This book examines the history of the relationship between these two centuries during the past twenty years and attempts to dispel the misconception that the Soviet Union has enjoyed undue influence over Iraq.

Seminar paper from the year 2002 in the subject Politics - Region: USA, grade: 1,0 (A), York University (Faculty of Arts), course: American Foreign Policy, language: English, abstract: Since the terrorist plot against the World Trade Centre took place on September 11, 2001, the United States is not tired to reiterate its commitment to fight terrorism on a global scale and to oppose all states involved in harbouring or supporting terrorist activities. It did not take long for Bush′s War Cabinet to announce that the war in Afghanistan is only the beginning of a wider range of activities, which soon may be extended to countries like the Philippines, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Iran, Iraq and North Korea. In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush depicted the latter three states as an "Axis of Evil". Meanwhile this expression has entered public debate as a household term. America′s increased war rhetoric and it′s blunt ambitions to oust Saddam Hussein and finally settle Bushs ́ unfinished family business raised open criticism not only in the Islamic world but also among NATO allies. Many conceive this term as inopportune, misleading, ideologically biased and even insulting. Despite widespread resentment, the United States is currently assessing its opportunities to stage a full-scale war against Iraq within the next months and is campaigning for diplomatic and if possible military support in the Middle East, Europe, Russia and China. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has already declared his support for American war plans. The strong stance of the White House was recently underlined by statements of Vice President Cheney and Minister of Defence Rumsfeld who announced that the United States is able and willing to rely on its own strength and act unilaterally if an international alliance against Saddam Hussein cannot be materialized. Against this background, it is likely that we soon will witness full media coverage of a new Gulf War and CNN footage of American soldiers operating in the Persian Gulf. It would be naive and inept to expect that the ousting of Saddam Hussein′s regime is an easy and bloodless task and could automatically bring long-term stability to the region. Although, most TV channels and newspapers will provide us anew with a version of a modern high-tech war absent of bloodshed and human suffering.

In the first years of the Soviet regime there was little, if any, Soviet interest in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Over the last fifty years relations between Russia and this part of the world have become more complex; this book traces their intricate history in a full analysis of Soviet policy towards the Arabian Peninsula. It opens with a review of events from the beginning of the Soviet regime until 1975. The author goes on to consider the period between 1975 and 1978, concentrating especially on Soviet relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and South Yemen. The impact of the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic in 1979 is examined in detail, with the emphasis on the situation in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and both North and South Yemen. Finally the author examines the effect on Soviet policy of the Iran-Iraq war and the subsequent insecurity in the Gulf region. This study is based on mainly primary sources of Soviet, Arab, Iranian and Western origins.

This is a collective volume on Soviet-American relations with the three rimland states of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The contributors argue that what happens in these three states would ultimately affect the states in the Gulf and the Middle East. The USA maintains friendly relations only with Pakistan, while her relations with Iran and Afghanistan are antagonistic. The future penetration of the Soviet influence in Iran and Afghanistan is assessed and probable scenarios are discussed by the seventeen contributors, who represent the military, diplomacy and academia. The concluding chapter synthesizes the discussions and the criticism of various papers. The book is the most up-to-date thorough analysis of superpower relations with the three neighbouring states of the Soviet Union currently available.

This volume offers a wide-ranging examination of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), featuring fresh regional and international perspectives derived from recently available new archival material. Three decades ago Iran and Iraq became embroiled in a devastating eight-year war which served to re-define the international relations of the Gulf region. The Iran–Iraq War stands as an anomaly in the Cold War era; it was the only significant conflict in which the interests of the United States and Soviet Union unwittingly aligned, with both superpowers ultimately supporting the Iraqi regime. The Iran–Iraq War re-assesses not only the superpower role in the conflict but also the war’s regional and wider international dimensions by bringing to the fore fresh evidence and new perspectives from a variety of sources. It focuses on a number of themes including the economic dimensions of the war and the roles played by a variety of powers, including the Gulf States, Turkey, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. The contributions to the volume serve to underline that the Iran–Iraq war was a defining conflict, shaping the perspectives of the key protagonists for a generation to come. This book will be of much interest to students of international and Cold War history, Middle Eastern politics, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

