2014 Reprint of 1961 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition. Not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. This study is an attempt to identify the meaning of arms control in the post war period. It presents an analysis of arms control with particular emphasis on the military policy involved. The general objectives of the study is to advance some aspects of the intellectual state of the art in arms control and to provide some concrete data on the technical and strategic problems of importance. Schelling remains relevant today for his work on game theory.

The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.

Arms control, for decades at the core of the foreign policy consensus, today is among the more contentious issues in American politics. It is pilloried and considered out of mode in many conservative quarters, while being viewed as nearly sacrosanct in many liberal circles. In this new book, Michael Levi and Michael O'Hanlon argue that neither the left nor the right has a correct view of the proper utility of arms control in the age of terror. Arms control in the traditional sense--lengthy treaties to limit nuclear and other military competitions among the great powers--is no longer particularly useful. Nor should arms control be pursued as a means to the end of constraining the power of nations or of promoting global government. It is still a critical tool, though, for controlling dangerous technologies, particularly those that, in the hands of hostile states or terrorist organizations, could cause massive death and destruction. Arms control and coercive action, including military force, must be integrated into an overall strategy for preventing proliferation, now more than ever before. Arms control should be used to gain earlier warning of illicit activities inside dangerous states, allowing the international community to take coercive action in a timely way. The authors propose three new criteria to guide future arms control efforts, designed to respond to today's geopolitical realities. Arms control must focus on the dangers of catastrophic technology, not so much in the hands of major powers as of small states and terrorist groups. Their criteria lead to a natural focus on nuclear and biological technologies. Much tougher measures to prevent countries from gaining nuclear weapons technoloty while purportedly complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and procedures for controlling dangerous biological technologies will be most prominent in this framework, while lower priority is giben to efforts such as bilateral nuclear accords and most t

Can a nation accept limits in an arms competition? James H. Lebovic explores the logic of seeking peace in an arms race. Flawed Logics offers a compelling intellectual history of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control. Lebovic thoroughly reviews the critical role of ideas and assumptions in U.S. arms control debates, tying them to controversies over U.S. nuclear strategy from the birth of the atomic age to the present. Each nuclear arms treaty—from the Truman to the Obama administration—is assessed in depth and the positions of proponents and opponents are systematically presented, discussed, and critiqued. Lebovic concludes that the terms of these treaties with the Russians were never as good as U.S. proponents claimed nor as bad as opponents feared. The comprehensive analysis in Flawed Logics is objective and balanced, challenging the logic of hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, and theorists of all schools with equal vigor. Lebovic’s controversial argument will promote debate as to the very plausibility of arms control.

"This volume brings together an international group of distinguished scholars to provide a fresh assessment of China's strategic military capabilities, doctrines, and perceptions in light of rapidly advancing technologies, an expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal, and increased great-power competition with the United States. China's strategic weapons are its expanding nuclear arsenal and emerging conventional weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite missiles. China's strategic arsenal is important because of how it affects the dynamics of US-China relations and the relationship between China and its neighbors. Without a doubt China's strategic arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, but this book also examines key uncertainties. Will China's new capabilities and confidence lead it to be more assertive or take more risks? Will China's nuclear traditions (i.e., no first use) change as the strategic balance improves? Will China's approach to military competition in the domains of cyberspace and outer space be guided by a notion of strategic stability or not? Will there be a strategic arms race with the United States? The goal of this book is to update our understanding of these issues and to make predictions about how these dynamics may play out"--

Our Uncertain Nuclear Future : Navigating a Third Nuclear Age of Multipolar Competition -- Cold War Theory Redux : Recalling a Hardnosed Conception of Adversarial Arms Control -- From Theories to Treaties : Learning from the Cold War Negotiating Experience -- A New Arms Race : Transitioning from Post-Cold War Denuclearization to Great Power Nuclear Rivalry -- Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age : Adapting Old Ideas for New Times.

“This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new introduction to the work shows how Schelling’s framework—conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction—still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.