This book examines the history of the relationship between these two centuries during the past twenty years and attempts to dispel the misconception that the Soviet Union has enjoyed undue influence over Iraq.

Relations between the USSR and Iran during the period from the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic up to early 1983 are reviewed in this book. It begins with a brief survey of Russian-Persian relations in earlier years, with a focus on the developments that served as a background to the current events. It examines Soviet attitudes and reactions to Iran’s foreign and internal policy and highlights the way in which the Soviets often raise events of which they do not approve in order to draw Iran closer to them. In particular, the book discusses the Soviet response to the Iran-Iraq war and the position of the Tudeh Party and the other leftists within Iran. Iran’s policy towards the USSR is treated at length and it is shown that it is suspicious of a tacit USA-USSR agreement over the fate of Iran. Khomeini’s attempts to isolate Iran from both East and West are also reviewed. This book was one of the first to discuss this crucial dimension in Middle East politics and it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the forces driving the Iranian Revolution.

This study focuses on the impact of Soviet policy toward the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, discussing Soviet interpretations of the Iranian revolution and evaluations of the potent impact of the fundamentalist revival for Moscow's clients in the region.

In the first years of the Soviet regime there was little, if any, Soviet interest in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Over the last fifty years relations between Russia and this part of the world have become more complex; this book traces their intricate history in a full analysis of Soviet policy towards the Arabian Peninsula. It opens with a review of events from the beginning of the Soviet regime until 1975. The author goes on to consider the period between 1975 and 1978, concentrating especially on Soviet relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and South Yemen. The impact of the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic in 1979 is examined in detail, with the emphasis on the situation in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and both North and South Yemen. Finally the author examines the effect on Soviet policy of the Iran-Iraq war and the subsequent insecurity in the Gulf region. This study is based on mainly primary sources of Soviet, Arab, Iranian and Western origins.

From the beginning of the Ba'th regime in 1968 to the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Iraq was the Soviet Union's most important ally in the Middle East. Haim Shemesh explores the evolution of this Soviet-Iraqi relationship - one that Moscow often exploited - concentrating on the impact of the 1969-1975 and 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflicts on the fluctuations in Soviet-Iraqi ties and also examining other issues relevant to the alliance: the Iraqi communist party, the Kurdish problem, and developments in the Arab East, including the Arab-Israeli dispute. Shemesh's conclusions, based on comparative analyses of Soviet, Arab and Western sources, contribute to a better understanding of not only Soviet-Middle Eastern relations, but also Soviet-Third World relations in general.

For more than three decades, the Soviet Union was a major force in the Middle East, and superpower rivalry exacerbated many of the conflicts endemic to the region. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have fundamentally altered the rules of the game in Middle East politics, producing a new fluidity in the region, new diplomatic alignments, and new opportunities for peace. The contributors place recent developments in historical and political context, analyzing changes in Soviet Middle East policy under Gorbachev as well as evaluating developments since the demise of the Soviet Union. The evolution of Moscow's policy toward the Arab states, Israel, the P.L.O., and the U.N. is given special attention. The contributors also examine the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the new states of Central Asia and weigh the potential implications of this development for the Middle East. In addition, they discuss security issues related to the transfer of military technology from former Soviet republics to the countries of the Middle East.

This book analyzes the ways in which US policy toward Iraq was dictated by America's broader Cold War strategy between 1958 and 1975. While most historians have focused on “hot” Cold War conflicts such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, few have recognized Iraq's significance as a Cold War battleground. This book argues that US decisions and actions were designed to deny the Soviet Union influence over Iraq and to create a strategic base in the oil-rich Gulf region. Using newly available primary sources and interviews, this book reveals new details on America's decision-making toward and actions against Iraq during the height of the Cold War and shows where Iraq fits into the broader historiography of the Cold War in the Middle East. Further, it raises important questions about widely held misconceptions of US-Iraqi relations, such as the CIA's alleged involvement in the 1963 Ba'thist coup and the theory that the US sold out the Kurds in 1975.