This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1851 edition. Excerpt: ...interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior fleet to his own. Instead of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay to the energy, confining our defences to the more important harbors and rivers that discharge into the bay. By this system, not only will these harbors be securt'd, but the defences will react upon the bay itself; and at any late, secure it from predatory incursions; because, as before shown, while Hampton Roads ami the navyyard at Norfolk are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less fores than that which could be sent out from the navy-yard. In certain cases o'f broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade, or as a shelter in tempestuous weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach the whole anchoi age, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mortars, well secured from escalade, would, in such a case, afford a good defence, because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range cf shells. In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence; we do not find that any thing can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable; and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last: ami in the last, we shall find them indispensable, as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no doubt, some cases where naval means must constitute the active and operative force; and it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be most suitable, as before stated. Before proceeding to a specification of the positions on our coast requiring fortifications, something more should...

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Excerpt from Report of General J. G. Totten: Chief Engineer, on the Subject of National Defences This cannot be a safe reliance with war steamers any more than with sailing vessels of war, and a few words ma make this clear. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

In 1794, faced with possible war with Great Britain, the federal government assumed the responsibility for the construction and manning of seacoast fortifications from Maine to Georgia. Construction was entrusted to French-born engineers, who followed traditional European bastioned designs. In 1806, Britain1s abuse of neutral maritime rights again threatened war, and Congress appropriated funds for additional seacoast defenses. Almost all of the design and construction of these works was supervised by officers of the Corps of Engineers, most of whom were graduates of the new U.S. Military Academy. On the eve of the outbreak of the War of 1812, the defenses of the Atlantic coast and the Mississippi River below New Orleans were substantially complete, manned by regular troops, and performed well. Due to the effectiveness of these fortifications, the United States embarked on construction of a series of permanent seacoast defense systems in 1816 that lasted through World War II.