In the 1980s and '90s many countries turned to the private sector to provide infrastructure and utilities, such as gas, telephones, and highways--with the idea that market-based incentives would control costs and improve the quality of essential services. But subsequent debacles including the collapse of California's wholesale electricity market and the bankruptcy of Britain's largest railroad company have raised troubling questions about privatization. This book addresses one of the most vexing of these: how can government fairly and effectively regulate "natural monopolies"--those infrastructure and utility services whose technologies make competition impractical? Rather than sticking to economics, José Gómez-Ibáñez draws on history, politics, and a wealth of examples to provide a road map for various approaches to regulation. He makes a strong case for favoring market-oriented and contractual approaches--including private contracts between infrastructure providers and customers as well as concession contracts with the government acting as an intermediary--over those that grant government regulators substantial discretion. Contracts can provide stronger protection for infrastructure customers and suppliers--and greater opportunities to tailor services to their mutual advantage. In some cases, however, the requirements of the firms and their customers are too unpredictable for contracts to work, and alternative schemes may be needed.

More than 200 new infrastructure regulators have been created around the world in the last 15 years. They were established to encourage clear and sustainable long-term economic and legal commitments by governments and investors to encourage new investment to benefit existing and new customers. There is now considerable evidence that both investors and consumers-the two groups that were supposed to have benefited from these new regulatory systems-have often been disappointed with their performance. The fundamental premise of this book is that regulatory systems can be successfully reformed only if there are independent, objective and public evaluations of their performance. Just as one goes to a medical doctor for a regular health checkup, it is clear that infrastructure regulation would also benefit from periodic checkups. This book provides a general framework as well as detailed practical guidance on how to perform such "regulatory checkups."

An economic analysis of what distributed ledgers can do, examining key components and discussing applications in both developed and emerging market economies. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) has the potential to transform economic organization and financial structure. In this book, Robert Townsend steps back from the hype and controversy surrounding DLT (and the related, but not synonymous, innovations of blockchain and Bitcoin) to offer an economic analysis of what distributed ledgers can do. Townsend examines the key components of distributed ledgers, discussing, evaluating, and illustrating each in the context of historical and contemporary economics, and reviewing featured applications in both developed economies and emerging-market countries.

In this comparison of infrastructure across countries and sectors, leading international academics and practitioners consider the latest approaches to infrastructure policy, implementation, and finance. The book presents evidence-based solutions and policy considerations, essential concepts and economic theories, and a current overview.

More than 50 percent of the global population resides in urban areas where land policy and infrastructure interactions facilitate economic opportunities, affect the quality of life, and influence patterns of urban development. While infrastructure is as old as cities, technological changes and public policies on taxation and regulation produce new issues worthy of analysis, ranging from megaprojects and greenhouse gas emissions to involuntary resettlement. This volume, based on the 2012 seventh annual Land Policy Conference at the Lincoln Institute, brings together economists, social scientists, urban planners, and engineers to discuss how infrastructure issues impact low-, middle-, and high-income countries. Infrastructure drives economic and social activities. For urban areas, the challenges of balancing economic growth with infrastructure development and maintenance are reflected in debates about finance, regulation, and location and about the sustainable levels of infrastructure services. Relevant sectors include energy (electricity and natural gas); telecommunications (phone lines, mobile phone service, and Internet); transportation (airports, railways, roads, waterways, and seaports); and water supply and sanitation (piped water, irrigation, and sewage collection and treatment). Recent research shows that inadequate infrastructure is associated with income inequality. This is likely linked to the delivery of infrastructure services to households, such as direct health benefits, improved access to education, and enhanced economic opportunities. Because so much infrastructure is energy intensive, efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other negative impacts must address services such as electric power and transport. Bringing the management of infrastructure up to levels of good practice has a large economic payoff, and performance levels vary dramatically between and within countries. A crucial unmet challenge is to convince policy makers and voters that large economic returns can result from improving infrastructure performance and maintenance.

Electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railways, and water supply, are often vertically and horizontally integrated state monopolies. This results in weak services, especially in developing and transition economies, and for poor people. Common problems include low productivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue, and investment shortfalls. Many countries over the past two decades have restructured, privatized and regulated their infrastructure. This report identifies the challenges involved in this massive policy redirection. It also assesses the outcomes of these changes, as well as their distributional consequences for poor households and other disadvantaged groups. It recommends directions for future reforms and research to improve infrastructure performance, identifying pricing policies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and social equity, suggesting rules governing access to bottleneck infrastructure facilities, and proposing ways to increase poor people's access to these crucial services.

Regulation of public infrastructure has been a topic of interest for more than a century. Yet, little is known about what works and why, when it comes to infrastructure regulation. This book intends to contribute to the understanding of infrastructure regulations by analyzing empirical cases in telecommunications, electricity and water, with examples drawn from a number of countries in Asia and beyond. The book addresses the following questions: Does regulation work? What kind of regulation works? What kinds don't work? Why do some forms of regulation work and not others? How do we know whether they work or not? How do we isolate the effects of different political, economic and legal contexts? Are there systematic differences across infrastructure sectors that necessitate particular regulatory design? It brings together distinguished scholars and practitioners who are experts in the area to address essential issues in regulation through conceptual and empirical studies.

During the 1990s, infrastructure concessions were hailed as the solution to Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit, by combining private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. This publication examines the design and implementation of over 1,000 examples of concession contracts, in order to identify the problems that have occurred in the process. It goes on to highlight lessons to be learned for the future, in order to realise the potential benefits of infrastructure reform and to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.

Countries exiting conflict and fragility face many urgent priorities and almost invariably suffer from substantial infrastructure deficits. There is typically very little infrastructure investment during periods of fragility and conflict, and existing installations are often damaged or destroyed. The purpose of this manual is to contribute to improvements in the quality of infrastructure regulation. It does so by identifying key principles for the governance of infrastructure regulators and by suggesting how these principles can be introduced successfully and maintained over time. The introduction of cross-cutting governance principles for regulators is based on the assumption that a uniform set of governance principles can be less costly and complex for governments to implement and enforce and will provide potential investors with a more consistent and predictable regulatory environment to navigate. The manual also discusses the process of implementing regulatory governance reforms in fragile contexts. Improvements in governance frameworks for infrastructure regulators will support better and accountable regulatory decision-making, as well as increased investment and overall economic development. Case studies from relevant country experience complement and provide context to the discussion on principles.

Regulation of public infrastructure has been a topic of interest for more than a century. Providing public goods, securing their financing, maintenance, and improving the efficiency of their delivery, has generated a voluminous literature and series of debates. More recently, these issues have again become a central concern, as new public management approaches have transformed the role of the state in the provision of public goods and the modalities by which the financing of infrastructure and its operation are procured.Yet, despite the proliferation of new modalities of regulating infrastructure little is known about what works and why. Why do certain regulatory regimes fail and others succeed? What regulatory designs and institutional features produce optimal outcomes and how? And why do regulatory forms of governance when transplanted into different institutional contexts produce less than uniform outcomes?This book addresses these questions, exploring the theoretical foundations of regulation as well as a series of case studies drawn from the telecommunications, electricity, and water sectors. It brings together distinguished scholars and expert practitioners to explore the practical problems of regulation, regulatory design, infrastructure operation, and the implications for infrastructure provision.