Examines techniques and strategies of tacit bargaining in attempts to slow or halt arms races and maintain arms agreements

Demonstrating the ways in which work in a broad range of fields can be pulled together in the analysis of conflict, this book provides the reader with a general introduction to the principles of conflict analysis and lays a methodological foundation for the further development of the interdisciplinary field of peace science. The text begins with an extensive survey of arms race models, from the classic Richardson model to models exploring the effects of factors such as the domestic and international economic environment, public opinion and party politics, and weapons technology and information development. The processes of individual and group problem-solving, in both crisis and non-crisis conditions, are examined, drawing on work in economics, operations research, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Building on this diverse body of work, the author moves on to develop a framework for conflict management with which to approach a variety of conflict situations and applies this procedure to the United States-Soviet arms control conflict. Walter Isard is cited by Mark Blaug as one of the Great Economists Since Keynes (CUP, 1989 paper edition).

The volume contains papers presented to the Eleventh Course of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) held in August 1986 at San Miniato, Italy. Attention was focused on the international aspects of arms control and disarmament.

The countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have begun to negotiate for nuclear and conventional arms reductions. The world is no longer bipolar, as the arsenals of China, France and Britain become more significant. This book looks at strategic realities and current global and European problems.

This book, first published in 1982, provides a well-informed historical overview, insightful analysis and searching critique of arms control agreements and negotiations from the Hague Declaration of 1899 to the SALT Treaties and Conventions of the 1970s and 1980s. Arms control agreements of international importance and historical merit are assessed, for the extent to which each affected the arms race or reduced the likelihood of war.

Originally published in 1982, this is the most comprehensive handbook on arms control ever published. It contains an analysis of the bilateral and multilateral agreements reached since World War II. An assessment is made of the extent to which each agreement has affected the arms race, reduced the likelihood of war or otherwise contributed to the overall goal of disarmament. Ongoing arms control negotiations are also analyzed. The complex problem of verification of compliance with arms control obligations is critically examined, and the shortcomings of the existing arrangements are pointed out. The critique is searching, objective and free of the usual biases of official government reports. The analysis of the arms control agreements is preceded by an historical overview, beginning with the Hague Peace Conferences, held at the turn of this century, through the League of Nations' attempts to bring about a universal reduction of armaments, to the activities of the United Nations in the field of arms regulation and general disarmament. The present arms control negotiating machinery is described. The texts of the relevant documents are reproduced for handy reference and the status of the implementation of the most important multilateral arms control agreements is presented in tabular form. Tables and figures facilitate the reading.

The United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating nuclear arms control agreements for over twenty years, yet radical differences remain in the two sides' concept of, and approaches to, strategic stability and arms control. This book compares and contrasts those approaches, using START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) as a case study. Throughout two decades of negotiation, U.S. policy has been directed toward dialogue that would encourage convergence of American and Soviet thought on nuclear deterrence. In Kartchner's view, that hope is belied not only by continuing asymmetries in the development and deployment of their strategic nuclear arsenals, but by differing U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions. The Reagan administration viewed START as a means of repudiating SALT II, restoring a measure of balance in the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition, and as a way of closing the so-called window of vulnerability. In contrast, Kartchner analyzes the Soviets' differing views of nuclear balance, emphasizing their satisfaction with SALT II and a strategic equilibrium shaped by a decade of bilateral arms control. Kartchner offers a detailed exposition of the major negotiating issues in START, contrasting concerns of U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Not surprisingly, each side's agenda was dominated by weapon systems that figure prominently in the other's development program. The author concludes by summarizing and comparing American and Soviet quests for stability and drawing up an assessment of U.S. efforts in both SALT and START to use arms control negotiations as a kind of classroom for instructing Soviet officials in American notions of "stabilizing" versus "destabilizing" weapon technology and America's own ethnocentric view of stability. START will profoundly affect the acquisition, operation, maintenance, and cost of U.S. strategic nuclear forces well into the next century. The history and analysis presented here will provide an essential source to policymakers and students of military-political relations for much-needed further study of this treaty's implications.