Relations between the USSR and Iran during the period from the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic up to early 1983 are reviewed in this book. It begins with a brief survey of Russian-Persian relations in earlier years, with a focus on the developments that served as a background to the current events. It examines Soviet attitudes and reactions to Iran’s foreign and internal policy and highlights the way in which the Soviets often raise events of which they do not approve in order to draw Iran closer to them. In particular, the book discusses the Soviet response to the Iran-Iraq war and the position of the Tudeh Party and the other leftists within Iran. Iran’s policy towards the USSR is treated at length and it is shown that it is suspicious of a tacit USA-USSR agreement over the fate of Iran. Khomeini’s attempts to isolate Iran from both East and West are also reviewed. This book was one of the first to discuss this crucial dimension in Middle East politics and it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the forces driving the Iranian Revolution.

Behind the Iran-Iraq war rests a history of conflict stretching back to the Ottoman Turks and the Persians. This book examines the deep-seated and complex factors involved in the rivalry between these two nations. It focuses particularly on the period between 1969 and 1984, a time that saw both the rise of the Ba’th party in Iraq and Khomeini’s return to power in Iran. These changes did much to escalate tensions. The Ba’th party’s ideological, socialist regime and its emphasis on political secular concerns stood in marked contrast to Iran under Khomeini and his efforts to spread an Islamic revolution among the nation’s Shiite majority. The author discusses how these differences have affected three long-term problems: Iraq’s and Iran’s rivalry for dominance in the Arabian Gulf region; disputes over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which serves as a boundary between the two nations; and the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, supported by Iran. The volume also looks at the most recent episodes of crisis and analyzes the evolution of the Iran-Iraq war and its implications both regionally and globally. Unlike other studies of Iraq’s relations with Iran, Abdulghani’s is distinguished by its systematic and comprehensive synthesis which interlocks legal, cultural, historical and political issues that have characterized relations between the two countries.

On November 9, 1989, a mob of jubilant Berliners dismantled the wall that had divided their city for nearly forty years; this act of destruction anticipated the momentous demolition of the European communist system. Within two years, the nations of the former Eastern Bloc toppled their authoritarian regimes, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist, fading quietly into the shadows of twentieth century history and memory. By the end of 1991, the United States and other Western nations celebrated the demise of their most feared enemy and reveled in the ideological vindication of capitalism and liberal democracy. As author Hal Brands compellingly demonstrates, however, many American diplomats and politicians viewed the fall of the Soviet empire as a mixed blessing. For more than four decades, containment of communism provided the overriding goal of American foreign policy, allowing generations of political leaders to build domestic consensus on this steady, reliable foundation. From Berlin to Baghdad incisively dissects the numerous unsuccessful attempts to devise a new grand foreign policy strategy that could match the moral clarity and political efficacy of containment. Brands takes a fresh look at the key events and players in recent American history. In the 1990s, George H. W. Bush envisioned the United States as the guardian of a "new world order," and the Clinton administration sought the "enlargement" of America's political and economic influence. However, both presidents eventually came to accept, albeit grudgingly, that America's multifaceted roles, responsibilities, and objectives could not be reduced to a single fundamental principle. During the early years of the George W. Bush administration, it appeared that the tragedies of 9/11 and the subsequent "war on terror" would provide the organizing principle lacking in U.S. foreign policy since the containment of communism became an outdated notion. For a time, most Americans were united in support of Bush's foreign policies and the military incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq. As the swift invasions became grinding occupations, however, popular support for Bush's policies waned, and the rubric of the war on terror lost much of its political and rhetorical cachet. From Berlin to Baghdad charts the often onerous course of recent American foreign policy, from the triumph of the fall of the Berlin Wall to the tragedies of 9/11 and beyond, analyzing the nation's search for purpose in the face of the daunting complexities of the post–Cold War world.