With Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence, Katherine Hibbs Pherson and Randolph H. Pherson have updated their highly regarded, easy-to-use handbook for developing core critical thinking skills and analytic techniques. This indispensable text is framed around 20 key questions that all analysts must ask themselves as they prepare to conduct research, generate hypotheses, evaluate sources of information, draft papers, and ultimately present analysis, including: How do I get started? Where is the information I need? What is my argument? How do I convey my message effectively? The Third Edition includes suggested best practices for dealing with digital disinformation, politicization, and AI. Drawing upon their years of teaching and analytic experience, Pherson and Pherson provide a useful introduction to skills that are essential within the intelligence community.

Michael Maccoby is a globally recognised expert in leadership. Drawing on his experience and multi-disciplinary understanding, in this book he explains the concept of Strategic Intellegence, and the tools that equip leaders to improve and transform organizations.

The classic book that established the principles and methods of modern intelligence analysis With the outbreak of the Second World War, historian Sherman Kent left his classroom at Yale to join the Office of Strategic Services—the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency—where he adapted scholarly methods to the rigors and unique challenges of producing actionable intelligence in support of the war effort. In this remarkable book, Kent draws on the lessons he learned in wartime to lay the foundations for postwar security. He presents the doctrine and practices of intelligence analysis and explains why they are vital to national survival. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy shows how intelligence activities and their consequences extend far beyond military considerations and are as essential to keeping the peace as they are to winning the war.

The revised edition of Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers, and Users is a primer for analysts involved in conducting strategic intelligence research. Author Don McDowell begins with an overview of what strategic intelligence and analysis is, the functions it performs, and outcomes it delivers. McDowell then outlines a proven methodological approach to planning and implementing a strategic research project useful in any setting whatsoever. Strategic Intelligence explains in detail the steps involved in doing strategic analysis and includes examples, guidelines, and standards to further illustrate the process. Each step in the process corresponds with a chapter in the book, describing the doctrine and/or theory appropriate, as well as applications of the theory and practical hints on its implementation. Additionally, holistic and creative thinking about the problem issues being tackled is stressed in order to avoid narrow, biased analysis.

If you are responsible for the management of an intelligence enterprise operation and its timely and accurate delivery of reliable intelligence to key decision-makers, this book is must reading. It is the first easy-to-understand, system-level book that specifically applies knowledge management principles, practices and technologies to the intelligence domain. The book describes the essential principles of intelligence, from collection, processing and analysis, to dissemination for both national intelligence and business applications.

Strategic intelligence (SI) has mostly been used in military settings, but its worth goes well beyond that limited role. It has become invaluable for improving any organization's strategic decision making process. The author of Strategic Intelligence: Business Intelligence, Competitive Intelligence, and Knowledge Management recognizes synergies amo

In their Second Edition of Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action, accomplished instructors and intelligence practitioners Sarah Miller Beebe and Randolph H. Pherson offer robust, class-tested cases studies of events in foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, terrorism, homeland security, law enforcement, and decision-making support. Designed to give analysts-in-training an opportunity to apply structured analytic techniques and tackle real-life problems, each turnkey case delivers a captivating narrative, discussion questions, recommended readings, and a series of engaging analytic exercises.

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.