As Sun Tzu said, "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his armies. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative." While it is unknown whether Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat or his advisors read Sun Tzu, the national security policy that Sadat adopted leading up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel (or Ramadan War as it is called by the Arabs) clearly followed this prescription. As the following discussion will show, Sadat, after carefully considering what he felt were Egypt's national interests territorial and psychological security, economic prosperity, and the survival of the regime developed a comprehensive strategy that attempted to make use of all of the instruments of power at his disposal to advance those interests. Faced with significant political, economic and military constraints on his actions, President Sadat first attempted to work with the tools of diplomacy. After the failure of diplomacy alone to resolve the stalemate between Israel and Egypt, he determined that military action was required to achieve perceived national interests through diplomacy. In his mind, he knew that there would be no resolution of the impasse that he felt was strangling his country and his regime, without war. An analysis of his military means, however, also led to the inescapable conclusion that he could not achieve a total military victory (i.e. recapturing all lost territory and destruction of Israeli military). Thus, he adopted a strategy of using military action to achieve a political solution for Egypt. Sadat fought a war not to acquire all territory via war, but to gain limited territory and increased political clout to allow him the freedom to create a viable peace following the war. It was a war with limited military objectives fought to lay the basis for restored Egyptian national well being in its aftermath.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategy and statecraft of Anwar Sadat with respect to the October 1973 war with Israel. Sadat's strategy is examined using a classical approach to grand strategy. First, the author discusses the international environment that Sadat faced in 1972 and 1973. Second, he examines the international, domestic, and psychological determinants of power that affected Sadat's strategic thinking. Third, he speculates on how Sadat may have analyzed Egypt's national interests and threats to its national interests, and how he may have selected the objectives he used in formulating his grand strategy. Fourth, he looks at the execution of Sadat's strategy using the traditional tools of statecraft. And finally, he assesses Sadat's overall performance as a grand strategist.

This strategic analysis reveals a coherent national strategy of a limited war integrated with non-violent instruments of statecraft that ultimately earned Egypt full partnership in the Middle East peace process. The October 1973 Yom Kippur War was a measurably successful effort based on a strategic calculus widely attributed to Anwar Sadat, Egypt's political leader and military Commander-in-Chief. The War's end started a chain of events that made possible the formulation of boundaries that Israel still shares with its Arab neighbors, 27 years to the day cease-fire was observed in the Middle East.

Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.

See report We often look for a single defining event which properly characterizes a great statesman's ability to shape world events. As the legacy of Anwar Sadat, the events leading up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War bear the distinctive mark of a master statesman, capable of using all aspects of national power to achieve his strategic objectives. The October War shows Sadat at his finest, able to support national interests while in possession of little apparent power, able to find opportunities where others only saw constraints, able to prioritize objectives and fit them carefully into a courageous plan of action. His success in the October War broke the deadlock between Egypt and Israel and cleared a path for a greater reconciliation and the potential for peace.

Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.

This is the authoritative account of the Israeli army’s performance in the bitter Yom Kippur War of 1973. The origins of the war amid the turbulent history of competing powers in the Middle East are fully explored, as is the build-up of Arab forces that almost inexplicably caught Israel by surprise. The author then provides a gripping narrative of the conflict itself, punctuated by firsthand accounts and interviews with combatants. The War of Atonement is full of drama and tales of inspirational bravery, as Israel defied the odds to defeat the two-pronged invasion. An analysis of the political implications of the conflict bring this epic tale to a close. For this edition Chaim Herzog’s son, Brigadier General Michael Herzog, has written an introduction which places the book in the context of his father’s achievements and gives a revealing insight into the man himself. This is the most comprehensive work on a conflict that has had major implications for our own troubled times.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1973, also known as the "October War" was the result of, and arguably a continuation of, a long-standing conflict between Arabs and Jews. Prior wars between the Arabs and Jews were fought in 1948, 1956, and more importantly, in 1967. The outcome of the "Six-Day War" of 1967 created an overwhelming feeling of hostility toward Israel by the Arab nations, particularly by the people of Egypt, who felt humiliated and dishonored. Honor is an important part of the Egyptian culture, lying at the core of their self-identity, thereby reflecting and influencing vociferous public opinion and national passion. The influence of Egyptian nationalism was made evident in a 1972 speech when President Sadat told the Egyptians that "a battle of destiny" would be waged against Israel to reclaim the land lost by Egypt to Israel in 1967. This essay will study how Egyptian nationalism affected the elements of statecraft, and how it weighed on the final decision to use military force against Israel. President Sadat possessed a keen awareness of the interplay of the government, the people and the military power-its volatility and synergy. Unfortunately, the world underestimated the salience of Egypt's cultural belief in preservation of honor. This brief analysis of both Egyptian domestic conditions and international relationships preceding the 1973 war exemplifies the significant role culture contributes to and influences statecraft and the relations of nations.

An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.

Until October, 1973 President Anwar Sadat was just another actor under the patronage of the Soviet Union on the regional Arab stage. Approximately one month later he was a player on the world stage of international politics, an achievement recognized by his contemporary, Henry Kissinger, as strategically brilliant. How did Sadat make the leap? What were his objectives and how did he reach them? This essay will look for answers by analyzing Sadat's circumstances and performance as he prepared for the October War using a number of the constructs of the design for national security strategy originated by Professor Terry Deibel.