The Imperial Security State explores an important but under-explored dimension of British imperialism - its information system and the close links between military knowledge and the maintenance of empire. James Hevia's innovative study focuses on route books and military reports produced by the British Indian Army military intelligence between 1880 and 1940. He shows that together these formed a renewable and authoritative archive that was used to train intelligence officers, to inform civilian policy makers and to provide vital information to commanders as they approached the battlefield. The strategic, geographical, political and ethnographical knowledge that was gathered not only framed imperial strategies towards colonized areas to the east but also produced the very object of intervention: Asia itself. Finally, the book addresses the long-term impact of the security regime, revealing how elements of British colonial knowledge have continued to influence contemporary tactics of counterinsurgency in twenty-first-century Iraq and Afghanistan.

NAMED ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF 2018 BY THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE AND SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE By a prize-winning young historian, an authoritative work that reframes the Industrial Revolution, the expansion of British empire, and emergence of industrial capitalism by presenting them as inextricable from the gun trade "A fascinating and important glimpse into how violence fueled the industrial revolution, Priya Satia's book stuns with deep scholarship and sparkling prose."--Siddhartha Mukherjee, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Emperor of All Maladies We have long understood the Industrial Revolution as a triumphant story of innovation and technology. Empire of Guns, a rich and ambitious new book by award-winning historian Priya Satia, upends this conventional wisdom by placing war and Britain's prosperous gun trade at the heart of the Industrial Revolution and the state's imperial expansion. Satia brings to life this bustling industrial society with the story of a scandal: Samuel Galton of Birmingham, one of Britain's most prominent gunmakers, has been condemned by his fellow Quakers, who argue that his profession violates the society's pacifist principles. In his fervent self-defense, Galton argues that the state's heavy reliance on industry for all of its war needs means that every member of the British industrial economy is implicated in Britain's near-constant state of war. Empire of Guns uses the story of Galton and the gun trade, from Birmingham to the outermost edges of the British empire, to illuminate the nation's emergence as a global superpower, the roots of the state's role in economic development, and the origins of our era's debates about gun control and the "military-industrial complex" -- that thorny partnership of government, the economy, and the military. Through Satia's eyes, we acquire a radically new understanding of this critical historical moment and all that followed from it. Sweeping in its scope and entirely original in its approach, Empire of Guns is a masterful new work of history -- a rigorous historical argument with a human story at its heart.

 From the Crimean War through the Second Boer War, the British Empire sought to solve the "Great Gun Question"--to harness improvements to ordnance, small arms, explosives and mechanization made possible by the Industrial Revolution. The British public played a surprising but overlooked role, offering myriad suggestions for improvements to the civilian-led War Office. Meanwhile, politicians and army leaders argued over control of the country's ground forces in a decades-long struggle that did not end until reforms of 1904 put the military under the Secretary of State for War. Following the debate in the press, voters put pressure on both Parliament and the War Office to modernize ordnance and military administration. The "Great Gun Question" was as much about weaponry as about who ultimately controlled military power. Drawing on ordnance committee records and contemporary news reports, this book fills a gap in the history of British military technology and army modernization prior to World War I.

