In October 1962, when the Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War ensued, bringing the world close to the brink of nuclear war. Over two tense weeks, U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev managed to negotiate a peaceful resolution to what was nearly a global catastrophe. Drawing on the best recent scholarship and previously unexamined documents from the archives of the former Soviet Union, this introductory volume examines the motivations and calculations of the major participants in the conflict, sets the crisis in the context of the broader history of the global Cold War, and traces the effects of the crisis on subsequent international and regional geopolitical relations. Selections from twenty primary sources provide firsthand accounts of the frantic deliberations and realpolitik diplomacy between the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Fidel Castro's Cuban regime; thirteen illustrations are also included. CONTENTS: Introduction: The Making of a global Crisis The Origins of the Cold WarA New Front in the Cold WarThe Cold War in Latin AmericaThe Cuban Revolution and the Soviet UnionU.S. and Regional Responses to the Cuban RevolutionOperation Zapata: The Bay of PigsOperation Anadyr: Soviet Missiles in CubaCrisis Dénouement: The Missiles of NovemberEvaluating the Leadership on All Sides of the CrisisNuclear Fallout: Consequences of the Missile CrisisThe Future of Cuban-Soviet RelationsLatin American Responses to the Missile CrisisConclusion: Lessons of the Cuban Missile CrisisHistoriography of the Cuban Missile Crisis DocumentsMemorandum for McGeorge Bundy from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., April 10, 1961State Department White Paper, April 1961From the Cable on the Conversation between Gromyko and Kennedy, October 18, 1962Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the CC CPSU, October 20, 1962President John F. Kennedy’s speech to the Nation, October 22, 1962Resolution Adopted by the Council of the Organization of American States Acting Provisionally as the Organ of Consultation, October 23, 1962Message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós, October 23, 1962Letter from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, October 24, 1962Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, October 24, 1962Memorandum for President Kennedy from Douglas Dillon, October 26, 1962Telegram from Fidel Castro to N.S. Khrushchev, October 26, 1962Letter from Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, October 28, 1962Cable from USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 28, 1962Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the U.N. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry (1), October 30, 1962Premier Khrushchev’s Letter to Prime Minister Castro, October 30, 1962Prime Minister Castro’s Letter to Premier Khrushchev, October 31, 1962Meeting of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba with Mikoyan in the Presidential Palace, November 4, 1962Brazilian Foreign Ministry Memorandum, “Question of Cuba,” November 20, 1968Letter from Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, January 31, 1963“I Know Something About the Caribbean Crisis,” Notes from a Conversation with Fidel Castro, November 5, 1987Select Bibliography

300 pages of documents include: telegrams, memoranda of conversations, instructions to diplomats, etc.

An examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis analyzes the roles, objectives, and actions of John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during the October 1962 showdown between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

During thirteen tense days in October 1962, and only ninety miles from the coast of Florida, the Soviet Union constructed nuclear missile silos and shipped nuclear warheads to Communist Cuba bringing both superpowers to the brink of a nuclear war. This volume examines the missile crisis from the perspective of U.S. citizens, includes articles that highlight the public response, and provides primary documents such as speeches and communiquis to which the public had access through news media during the crisis period.

A NEW YORK TIMES NOTABLE BOOK • “[A] riveting retrospective examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis” (The Washington Times), from one of the giants of American journalism, Pulitzer Prize winner Max Frankel Finalist for the Los Angeles Times Book Prize in History In High Noon in the Cold War, Max Frankel captures the Cuban Missile Crisis in a new light, from inside the hearts and minds of the famous men who provoked and, in the nick of time, resolved the confrontation. Using his experiences covering Moscow and Havana and the Missile Crisis in Washington, the former executive editor of The New York Times has gathered evidence from recent records and new scholarship to correct widely held misconceptions about the game of “nuclear chicken” played by John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962, when Soviet missiles were secretly planted in Cuba and aimed at the United States. High Noon in the Cold War gives balanced and nuanced portraits of Kennedy and Khrushchev, depicting both as more measured and deliberative in their actions than in many previous accounts. Here, too, are forgotten heroes like John McCone, the conservative Republican CIA head who played a key role in White House strategic debates. In detailing the disastrous miscalculations of the two superpowers and how Kennedy and Khrushchev beat back hotheads in their own councils, this fascinating book chronicles the whole story of the Cold War’s most frightening encounter.

The United States and the Soviet Union were two of the nations that defeated Nazi Germany in World War II. Yet their systems of government were completely different. These differences soon developed into the Cold War. Both sides became bitter enemies. But there was no actual fighting. That situation nearly changed in 1961. The Soviets secretly installed missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. These missiles could reach many cities in the United States. When President John F. Kennedy learned about these weapons, he confronted Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. The world teetered on the brink of a nuclear war. This is the story of that chilling event.

The event known as the Cuban missile crisis, the greatest of all Cold War crises, is a milestone in the history of the Cold War. According to the author, the main questions of the situation have eluded satisfactory answers because analysts have neglected the true Cuban role in the event, particularly the Russo-Cuban relations prior to the crisis.

"The definitive history.…With his masterly book, Mr. Plokhy has sounded a warning bell." — The Economist A harrowing account of the Cuban missile crisis and how the US and USSR came to the brink of nuclear apocalypse. Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today’s world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis. Serhii Plokhy’s Nuclear Folly offers an international perspective on the crisis, tracing the tortuous decision-making that produced and then resolved it, which involved John Kennedy and his advisers, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and their commanders on the ground. In breathtaking detail, Plokhy vividly recounts the young JFK being played by the canny Khrushchev; the hotheaded Castro willing to defy the USSR and threatening to align himself with China; the Soviet troops on the ground clearing jungle foliage in the tropical heat, and desperately trying to conceal nuclear installations on Cuba, which were nonetheless easily spotted by U-2 spy planes; and the hair-raising near misses at sea that nearly caused a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine to fire its weapons. More often than not, the Americans and Soviets misread each other, operated under false information, and came perilously close to nuclear catastrophe. Despite these errors, nuclear war was ultimately avoided for one central reason: fear, and the realization that any escalation on either the Soviets’ or the Americans’ part would lead to mutual destruction. Drawing on a range of Soviet archival sources, including previously classified KGB documents, as well as White House tapes, Plokhy masterfully illustrates the drama and anxiety of those tense days, and provides a way for us to grapple with the problems posed in our present day.

United States president John F. Kennedy advocated an invasion of Cuba. Led by anti-Castro supporters, the Bay of Pigs invasion was unsuccessful. Castro understood the invasion as an attempt to overthrow his government. After this unsuccessful event, the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union came close to a nuclear confrontation. This book takes a closer look at this dramatic conflict and the tensions that emerged from the threat of nuclear power.

Prelude to Leadership is the private diary of John F. Kennedy when he was a 28-year-old reporter in Europe. It offers a short yet intimate look into the mind of the man who was to become the 35th President of the United States. As World War II was ending and the Cold War was just beginning, a young naval hero decommissioned before war's end because of his crippling injuries, traveled through a devastated Europe. During the trip, John F. Kennedy kept a diary, never before published. As the diary makes clear, that European trip was a turning point in the future President's life. It was on this trip that Kennedy first confronted the "long twilight struggle" for the preservation of Western freedom that would define his Presidency. In these few months an agenda for a Presidency began to be forged, and the closing pages of the diary make clear that it was at this moment in time that Kennedy began laying plans for his first run for Congress , the first step in his journey to the White House.