In 1962, economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock published The Calculus of Consent, in which they developed the principles of public choice theory. In the fifty years since its publication, the book has defined the field and set the standard for research and analysis. To celebrate a half-century of scholarship in public choice, Dwight Lee has assembled distinguished academics from around the world to reflect on the influence of this monumental publication, and, more broadly, the legacy of its legendary authors. Their essays cover a broad spectrum of topics and approaches, from the impact of public choice theory on foreign policy analysis to personal remembrances of learning from and collaborating with Buchanan and Tullock. The result is a unique collection of insights that celebrate public choice and its visionary proponents, while considering its future directions. ​

When market forces fail us, what are we to do? Who will step in to protect the public interest? The government, right? Wrong. The romantic view of bureaucrats coming to the rescue confuses the true relationship between economics and politics. Politicians often cite "market failure" as justification for meddling with the economy, but a group of leading scholars show the shortcomings of this view. In Government Failure, these scholars explain the school of study known as "public choice," which uses the tools of economics to understand and evaluate government activity. Gordon Tullock, one of the founders of public choice, explains how government "cures" often cause more harm than good. Tullock provides an engaging overview of public choice and discusses how interest groups seek favors from government at enormous costs to society. Displaying the steely realism that has marked public choice, Tullock shows the political world as it is, rather than as it should be. Gordon Brady scrutinizes American public policy, looking closely at international trade, efforts at regulating technology, and environmental policy. At every turn Brady points out the ways in which interest groups have manipulated the government to advance their own agendas. Arthur Seldon, a seminal scholar in public choice, provides a comparative perspective from Great Britain. He examines how government interventions in the British economy have led to inefficiency and warns about the political centralization promised by the European Community. Government Failure heralds a new approach to the study of politics and public policy. This book enlightens readers with the basic concepts of public choice in an unusually accessible way to show the folly of excessive faith in the state.

This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory. The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan’s book-length works such as The Calculus of Consent or The Reason of Rules (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund’s The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan) are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioral models to government. But Buchanan’s shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What’s more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice. In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings: 1.General Approach 2.Public Choice and Its Critics 3.Voters 4.Voting Models 5.Rent Seeking 6.Regulation 7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, "Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works,’ these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects.” James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century. The entire series will include: Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods Volume 6: Cost and Choice Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit Volume 9: The Power to Tax Volume 10: The Reason of Rules Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice Volume 14: Debt and Taxes Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events Volume 20: Indexes

This book argues that while the US president makes foreign policy decisions based largely on political pressures, it is concentrated interests that shape the incentive structures in which he and other top officials operate. The author identifies three groups most likely to be influential: government contractors, the national security bureaucracy, and foreign governments. This book shows that the public choice perspective is superior to a theory of grand strategy in explaining the most important aspects of American foreign policy, including the war on terror, policy toward China, and the distribution of US forces abroad. Arguing that American leaders are selected to respond to public opinion, not necessarily according to their ability to formulate and execute long-terms plans, the author shows how mass attitudes are easily malleable in the domain of foreign affairs due to ignorance with regard to the topic, the secrecy that surrounds national security issues, the inherent complexity of the issues involved, and most importantly, clear cases of concentrated interests. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of American Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis and Global Governance.

'. . . this compendium offers a solid introduction into an economic field that is gaining in influence.' – Detmar Doering, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'The first essay in this volume, "Public Choice at the Millennium," by the two editors, sets a high standard for all the essays to follow. . . The essay takes us through the early history of public choice research in a particularly lucid fashion. . . This first article is destined to be a must-read on many reading lists on both graduate and undergraduate courses in political economy. . . . the volume is likely to become a much-used reference tool. . . . for those researchers interested in a comprehensive discussion of the far-reaching literature in this area, and want some provocation in the mix, this is clearly the right choice.' – Sharon M. Oster, Public Choice 'Many of the chapters of this handbook will be an indispensable addition to any course reading list in public choice, or public economics. They serve as an excellent complement, integrating diverse lines of thoughts, to the core scholarly writings in the field. The essays are well-written and succeed, admirably, in accomplishing what a handbook must, making difficult and disparate material quite comprehensible to someone who wishes to become acquainted with the area.' – Harold M. Hochman, Lafayette College, US 'This is an extremely valuable insiders' account of what public choice is about. Presented in thirty well-reasoned and documented chapters, the book is a treasure trove for every political economist.' – Jürgen G. Backhaus, Maastricht University, The Netherlands This authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work provides a thorough account of the public choice approach to economics and politics. The Companion breaks new ground by joining together the most important issues in the field in a single comprehensive volume. It contains state-of-the-art discussions of both old and contemporary problems, including new work by the founding fathers as well as contributions by a new generation of younger scholars. The book reviews the literature of public choice, highlighting the common ground between all rational choice approaches to politics. It demonstrates the important impact of public choice on economics, political science, philosophy and sociology. It will be an indispensable source of reference for many years to the ideas, analytical methods and empirical research in the field. The Companion will serve as the standard reference work for all those engaged in the field of public choice and will be essential reading for politicians and policymakers, scholars in political science, public and social choice, as well as graduate students in economics, political science and public administration.

Applies the theories of economics to political decision making, and discusses elections, lobbying, bureaucracy, and political coalitions

Public choice has been one of the most important developments in the social sciences in the last twenty years. However there are many people who are frustrated by the uncritical importing of ideas from economics into political science. Public Choice uses both empirical evidence and theoretical analysis to argue that the economic theory of politics is limited in scope and fertility. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of political life, political scientists must learn from both economists and sociologists.

Providing students of economics, politics, and policy with a concise explanation of public choice, markets, property, and political and economic processes, this record identifies what kinds of actions are beyond the ability of government. Combining public choice with studies of the value of property rights, markets, and institutions, this account produces a much different picture of modern political economy than the one accepted by mainstream political scientists and welfare economists. It demonstrates that when citizens request that their governments do more than it is possible, net benefits are reduced, costs are increased, and wealth and freedom are diminished. Solutions are also suggested with the goal to improve the lot of those who should be the ultimate sovereigns in a democracy: the citizens.

Economics: Private and Public Choice is an aid for students and general readers to develop a sound economic reasoning. The book discusses several ways to economic thinking including six guideposts as follows: (i) scarce goods have costs; (ii) Decision-makers economize in their choices; (iii) Incentives are important; (iv) Decision-makers are dependent on information scarcity; (v) Economic actions can have secondary effects; and (vi) Economic thinking is scientific. The book explains the Keynesian view of money, employment, and inflation, as well as the monetarist view on the proper macropolicy, business cycle, and inflation. The book also discusses consumer decision making, the elasticity of demand, and how income influences demand. The text analyzes costs and producer decisions, the firm under pure competition, and how a competitive model functions. The book explains monopoly, and also considers the high barriers that prevent entry such as legal barriers, economies of scale, and control over important resources. The author also presents comparative economic systems such as capitalism and socialism. This book can prove useful for students and professors in economics, as well as general readers whose works are related to public service and planning in the area of economic development.

"This two-volume collection provides a comprehensive overview of the past seventy years of public choice research, written by experts in the fields surveyed. The individual chapters are more than simple surveys, but provide readers with both a sense of the progress made and puzzles that remain. Most are written with upper level undergraduate and graduate students in economics and political science in mind, but many are completely accessible to non-expert readers who are interested in Public Choice research. The two-volume set will be of broad interest to social scientists, policy analysts, and historians"--