Many of the British Army's actions during the Victorian Era are forgotten, misunderstood and misrepresented. Stereotypes of the Victorian officer, soldier and battlefield abound. As the latter half of the twentieth century was one of 'Imperial Guilt' it is perhaps unsurprising that many of the 'heroes' of the age have been forgotten. This is particularly true of the 'Generals'. They were lauded in their day but now are unknown. Yet there were many capable individuals exercising high office. This new work provides some examples of the many interesting and talented officers who exercised command during the Victorian Era. It is hoped that such a work will be of interest to both the casual reader and the student of military history. Much of the military history of this age has been unfairly ignored, and there are many powerful and important lessons to be learnt from the careers of the men included in this book. The Generals featured in this book represent different types of General. Field Marshal Sir George White was Commander in Chief in India from 1893 to 1898 and was a rising star of the Army. Yet his reputation suffered from the South African War and his decision to take refuge in Ladysmith and become sieged during the early part of the war. Field Marshal Robert Napier was also Commander-in-Chief India from 1870 to 1876. He was originally an officer of engineers in the East India Company Army. He was considered one of the finest civil engineers in India and developed a reputation as a fine battlefield commander, culminating in his successfully conducting the Abyssinia Campaign of 1867-68. Brigadier General Robert Loyd-Lindsay's success lay in the political arena more than the military. He did much in the name of military reform and worked hard for the medical support of soldiers. General Sir Archibald Allison was very much the fighting soldier in his younger days, but in later life proved a successful Commandant at Sandhurst and Head of the Intelligence Branch at the War Office. Field Marshal William Nicholson had an interesting campaigning career and had the distinction of being the Second Chief of the General Staff of the British Army and was credited with much success in reforming the army. General Sir William Lockhart was yet another Commander-in-Chief in India who had seen considerable active service including commanding the Tirah Expedition of 1897-1898. General Sir Henry Brackenbury saw considerable active service but his greatest contributions were behind the scenes. He was the greatest administrator in the British Army during the Victorian Era. Major-General Sir John Ardagh had served under Brackenbury in the Intelligence Branch and later became its leader. Ardagh was also a first rate administrator and did an excellent job in the Intelligence Branch. Although criticized during the South African War for a perceived failure of military intelligence he was exonerated by the Royal Commission set up after the war. General Sir Arthur Cunynghame was an officer of the old school. He perhaps deserves more credit than he gets and certainly provides for an interesting study. All in all the Generals featured in this book provides us with a very interesting insight into generals of this era and the way in which they exercised command. The authors are a collection of experienced and early career historians.

This title focuses on the "Risorgimento", the movement that led to the unification of Italy as a single kingdom. The Italian Wars of Independence were a sequence of three separate conflicts, taking place in 1848-49, 1859 and 1866. This volume examines the role of the major powers outside Italy in these conflicts, particularly France, Austria, Great Britain and Prussia, and in Italy the Italian states, the Catholic Church and the revolutionaries. It also examines the role of: Cavour's Piedmont, Mazzini's Young Italy and the Party of Action, Garibaldi's Red Shirts and Daniele Manin's National Society. It is based on original research, particularly in the Vatican archives and it should to be an invaluable text for all students of Italian and European History from 6th form to undergraduate level.

The Crimean War (1853-56) between Russia, Turkey, Britain, France and the Kingdom of Sardinia was a diplomatically preventable conflict for influence over an unstable Near and Middle East. It could have broken out in any decade between Napoleon and Wilhelm II; equally, it need never have occurred. In this masterly study, based on massive archival research, David Goldfrank argues that the European diplomatic roots of the war stretch far beyond the `Eastern Question' itself, and shows how the domestic concerns of the participants contributed to the outbreak of hostilities.

This book offers a fresh and vibrant account of the military campaign of Argyll and Monmouth that concludes at Sedgemoor in July 1685.

"True, the concept of Britain dates back to Roman times, but it was James I that founded Britain in the modern sense. With his accession to the throne in 1603 for the first time Scotland, England, Wales and Ireland were united - with James bestowing on himself the title of 'King of Great Britain'. Before this time, Scots and Irishmen may have served in the English Army as mercenaries, but it was known as an English Army - but now the King's (or British) flag flew over the castles and forts throughout the land. The army raised by Charles I in 1625 for his war against Spain -and subsequently, with France - is most famous for its failure. However, it is one of the best-documented armies of the early 17th century. Using archival and archaeological evidence, the first half of the book covers the lives of the officers and men serving in the army at this time - as well as the women who accompanied them. The author discusses the origins of officers and why they decided to serve in the army - and how the men from England, Scotland and Ireland were recruited (as well as how they were clothed and what they ate; the medical care; and the tactics used by the army at this time). It also covers the hidden faction of tailors, armorers and merchants who helped to put the army into the field. The second half of the book covers not only the expeditions to Cadiz, the Isle de Rhe and the siege of La Rochelle, but also their effect on an England who feared a Spanish (and later a French) invasion. Also covered are the campaigns of Count Ernest von Mansfeldt's and Sir Charles Morgan's armies at this time, which fought at Breda, Dessau Bridge and against the forces of the Holy Roman Empire. The final chapter looks at what became of the soldiers and their widows once the army had been disbanded - therefore, the book will be essential reading for anyone interested in Early Modern History, including the English Civil War and the Thirty Years War." --Publisher description.

Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.

Based on the letters and diaries of the British soldiers who served as the backbone of the army from 1760 to 1860, this illuminating book is rich in the history of a fascinating era. of illustrations.