultural currents that often have frustrated inter-American progress and accord. Most important, the greater attention given to U.S. relations with Canada in this edition provides a broader and deeper understanding of the often controversial role of the nation in the hemisphere and, particularly, in North America. Commencing with the French-British struggle for supremacy in North America in the French and Indian War, Langley frames the story of the American experience in the Western Hemisphere through four distinct eras. In the first era, from the 1760s to the 1860s, the fundamental character of U.S. policy in the hemisphere and American values about other nations and peoples of the Americas took form. In the second era, from the 1870s to the 1930s, the United States fashioned a continental and then a Caribbean empire. From the mid-1930s to the early 1960s, the paramount issues of the inter-American experience related to the global crisis. In the final part of the book, Langley details the efforts of the United States to carry out its political and economic agenda in the hemisphere from the early 1960s to the onset of the twenty-first century, only to be frustrated by governments determined to follow an independent course. Over more than 250 years of encounter, however, the peoples of the Americas have created human bonds and cultural exchanges that stand in sharp contrast to the formal and often conflictive hemisphere crafted by governments.

Franklin Roosevelt's good neighbour policy, coming in the wake of decades of US intervention in Central America, and following a lengthy US military occupation of Nicaragua, marked a significant shift in US policy towards Latin America. Its basic tenets were non-intervention and non-interference. The period was exceptionally significant for Nicaragua, as it witnessed the creation and consolidation of the Somoza government - one of Latin America's most enduring authoritarian regimes, which endured from 1936 to the sandinista revolution in 1979. Addressing the political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, and intelligence components of US policy, Andrew Crawley analyses the background to the US military withdrawal from Nicaragua in the early 1930s. He assesses the motivations for Washington's policy of disengagement from international affairs, and the creation of the Nicaraguan National Guard, as well as debating US accountability for what the Guard became under Somoza. Crawley effectively challenges the conventional theory that Somoza's regime was a creature of Washington. It was US non-intervention, not interference, he argues, that enhanced the prospects of tyranny.

For Mexican workers on the American home front during World War II, unprecedented new employment opportunities contrasted sharply with continuing discrimination, inequality, and hardship.

In October 1962, when the Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War ensued, bringing the world close to the brink of nuclear war. Over two tense weeks, U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev managed to negotiate a peaceful resolution to what was nearly a global catastrophe. Drawing on the best recent scholarship and previously unexamined documents from the archives of the former Soviet Union, this introductory volume examines the motivations and calculations of the major participants in the conflict, sets the crisis in the context of the broader history of the global Cold War, and traces the effects of the crisis on subsequent international and regional geopolitical relations. Selections from twenty primary sources provide firsthand accounts of the frantic deliberations and realpolitik diplomacy between the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Fidel Castro's Cuban regime; thirteen illustrations are also included. CONTENTS: Introduction: The Making of a global Crisis The Origins of the Cold WarA New Front in the Cold WarThe Cold War in Latin AmericaThe Cuban Revolution and the Soviet UnionU.S. and Regional Responses to the Cuban RevolutionOperation Zapata: The Bay of PigsOperation Anadyr: Soviet Missiles in CubaCrisis Dénouement: The Missiles of NovemberEvaluating the Leadership on All Sides of the CrisisNuclear Fallout: Consequences of the Missile CrisisThe Future of Cuban-Soviet RelationsLatin American Responses to the Missile CrisisConclusion: Lessons of the Cuban Missile CrisisHistoriography of the Cuban Missile Crisis DocumentsMemorandum for McGeorge Bundy from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., April 10, 1961State Department White Paper, April 1961From the Cable on the Conversation between Gromyko and Kennedy, October 18, 1962Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the CC CPSU, October 20, 1962President John F. Kennedy’s speech to the Nation, October 22, 1962Resolution Adopted by the Council of the Organization of American States Acting Provisionally as the Organ of Consultation, October 23, 1962Message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós, October 23, 1962Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, October 24, 1962Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, October 24, 1962Memorandum for President Kennedy from Douglas Dillon, October 26, 1962Telegram from Fidel Castro to N.S. Khrushchev, October 26, 1962Letter from Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, October 28, 1962Cable from USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 28, 1962Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the U.N. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry (1), October 30, 1962Premier Khrushchev’s Letter to Prime Minister Castro, October 30, 1962Prime Minister Castro’s Letter to Premier Khrushchev, October 31, 1962Meeting of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba with Mikoyan in the Presidential Palace, November 4, 1962Brazilian Foreign Ministry Memorandum, “Question of Cuba,” November 20, 1968Letter from Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, January 31, 1963“I Know Something About the Caribbean Crisis,” Notes from a Conversation with Fidel Castro, November 5, 1987Select Bibliography

Stephen Rabe's timely book examines President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Latin American policy and assesses the president's actions in light of recent "Eisenhower revisionism." During his first term, Eisenhower paid little attention to Latin America but his objective there was clear: to prevent communism from gaining a foothold. The Eisenhower administration was prepared to cooperate with authoritarian military regimes, but not to fund developmental aid or vigorously promote political democracy. Two events in the second administration convinced Eisenhower that he had underestimated the extent of popular unrest--and thus the potential for Communist inroads: the stoning of Vice-President Richard M. Nixon in Caracas and the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution. He then began to support trade agreements, soft loans, and more strident measures that led to CIA involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion and plots to assassinate Fidel Castro and Rafael Trujillo. In portraying Eisenhower as a virulent anti-Communist and cold warrior, Rabe challenges the Eisenhower revisionists who view the president as a model of diplomatic restraint.