This study analyzes the readiness of the British military establishment for war in 1899 and its performance in the South African War (1899-1902). It focuses on the career of Field Marshal Paul Sanford, 3rd Baron Methuen, whose traditional military training, used so effectively in Queen Victoria's small wars, was put to the test by the modern challenges of the South African War. A subsidiary aim of this work is to correct and refine the historical consensus that Methuen's campaing in the South African War was plagued by practical errors and poor judgement. The South African War was a crucial transitional episode in the history of the British army. Unlike Great Britain's other expeditions, it required the concentrated resources of the entire empire. It was a modern war in the sense that it employed the technology, the weaponry, the communications, and the transportation of the second industrial revolution.

How did British authorities manage to secure the commitment of large dominion and Indian armies that could plan, fight, shoot, communicate, and sustain themselves, in concert with the British Army and with each other, during the era of the two world wars? What did the British want from the dominion and Indian armies and how did they go about trying to get it? Douglas E Delaney seeks to answer these questions to understand whether the imperial army project was successful. Answering these questions requires a long-term perspective — one that begins with efforts to fix the armies of the British Empire in the aftermath of their desultory performance in South Africa (1899-1903) and follows through to the high point of imperial military cooperation during the Second World War. Based on multi-archival research conducted in six different countries, on four continents, Delaney argues that the military compatibility of the British Empire armies was the product of a deliberate and enduring imperial army project, one that aimed at standardizing and piecing together the armies of the empire, while, at the same time, accommodating the burgeoning autonomy of the dominions and even India. At its core, this book is really about how a military coalition worked.

Based on many years of research with regard to the Anglo-Boer War, this book is essential reading for anyone who would like to know more about the most devastating conflict that has thus far been waged between white people in Southern Africa. However, with due course, this war also involved more and more black, brown and, to some extent, Asian people.

 From the Crimean War through the Second Boer War, the British Empire sought to solve the "Great Gun Question"--to harness improvements to ordnance, small arms, explosives and mechanization made possible by the Industrial Revolution. The British public played a surprising but overlooked role, offering myriad suggestions for improvements to the civilian-led War Office. Meanwhile, politicians and army leaders argued over control of the country's ground forces in a decades-long struggle that did not end until reforms of 1904 put the military under the Secretary of State for War. Following the debate in the press, voters put pressure on both Parliament and the War Office to modernize ordnance and military administration. The "Great Gun Question" was as much about weaponry as about who ultimately controlled military power. Drawing on ordnance committee records and contemporary news reports, this book fills a gap in the history of British military technology and army modernization prior to World War I.

Although in Victorian society the Army was the aristocratic backbone of England, it was persistently engaged in fighting Colonial Wars.

In this biography Rodney Atwood details the life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (1864-1925), a distinguished British soldier whose career culminated in decisive victories on the Western Front in 1918 and command of the Indian Army in the early 1920s. He served his soldier's apprenticeship in the Victorian colonial wars in Burma, the Sudan and South Africa. His career provides a lens through which to examine the British Army in the late-19th and early-20th century. In the South African War (1899-1902) Rawlinson's ideas aided the defence of Ladysmith, and he distinguished himself leading a mobile column in the guerrilla war. In the First World War he held an important command in most of the British Expeditionary Force's battles on the Western Front. He bears a heavy part-responsibility for the disastrous first day of the Somme, but later in the battle his successful tactics inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. His Western Front career culminated in a series of victories beginning at Amiens. He commanded the Indian Army between 1920 and 1925 at a time of military and political tension following the 3rd Afghan War and the Amritsar Massacre. He introduced necessary reforms, cut expenditure at a time of postwar retrenchment and began commissioning Indians to replace British officers. He would have taken up the post of CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), thus being the only British soldier to hold these two top posts. He died, however, four days after his sixty-first birthday. Drawing extensively on archival material including Rawlinson's own engagingly-written letters and diaries, this thorough examination of his life will be of great interest to those studying British military history, imperial history and the First World War.

This volume gathers 19 papers first presented at the 5th International Symposium of the ICA Commission on the History of Cartography, which took place at the University of Ghent, Belgium on 2-5 December 2014. The overall conference theme was 'Cartography in Times of War and Peace', but preference was given to papers dealing with the military cartography of the First World War (1914-1918). The papers are classified by period and regional sub-theme, i.e. Military Cartography from the 18th to the 20th century; WW I Cartography in Belgium, Central Europe, etc.