From Kennedy to Reagan.

Vividly written and based on up-to-date scholarship, this title provides an interpretive overview of the international history of the Cold War.

In a brilliantly conceived book, Jeremi Suri puts the tumultuous 1960s into a truly international perspective in the first study to examine the connections between great power diplomacy and global social protest. Profoundly disturbed by increasing social and political discontent, Cold War powers united on the international front, in the policy of detente. Though reflecting traditional balance of power considerations, detente thus also developed from a common urge for stability among leaders who by the late 1960s were worried about increasingly threatening domestic social activism. In the early part of the decade, Cold War pressures simultaneously inspired activists and constrained leaders; within a few years activism turned revolutionary on a global scale. Suri examines the decade through leaders and protesters on three continents, including Mao Zedong, Charles de Gaulle, Martin Luther King Jr., Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. He describes connections between policy and protest from the Berkeley riots to the Prague Spring, from the Paris strikes to massive unrest in Wuhan, China. Designed to protect the existing political order and repress movements for change, detente gradually isolated politics from the public. The growth of distrust and disillusion in nearly every society left a lasting legacy of global unrest, fragmentation, and unprecedented public skepticism toward authority.

In this revised edition of his acclaimed 1985 volume, incorporating newly declassified secret Russian as well as American materials, Raymond Garthoff reexamines the historical development of American-Soviet relations from 1969 through 1980. The book takes into account both the broader context of world politics and internal political considerations and developments, and examines these developments as experienced by both sides. Despite a long history as rivals and adversaries, the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached a ditente in relations in 1972. From 1975 to 1979, however, this ditente gradually eroded until it collapsed in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Garthoff recounts how differences in ideology, perceptions, aims, and interests were key determinants of both U.S. and Soviet policies. Involvements in Europe, with China, and in the third world further entangled their relations. And each saw the other not only as harboring hostile intentions but also as building military and other capabilities to support such aims. Ditente--as well as confrontation--remained an alternative only within the constraints of a continuing cold war. Praise for the first edition: "A gold mine of information." The New York Times Book Review "A monumental contribution offering insightful, rarely considered comparisons of Soviet and American perspectives." Library Journal Praise for the revised edition: "This unprecedented, detailed volume adds invaluable new information to the public knowledge and the historical record." Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin

This book examines the US foreign policy of differentiation towards the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe as it was implemented by various administrations towards Ceausescu’s Romania from 1969 to 1980. Drawing from multi-archival research from both US and Romanian sources, this is the first comprehensive analysis of differentiation and shows that Washington’s Eastern European policy in the 1970s was more nuanced than the common East vs. West narrative suggests. By examining systemic Cold War factors such as the rise of détente between the two superpowers and the role of agency, the study deals with the dynamics that shaped the evolution of American-Romanian relations after Bucharest’s opening towards the West, and the subsequent embrace of this initiative by Washington as an instrument to undermine the unity of the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, it revises interpretations about Carter’s celebrated human rights policy based on the Romanian case, pointing towards a remarkable continuity between the three administrations under examination (Nixon, Ford and Carter). By doing so, this study contributes to the field by highlighting a largely neglected aspect of US foreign policy and uncovers the subtleties of Washington’s relations with one of the most vigorous actors of the Eastern European bloc. This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War Studies, US foreign policy, Eastern European politics and International Relations in general.

The monumental events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be understood, Jan Van Oudenaren argues, in the context of a process of East-West détente begun in 1953 in the aftermath of Stalin's death. Van Oudenaren's comprehensive and timely study examines the development of Soviet-Western détente from the death of Stalin to the unification of Germany. In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of "two plus four" talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power. Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.

Containing essays by leading Cold War scholars, such as Wilfried Loth, Geir Lundestad and Seppo Hentilä, this volume offers a broad-ranging examination of the history of détente in the Cold War. The ten years from 1965 to 1975 marked a deep transformation of the bipolar international system of the Cold War. The Vietnam War and the Prague Spring showed the limits of the two superpowers, who were constrained to embark on a wide-ranging détente policy, which culminated with the SALT agreements of 1972. At the same time this very détente opened new venues for the European countries: French policy towards the USSR and the German Ostpolitik being the most evident cases in point. For the first time since the 1950s, Western Europe began to participate in the shaping of the Cold War. The same could not be said of Eastern Europe, but ferments began to establish themselves there which would ultimately lead to the astounding changes of 1989-90: the Prague Spring, the uprisings in Gdansk in 1970 and generally the rise of the dissident movement. That last process being directly linked to the far-reaching event which marked the end of that momentous decade: the Helsinki conference. The Making of Détente will appeal to students of the Cold War, international history and European contemporary history.

"Pax Transatlantica asserts that the recurrent transatlantic crises that have dominated headlines since the end of the Cold War, while not irrelevant, pale when set against the realities of shared interests and goals. It emphasizes three key factors. First, despite inflammatory and dismissive rhetoric, NATO continues to provide a solid security structure for its member states; an institutional framework of a Pax Transatlantica that has stood the test of time by expanding its remit and scope. Second, in a world concerned with the potential effects of trade wars (especially between the US and China) and the rise of economic nationalism, the transatlantic economic relationship stands apart as the richest, most closely integrated transcontinental economic space on the globe. Third, the book will trace the parallel evolution of domestic politics on both sides of the Atlantic with specific focus on the rise of populism. Rather than a sign of transatlantic 'drift,' the rise of populism - much like the emergence of so-called 'Third Way politics on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1990s - is evidence of a closely integrated transatlantic political space. In the end, while it is obvious that the history of the transatlantic relationship - even during the Cold War - was littered with crises, the relationship has endured. Conflicts have illustrated, time and again, the strength of the transatlantic community. The 'West', the book concludes, not only continues to exist. It is likely to thrive in the future"

This volume examines the origins and early years of the Cold War in the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period. A team of leading scholars shows how the conflict evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic and sociopolitical environments of the two world wars and interwar period.

In 1941 the magazine publishing titan Henry R. Luce urged the nation’s leaders to create an American Century. But in the post-World-War-II era proponents of the American Century faced a daunting task. Even so, Luce had articulated an animating idea that, as William O. Walker III skillfully shows in The Rise and Decline of the American Century, would guide United States foreign policy through the years of hot and cold war. The American Century was, Walker argues, the counter-balance to defensive war during World War II and the containment of communism during the Cold War. American policymakers pursued an aggressive agenda to extend U.S. influence around the globe through control of economic markets, reliance on nation-building, and, where necessary, provision of arms to allied forces. This positive program for the expansion of American power, Walker deftly demonstrates, came in for widespread criticism by the late 1950s. A changing world, epitomized by the nonaligned movement, challenged U.S. leadership and denigrated the market democracy at the heart of the ideal of the American Century. Walker analyzes the international crises and monetary troubles that further curtailed the reach of the American Century in the early 1960s and brought it to a halt by the end of that decade. By 1968, it seemed that all the United States had to offer to allies and non-hostile nations was convenient military might, nuclear deterrence, and the uncertainty of détente. Once the dust had fallen on Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency and Richard M. Nixon had taken office, what remained was, The Rise and Decline of the American Century shows, an adulterated, strategically-based version of Luce’s American Century.