The terms of reference for the Tactical Air Warfare Task Force tasked the Defense Science Board (DSB) to review a fascinating set of the country's acquisition options for tactical air warfare over the next 10 to 20 years. (See Appendix A for Terms of Reference.) As the force structure is resized and restructured to meet the challenges of a disorderly new world order there will be opportunities for important new approaches and perspectives. More specifically, we were charged with exploring promising concepts and technologies that might provide high leverage in cost and effectiveness against foreseeable threats. Our task force was organized to review as much of the spectrum of tactical air warfare as time would permit. Appendix B lists the members and panels. We began by analyzing historic trends in tactical air warfare. In those efforts we focused on the concepts of operations that were in practice, sought to discern how the then-current technologies drove us to employ those concepts, and sought to derive where the trends in operational concepts coupled with technology advancements might lead us.

The DoD team that conducted the Bottom Up Review (BUR) took on a very substantial task. The BUR team was appropriately composed of all relevant OSD offices and the services. This Defense Science Board Task Force conducted an independent assessment of their effort. The limited time available required the BUR team to focus chiefly on a comparison of tactical aircraft as stand alone air warfare assets. The process included six main avenues of analysis: costing, affordability, industrial base and threat assessments, a PA and E qualitative assessment, and an Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) cost-effectiveness comparison model.

The Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) resulted from the decisions of the Secretary of Defense' Bottom Up Review (BUR). Each service has a demonstrated need for advanced technology aircraft to meet future contingencies, but it was determined that costs for development and production of these several different aircraft could not be met due to budgetary constraints. The BUR found that there were not enough resources available to support all these programs in future years. The decision was made to continue with the Air Force F-22 fighter aircraft, and the F/A-18E/F aircraft for the Navy, but to cancel the A/F-X and the MRF. The decision on ASTOL was to continue that research, but to secure specific commitment of resources by at least two of the three Services before building a flying prototype. The BUR also confirmed the continuing needs that were to be met by the A/F-X and MRF programs. This led to the establishment of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program in July 1993.