The Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare (Defense) was established at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. By USD(A & T) Memorandum for the Chairman, Defense Science Board, dated October 4, 1995, the Task Force was directed to "focus on protection of information interests of national importance through the establishment and maintenance of a credible information warfare defensive capability in several areas, including deterrence.' Specifically, the Task Force was asked to: * Identify the information users of national interest who can be attacked through the shared elements of the national information infrastructure. * Determine the scope of national information interests to be defended by information warfare defense and deterrence capabilities. * Characterize the procedures, processes, and mechanisms required to defend against various classes of threats to the national information infrastructure and the information users of national interest. * Identify the indications and warning, tactical warning, and attack assessment procedures, processes, and mechanisms needed to anticipate, detect, and characterize attacks on the national information infrastructure and/or attacks on the information users of national interest. * Identify the reasonable roles of government and the private sector, alone and in concert, in creating, managing, and operating a national information warfare-defense capability. Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Force's recommendations.

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare (Defense) was established at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. By USD(A & T) Memorandum for the Chairman, Defense Science Board, dated October 4, 1995, the Task Force was directed to "focus on protection of information interests of national importance through the establishment and maintenance of a credible information warfare defensive capability in several areas, including deterrence.' Specifically, the Task Force was asked to: * Identify the information users of national interest who can be attacked through the shared elements of the national information infrastructure. * Determine the scope of national information interests to be defended by information warfare defense and deterrence capabilities. * Characterize the procedures, processes, and mechanisms required to defend against various classes of threats to the national information infrastructure and the information users of national interest. * Identify the indications and warning, tactical warning, and attack assessment procedures, processes, and mechanisms needed to anticipate, detect, and characterize attacks on the national information infrastructure and/or attacks on the information users of national interest. * Identify the reasonable roles of government and the private sector, alone and in concert, in creating, managing, and operating a national information warfare-defense capability. Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Force's recommendations.

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare (Defense) was established at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. The Task Force was directed to "focus on protection of information interests of national importance through the establishment and maintenance of a credible information warfare defensive capability in several areas, including deterrence." Specifically, the Task Force was asked to: Identify the information users of national interest who can be attacked through the shared elements of the national information infrastructure; Determine the scope of national information interests to be defended by information warfare defense and deterrence capabilities; Characterize the procedures, processes, and mechanisms required to defend against various classes of threats to the national information infrastructure and the information users of national interest; Identify the indications and warning, tactical warning, and attack assessment procedures, processes, and mechanisms needed to anticipate, detect, and characterize attacks on the national information infrastructure and/or attacks on the information users of national interest; Identify the reasonable roles of government and the private sector, alone and in concert, in creating, managing, and operating a national information warfare-defense capability; Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Force's recommendations. Information infrastructures are vulnerable to attack. While this in itself poses a national security threat, the linkage between information systems and traditional critical infrastructures has increased the scope and potential of the information warfare threat. For economic reasons, increasing deregulation and competition create an increased reliance on information systems to operate, maintain, and monitor critical infrastructures. This in turn creates a tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict. Information warfare offers a veil of anonymity to potential attackers. Attackers can hide in the mesh of inter-netted systems and often use previously conquered systems to launch their attacks. Information warfare is also relatively cheap to wage, offering a high return on investment for resource-poor adversaries. The technology required to mount attacks is relatively simple and ubiquitous. During information warfare, demand for information will dramatically increase while the capacity of the information infrastructure will most certainly decrease. The law, particularly international law, is currently ambiguous regarding criminality in and acts of war on information infrastructures. This ambiguity, coupled with a lack of clearly designated responsibilities for electronic defense hinders the development of remedies and limits response options. The current Administration's national security strategy for the United States suggests that the nation's "economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable" and that "we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests-political, military and economic-without active engagement in world affairs." In the broad sense, then, the scope of national information interests to be defended by information warfare defense and deterrence capabilities are those political, military, and economic interests. These include the continuity of a democratic form of government and a free market economy, the ability to conduct effective diplomacy, a favorable balance of trade, and a military force that is ready to fight and that can be deployed where needed. Some of these activities are critical to the nation's political, military, and economic interests. These critical functional activities, in turn, depend on information technology and critical infrastructures such as banking and finance, electric power, telecommunications, and transportation.

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare (Defense) was established at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. By USD(A & T) Memorandum for the Chairman, Defense Science Board, dated October 4, 1995, the Task Force was directed to "focus on protection of information interests of national importance through the establishment and maintenance of a credible information warfare defensive capability in several areas, including deterrence.' Specifically, the Task Force was asked to: * Identify the information users of national interest who can be attacked through the shared elements of the national information infrastructure. * Determine the scope of national information interests to be defended by information warfare defense and deterrence capabilities. * Characterize the procedures, processes, and mechanisms required to defend against various classes of threats to the national information infrastructure and the information users of national interest. * Identify the indications and warning, tactical warning, and attack assessment procedures, processes, and mechanisms needed to anticipate, detect, and characterize attacks on the national information infrastructure and/or attacks on the information users of national interest. * Identify the reasonable roles of government and the private sector, alone and in concert, in creating, managing, and operating a national information warfare-defense capability. Provide specific guidelines for implementation of the Task Force's recommendations

Globalization-the integration of the political, economic and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated peoples-is not a discernible event or challenge, is not new, but it is accelerating. More importantly, globalization is largely irresistible. Thus, globalization is not a policy option, but a fact to which policymakers must adapt. Globalization has accelerated as a result of many positive factors, the most notable of which include: the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; the spread of capitalism and free trade; more rapid and global capital flows and more liberal financial markets; the liberalization of communications; international academic and scientific collaboration; and faster and more efficient forms of transportation. At the core of accelerated global integration-at once its principal cause and consequence-is the information revolution, which is knocking down once-formidable barriers of physical distance, blurring national boundaries and creating cross-border communities of all types.

In late 1998 the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the Defense Science Board to create a task force on training and education. The task force met periodically throughout 1999 and 2000. This document is the report of our deliberations.