This title provides a practical guide for regulators, policy-makers, and utility managers for establishing regulatory accounts that can be the cornerstone for better, more complete, and more reliable information. It sets out the essential accounting features of regulatory accounts and provides practical guidance on controversial areas such as cost allocation, asset valuation, and depreciation. It emphasizes the essential requirements for consistency with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

Ch. 1. Regulating infrastructure : a review of the issues, problems, and challenges / Ed Araral [und weitere] -- pt. I. Problems, issues, and perspectives in regulation, regulatory design and outcomes. ch. 2. Infrastructure regulation : what works, why, and how do we know? / Judith Clifton [und weitere]. ch. 3. Does political accountability matter for infrastructure regulation? : the case of telecommunications / Farid Gasmi, Paul Noumba and Laura Recuero Virto. ch. 4. Entry relaxation and an independent regulator : performance impact on the mobile telecoms industry in Asia / Chalita Srinuan, Pratompong Srinuan and Erik Bohlin -- pt. II. Electricity sector regulation & governance. ch. 5. Risk, regulation and governance : institutional processes and regulatory risk in the Thai energy sector / Darryl S.L. Jarvis. ch. 6. Electricity tariff regulation in Thailand : analyses and applications of incentive regulation / Puree Sirasoontorn. ch. 7. Regulating power without a five year plan : institutional changes in the Chinese power sector / Kun-Chin Lin, Mika Purra and Hui Lin. ch. 8. The Indonesian electricity sector : institutional transition, regulatory capacity and outcomes / Mika Purra. ch. 9. Regulating the independent power producers : a comparative analysis of performance of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu in India / Rajendra Kumar. ch. 10. Partial privatization and nested regulation : institutional choices in public sector and regulatory reform / Sunil Tankha. ch. 11. The electricity industry reform in Korea : lessons for further liberalization / Junki Kim and Kyuhyun Kim -- pt. III. Water sector regulation & governance. ch. 12. Regulatory independence and contract incompleteness : assessing regulatory effectiveness in water privatization in Manila / Xun Wu, Loit Batac and Nepomuceno A. Malaluan. ch. 13. Can regulation improve the performance of government-controlled water utilities? / David Ehrhardt and Nils Janson. ch. 14. Effects of regulatory quality and political institutions on access to water and sanitation / Andrew B. Whitford, Helen Smith and Anant Mandawat. ch. 15. The regulation of water infrastructure in Italy : origins and effects of an 'hybrid' regulatory system / Alberto Asquer. ch. 16. Measuring effectiveness of regulation across a river system : a welfare approach / Alex Coram and Lyle Noakes. ch. 17. Private sector participation and regulatory reform in water supply : the Southern Mediterranean experience / Edouard Perard. ch. 18. Tempered responsiveness through regulatory negotiations in the water sector : managing unanticipated innovations emerging from participation reforms / Boyd Fuller and Sunil Tankha

An economic analysis of what distributed ledgers can do, examining key components and discussing applications in both developed and emerging market economies. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) has the potential to transform economic organization and financial structure. In this book, Robert Townsend steps back from the hype and controversy surrounding DLT (and the related, but not synonymous, innovations of blockchain and Bitcoin) to offer an economic analysis of what distributed ledgers can do. Townsend examines the key components of distributed ledgers, discussing, evaluating, and illustrating each in the context of historical and contemporary economics, and reviewing featured applications in both developed economies and emerging-market countries.

This book provides a comprehensive discussion of the public policy and management issues that are encountered in the regulation of infrastructure and utilities. Drawing from theoretical arguments and several case studies, the book is divided into three parts, namely devising regulation, installing regulation, and making regulation work. The first part covers theories of regulation, regulatory policies, strategies and tools, and regulatory reforms. The second part deals with the politics of regulation and regulatory capacity. The third part discusses regulatory commitment and investments, the performance of regulated industries, and the design of regulatory systems. Case studies pay attention to various sectors (including water, electricity, telecommunications, highways, railways, district heating, and airports) from countries in every region of the world. ; ;

More than 200 new infrastructure regulators have been created around the world in the last 15 years. They were established to encourage clear and sustainable long-term economic and legal commitments by governments and investors to encourage new investment to benefit existing and new customers. There is now considerable evidence that both investors and consumers-the two groups that were supposed to have benefited from these new regulatory systems-have often been disappointed with their performance. The fundamental premise of this book is that regulatory systems can be successfully reformed only if there are independent, objective and public evaluations of their performance. Just as one goes to a medical doctor for a regular health checkup, it is clear that infrastructure regulation would also benefit from periodic checkups. This book provides a general framework as well as detailed practical guidance on how to perform such "regulatory checkups."

Electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railways, and water supply, are often vertically and horizontally integrated state monopolies. This results in weak services, especially in developing and transition economies, and for poor people. Common problems include low productivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue, and investment shortfalls. Many countries over the past two decades have restructured, privatized and regulated their infrastructure. This report identifies the challenges involved in this massive policy redirection. It also assesses the outcomes of these changes, as well as their distributional consequences for poor households and other disadvantaged groups. It recommends directions for future reforms and research to improve infrastructure performance, identifying pricing policies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and social equity, suggesting rules governing access to bottleneck infrastructure facilities, and proposing ways to increase poor people's access to these crucial services.

In the 1980s and '90s many countries turned to the private sector to provide infrastructure and utilities, such as gas, telephones, and highways--with the idea that market-based incentives would control costs and improve the quality of essential services. But subsequent debacles including the collapse of California's wholesale electricity market and the bankruptcy of Britain's largest railroad company have raised troubling questions about privatization. This book addresses one of the most vexing of these: how can government fairly and effectively regulate "natural monopolies"--those infrastructure and utility services whose technologies make competition impractical? Rather than sticking to economics, José Gómez-Ibáñez draws on history, politics, and a wealth of examples to provide a road map for various approaches to regulation. He makes a strong case for favoring market-oriented and contractual approaches--including private contracts between infrastructure providers and customers as well as concession contracts with the government acting as an intermediary--over those that grant government regulators substantial discretion. Contracts can provide stronger protection for infrastructure customers and suppliers--and greater opportunities to tailor services to their mutual advantage. In some cases, however, the requirements of the firms and their customers are too unpredictable for contracts to work, and alternative schemes may be needed.

Regulation of public infrastructure has been a topic of interest for more than a century. Yet, little is known about what works and why, when it comes to infrastructure regulation. This book intends to contribute to the understanding of infrastructure regulations by analyzing empirical cases in telecommunications, electricity and water, with examples drawn from a number of countries in Asia and beyond. The book addresses the following questions: Does regulation work? What kind of regulation works? What kinds don't work? Why do some forms of regulation work and not others? How do we know whether they work or not? How do we isolate the effects of different political, economic and legal contexts? Are there systematic differences across infrastructure sectors that necessitate particular regulatory design? It brings together distinguished scholars and practitioners who are experts in the area to address essential issues in regulation through conceptual and empirical studies.

This casebook is an effort to explain infrastructure markets from a unique perspective: regulation. Regulation means the analysis of two main groups of laws, namely internal market and antitrust law. The aim is to find a uniform regulation applicable to infrastructures in the European common market through a direct reading and explanation of judicial opinions. The book is divided into five parts: two general chapters and three thematic chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the main European law principles applicable to infrastructure markets. The second chapter applies the Services of General Interest doctrine to infrastructure markets: The key issue is the separation of the public administrations and the private companies operating infrastructures. The thematic chapters focus on seaports, railways and airports, respectively. The core of the examination is a dual perspective dealing with both the internal market rules and ensuring fair competition.

The author assesses the importance of the regulatory framework as a determinant of private sector investment in infrastructure. She uses recently compiled data on private and public sector investment in the water, power, telecommunications, railroads, and roads sectors between 1980 and 1998 in nine countries in Latin America. The author finds that the most significant institutional determinant of private investment volumes is the passage of legislation liberalizing the investment regime. This is important because it indicates that the legal basis for reform is probably more critical in determining the quality of the investment climate than specific aspects of the institutional framework governing private sector participation. In accordance with intuition, the author's results indicate that government action to increase regulatory certainty and minimize the perceived risk of expropriation through the establishment of independent regulatory bodies is a critical determinant of the volume of private investment flows. She also finds that the general relationship of private to public investment is one of substitutability.