This edited volume is the first detailed exploration of the last phase of the Cold War, taking a critical look at the crisis of détente in Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The transition from détente to a new phase of harsh confrontation and severe crises is an interesting, indeed crucial, phase of the evolution of the international system. This book makes use of previously unreleased archival materials, moving beyond existing interpretations of this period by challenging the traditional bipolar paradigm that focuses mostly on the role of the superpowers in the transformation of the international system. The essays here emphasize the combination and the interplay of a large number of variables- political, ideological, economic and military - and explore the topic from a truly international perspective. Issues covered include human rights, the Euromissiles, the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe), the Revolution in Military Affairs, economic growth and its consequences.

The monumental events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be understood, Jan Van Oudenaren argues, in the context of a process of East-West détente begun in 1953 in the aftermath of Stalin's death. Van Oudenaren's comprehensive and timely study examines the development of Soviet-Western détente from the death of Stalin to the unification of Germany. In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of "two plus four" talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power. Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.

Containing essays by leading Cold War scholars, such as Wilfried Loth, Geir Lundestad and Seppo Hentilä, this volume offers a broad-ranging examination of the history of détente in the Cold War. The ten years from 1965 to 1975 marked a deep transformation of the bipolar international system of the Cold War. The Vietnam War and the Prague Spring showed the limits of the two superpowers, who were constrained to embark on a wide-ranging détente policy, which culminated with the SALT agreements of 1972. At the same time this very détente opened new venues for the European countries: French policy towards the USSR and the German Ostpolitik being the most evident cases in point. For the first time since the 1950s, Western Europe began to participate in the shaping of the Cold War. The same could not be said of Eastern Europe, but ferments began to establish themselves there which would ultimately lead to the astounding changes of 1989-90: the Prague Spring, the uprisings in Gdansk in 1970 and generally the rise of the dissident movement. That last process being directly linked to the far-reaching event which marked the end of that momentous decade: the Helsinki conference. The Making of Détente will appeal to students of the Cold War, international history and European contemporary history.

The monumental events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be understood, Jan Van Oudenaren argues, in the context of a process of East-West détente begun in 1953 in the aftermath of Stalin's death. Van Oudenaren's comprehensive and timely study examines the development of Soviet-Western détente from the death of Stalin to the unification of Germany. In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of "two plus four" talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power. Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.

The Mediterranean sea has been a key geopolitical territory in the global international relations of the twentieth century; of crucial importance to the US, the Middle East and in the history of the EU. As Cold War documents become declassified and these archives become accessible to western historians, this volume reassesses the secret war waged over three decades for control of the Mediterranean Sea. An 'American lake' in the 1950s, a battlefield for influence in the Cold War of the 1960s, and an increasingly important political arena for the oil-rich Gulf States in the 1970s, the Mediterranean offers a focal point around which the major themes and narratives of Cold War history were constructed. "Detente in Cold War Europe" draws together detailed analyses of the major moments of post-WWII history through the prism of the Mediterranean - including the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the Soviet role in the Yom Kippur war, the Cyprus emergency of 1974, US-Soviet detente and US-Israeli relations under President Nixon. This book is a vital work for historians of the twentieth century and for those seeking to understand the importance of the Mediterranean in the political history of the Cold War.

Vividly written and based on up-to-date scholarship, this title provides an interpretive overview of the international history of the Cold War.

This book presents pieces of evidence, which ? taken together ? lead to an argument that goes against the grain of the established Cold War narrative. The argument is that a ?long d‚tente? existed between East and West from the 1950s to the 1980s, that it existed and lasted for good (economic, national security, societal) reasons, and that it had a profound impact on the outcome of the conflict between East and West and the quintessentially peaceful framework in which this ?endgame? was played. New, Euro-centered narratives are offered, including both West and East European perspectives. These contributions point to critical inconsistencies and inherent problems in the traditional U.S. dominated narrative of the ?Victory in the Cold War.? The argument of a ?long d‚tente? does not need to replace the ruling American narrative. Rather, it can and needs to be augmented with European experiences and perceptions. After all, it was Europe ? its peoples, societies, and states ? that stood both at the ideological and military frontline of the conflict between East and West, and it was here that the struggle between liberalism and communism was eventually decided.

Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2009 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict Studies, Security, grade: 2,0, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen (Institut f r Politikwissenschaft), course: The East-West Conflict, language: English, abstract: The ideological division between East and West, communism and capitalism, culminated in a nuclear arms race, which had the potential to destroy the whole world. After going through various crises, which will be presented to you in this paper, like for example the extremely dangerous Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the involved states realized that without a rapprochement on governmental level a competition for global predominance would potentially destroy the whole world. One first step on the way to d tente was the installation of the Moscow-Washington hotline. The "red telephone" or the "hei e Draht" how we call it in Germany, was approved by an agreement on June 20, 1963 in Geneva, Switzerland. Other reasons for a political approximation were to be found in the domestic affairs of the U.S.A and the Soviet Union: "From the American perspective, the debacle in Vietnam had, by the late 1960 s, proven costly in terms of life lost and the expenditures incurred, while it had simultaneously undermined the United States prestige around the globe. (...) Weaknesses in the Soviet economy - the need for access to Western markets and technology - provided an additional rationale for Moscow s interest in Det nte".

From Kennedy to Reagan.