This benchmark study in the field of national security and weapons control was first published in 1961. Republished with a new preface providing the perspectives of 1985, it focuses on the world's military environment and analyzes how that environment may or may not be improved through political arms control efforts. The authors begin with a framework for understanding security, defense and arms control relationships. They also provide a framework for evaluating arms control proposals and for determining whether these proposals are in the security interests of the United States. ISBN 0-08-032391-X : $14.95 ; ISBN 0-08-032390-1 (pbk.) : $9.95.

2014 Reprint of 1961 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition. Not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. This study is an attempt to identify the meaning of arms control in the post war period. It presents an analysis of arms control with particular emphasis on the military policy involved. The general objectives of the study is to advance some aspects of the intellectual state of the art in arms control and to provide some concrete data on the technical and strategic problems of importance. Schelling remains relevant today for his work on game theory.

Bringing the subject of arms control into the arena of complex, multi-polar international relations, this text traces the history of agreements over weapons back to ancient times. The author puts forward a typology of arms control: it occurs at the end of major conflicts, stabilizes balancesbetween states, develops norms of behaviour, manages weapons proliferation, and acts as a tool of international organizations. He examines the evolution of five qualitatively different strategies, and applies the arms control typology to agreements in the post-Cold War world.

The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.

"If peace breaks out, can arms control be far behind?" According to Colin S. Gray, this sardonic motto describes events of the 1990s just as well as it did those of the 1920s. Gray offers a provocative history of twentieth-century attempts at arms limitation, as he challenges the fundamental assumptions of arms control theory. Arms control has never worked, he concludes, because it never can. Existing approaches to arms control appeal to common sense, but they are logically unsound and inherently impractical, Gray argues, because they fail to take political realities into account. He outlines their inadequacies in what he calls the Arms Control Paradox: the more motivated nations are to fight one another, the less interested they will be in supporting significant arms limitations. Under these conditions, arms control agreements must be, to echo a phrase of George Will's, either impossible or unimportant. Documenting the naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s and the initiatives to limit strategic nuclear arms from 1969 to the present, Gray seeks to demonstrate that the fortunes of negotiated arms limitation have merely reflected the temperature of international relations, rather than influencing those relations. National security analysts, students and scholars of international relations, and others interested in arms control issues will want to read House of Cards and debate its conclusions.

Completely revised and updated, this is an exhaustive analysis of national and international arms control: its history, philosophy, achievements and future prospects as well as its political, military and economic ramifications. Includes the complete text of the SALT II treaty and texts of major arms control agreements. ISBN 0-8047-1211-5 : $45.00; ISBN 0-8047-1212-0 (pbk.) : $16.95.

Balanced and comprehensive in approach, this text assembles classic statements on nuclear strategy and arms control made by Soviet and U.S. policymakers, military thinkers, and opinion leaders during the last forty years. Major Soviet statements, rarely appearing in translation, reflect the disagreement over whether "victory" or "parity" is the goa

This compilation of 10 articles by frequently published arms-control experts captures the story of a young Air Force's initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It documents a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than merely to be a passive recipient. This book also highlights the lesson the Air Force belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: that it has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations. When a treaty goes into effect, the Air Force needs to be ready to execute its responsibilities to ensure complete and timely treaty compliance. Though the Air Force did not seize a prominent role in the early days of post-war arms control, it made up for it quickly and forcefully as it gained a fuller appreciation of what was at stake.