A scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing democratic decision making

In 1962, economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock published The Calculus of Consent, in which they developed the principles of public choice theory. In the fifty years since its publication, the book has defined the field and set the standard for research and analysis. To celebrate a half-century of scholarship in public choice, Dwight Lee has assembled distinguished academics from around the world to reflect on the influence of this monumental publication, and, more broadly, the legacy of its legendary authors. Their essays cover a broad spectrum of topics and approaches, from the impact of public choice theory on foreign policy analysis to personal remembrances of learning from and collaborating with Buchanan and Tullock. The result is a unique collection of insights that celebrate public choice and its visionary proponents, while considering its future directions. ​

Buchanan and Tullock’s seminal work, The Calculus of Consent, linked economic methodology to substantive questions in political science. Among the major contributions of their book is a connection between constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection between empirical decision making and normative principles. The current book formalizes and extends their foundational ideas as it attempts to show how economic and philosophical arguments about the "best" voting rules can be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions are made, and what factors allow for corrupt decision making. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provides a benchmark to help create better constitutions and informs empirical research about what institutions are most likely to succeed. The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to justify choices about decision-making. It then carefully defines several concepts employed by Buchanan and Tullock and shows why the relationships between these concepts may not be as closely linked as Buchanan and Tullock first thought. This provides a backdrop for analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal k-majority rule is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the optimal voting rule for large electorates and open alternatives are determined. These phases differ by context and sources of legitimacy. Computational models and analytic techniques are introduced in each of these chapters. Finally, the book concludes with statements about the significance of the research for the creation of constitutions more broadly.

Discusses voting, tax policy, government regulation, redistribution of wealth, and international negotiation in a new approach to government

This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory. The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's book-length works such as 'The Calculus of Consent' or 'The Reason of Rules' (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's 'The Collected Works of James M Buchanan') are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioural models to government. But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice. In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings: general approach; public choice and its critics; voters; voting models; rent seeking; regulation; public choice and public expenditures. As Robert D Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, "Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works', these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects."

An index to the series "The Collected works of James M. Buchanan."

"The Limits of Liberty is concerned mainly with two topics. One is an attempt to construct a new contractarian theory of the state, and the other deals with its legitimate limits. The latter is a matter of great practical importance and is of no small significance from the standpoint of political philosophy."—Scott Gordon, Journal of Political Economy James Buchanan offers a strikingly innovative approach to a pervasive problem of social philosophy. The problem is one of the classic paradoxes concerning man's freedom in society: in order to protect individual freedom, the state must restrict each person's right to act. Employing the techniques of modern economic analysis, Professor Buchanan reveals the conceptual basis of an individual's social rights by examining the evolution and development of these rights out of presocial conditions.

In his foreword, Robert D Tollison identifies the main objective of Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan's THE REASON OF RULES: "...a book-length attempt to focus the energies of economists and other social analysts on the nature and function of the rules under which ordinary political life and market life function." In persuasive style, Brennan and Buchanan argue that too often economists become mired in explaining the obvious or constructing elaborate mathematical models to shed light on trivial phenomena. Their solution: economics as a discipline would be better focused on deriving normative procedures for establishing rules so that ordinary economic life can proceed unaffected as much as possible by social issues. In THE REASON OF RULES, Brennan and Buchanan sketch out a methodological and analytical framework for the establishment of rules. They point out that the consideration of rules has its roots in classical economics and has been hinted at in the work of some contemporary economists. But the enterprise of applying the analytical rigor of modern economics to the establishment of effective rules is the little-traveled road that bears the most promise. In fact, the basic idea of the importance of rules is a thread that runs through virtually the whole of Buchanan's distinguished career, and it is one of his signal contributions to the contemporary discipline of economics. THE REASON OF RULES is an elaboration of the potential for rules and the normative process by which they can best be devised.

Written with graduate and advanced undergraduate students in mind, this textbook introduces computational logic from the foundations of first-order logic to state-of-the-art decision procedures for arithmetic, data structures, and combination theories. The textbook also presents a logical approach to engineering correct software. Verification exercises are given to develop the reader's facility in specifying and verifying software using logic. The treatment of verification concludes with an introduction to the static analysis of software, an important component of modern verification systems. The final chapter outlines courses of further study.

During the past half-century Gordon Tullock continually advanced the frontiers of political economy, most particularly with respect to the workings of representative democracies and of autocracies. This ten-volume series, edited and arranged thematically, brings together Tullock's most significant contributions to economics, political science, public choice, sociology, law and economics, and bioeconomics. Scholars will undoubtedly find the extensive breadth and depth of Tullock's writings enriching. The general reader, as well as the student of politics, and all who love economic liberty, will find Tullock's prose lucid, readable, and sprinkled with wit. His forensic argument is penetrating, compelling, and clear, and his brilliant mind is surprisingly accessible to us all. The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock provides an entr e to the mind of a legend in the field of political economics. Professor Rowley gives a deliberately sparse contextual introduction to each volume, opting to allow the very able and eloquent Tullock to speak for himself. Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) was Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and University Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became Public Choice and remained its editor until 1990. Charles K. Rowley (1939-2013) was Duncan Black Professor of Economics, a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University, and the General Director of the Locke Institute.