Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1973, also known as the "October War" was the result of, and arguably a continuation of, a long-standing conflict between Arabs and Jews. Prior wars between the Arabs and Jews were fought in 1948, 1956, and more importantly, in 1967. The outcome of the "Six-Day War" of 1967 created an overwhelming feeling of hostility toward Israel by the Arab nations, particularly by the people of Egypt, who felt humiliated and dishonored. Honor is an important part of the Egyptian culture, lying at the core of their self-identity, thereby reflecting and influencing vociferous public opinion and national passion. The influence of Egyptian nationalism was made evident in a 1972 speech when President Sadat told the Egyptians that "a battle of destiny" would be waged against Israel to reclaim the land lost by Egypt to Israel in 1967. This essay will study how Egyptian nationalism affected the elements of statecraft, and how it weighed on the final decision to use military force against Israel. President Sadat possessed a keen awareness of the interplay of the government, the people and the military power-its volatility and synergy. Unfortunately, the world underestimated the salience of Egypt's cultural belief in preservation of honor. This brief analysis of both Egyptian domestic conditions and international relationships preceding the 1973 war exemplifies the significant role culture contributes to and influences statecraft and the relations of nations.

See report We often look for a single defining event which properly characterizes a great statesman's ability to shape world events. As the legacy of Anwar Sadat, the events leading up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War bear the distinctive mark of a master statesman, capable of using all aspects of national power to achieve his strategic objectives. The October War shows Sadat at his finest, able to support national interests while in possession of little apparent power, able to find opportunities where others only saw constraints, able to prioritize objectives and fit them carefully into a courageous plan of action. His success in the October War broke the deadlock between Egypt and Israel and cleared a path for a greater reconciliation and the potential for peace.

A NETFLIX ORIGINAL MOVIE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE BOOK for 2017 by The American Association of Former Intelligence Officers A gripping feat of reportage that exposes—for the first time in English—the sensational life and mysterious death of Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian senior official who spied for Israel, offering new insight into the turbulent modern history of the Middle East. As the son-in-law of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and a close advisor to his successor, Anwar Sadat, Ashraf Marwan had access to the deepest secrets of the country’s government. But Marwan himself had a secret: He was a spy for the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service. Under the codename “The Angel,” Marwan turned Egypt into an open book for the Israeli intelligence services—and, by alerting the Mossad in advance of the joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on Yom Kippur, saved Israel from a devastating defeat. Drawing on meticulous research and interviews with many key participants, Uri Bar Joseph pieces together Marwan’s story. In the process, he sheds new light on this volatile time in modern Egyptian and Middle Eastern history, culminating in 2011’s Arab Spring. The Angel also chronicles the discord within the Israeli government that brought down Prime Minister Golda Meir. However, this nail-biting narrative doesn’t end with Israel’s victory in the Yom Kippur War. Marwan eluded Egypt’s ruthless secret services for many years, but then somebody talked. Five years later, in 2007, his body was found in the garden of his London apartment building. Police suspected he had been thrown from his fifth-floor balcony, and thanks to explosive new evidence, Bar-Joseph can finally reveal who, how, and why.

An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.

Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.

As Sun Tzu said, "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his armies. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative." While it is unknown whether Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat or his advisors read Sun Tzu, the national security policy that Sadat adopted leading up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel (or Ramadan War as it is called by the Arabs) clearly followed this prescription. As the following discussion will show, Sadat, after carefully considering what he felt were Egypt's national interests territorial and psychological security, economic prosperity, and the survival of the regime developed a comprehensive strategy that attempted to make use of all of the instruments of power at his disposal to advance those interests. Faced with significant political, economic and military constraints on his actions, President Sadat first attempted to work with the tools of diplomacy. After the failure of diplomacy alone to resolve the stalemate between Israel and Egypt, he determined that military action was required to achieve perceived national interests through diplomacy. In his mind, he knew that there would be no resolution of the impasse that he felt was strangling his country and his regime, without war. An analysis of his military means, however, also led to the inescapable conclusion that he could not achieve a total military victory (i.e. recapturing all lost territory and destruction of Israeli military). Thus, he adopted a strategy of using military action to achieve a political solution for Egypt. Sadat fought a war not to acquire all territory via war, but to gain limited territory and increased political clout to allow him the freedom to create a viable peace following the war. It was a war with limited military objectives fought to lay the basis for restored Egyptian national well being in its aftermath.

"In eleven dramatic years, Anwar Sadat changed history--not just that of Egypt, or of the Middle East, but of the entire world. As the architect of the 1973 war against Israel, he gained the support of other Arab nations and inspired the oil embargo that transformed the global economy. Following the war, however, he forever ended Arab aspirations of unity by making peace with Israel. Early in his presidency, Sadat jettisoned Egypt's alliance with the Soviet Union and turned to the United States, thereby giving the West a crucial Cold War victory. Sadat's historic tenure still resonates in the twenty-first century as the Islamic activists--whom he originally encouraged but who opposed his conciliatory policy toward Israel and ultimately played a role in his assassination--continue to foster activism, including the Muslim Brotherhood, today.Thomas W. Lippman was stationed in the Middle East as a journalist during Sadat's presidency and lived in Egypt in the aftermath of the October War. He knew Sadat personally, but only now, after the passage of time and the long-delayed release of the U.S. State Department's diplomatic files, can Lippman assess the full consequences of Sadat's presidency. Hero of the Crossing provides an eye-opening account of the profound reverberations of one leader's political, cultural, and economic maneuverings and legacy"--

"Assessment of Anwar Sadat and the 1973 War, as well as the event's global implications"--

Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.