Rational Behaviour And Bargaining Equilibrium In Games And Social Situations
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Author |
: John C. Harsanyi |
Publisher |
: CUP Archive |
Total Pages |
: 340 |
Release |
: 1986 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0521311837 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780521311830 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (37 Downloads) |
Synopsis Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations by : John C. Harsanyi
This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.
Author |
: John C. Harsanyi |
Publisher |
: Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages |
: 352 |
Release |
: 1977-10-01 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0521208866 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780521208864 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (66 Downloads) |
Synopsis Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations by : John C. Harsanyi
This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.
Author |
: John C. Harsanyi |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: |
Release |
: 1977 |
ISBN-10 |
: OCLC:642097241 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (41 Downloads) |
Synopsis Ratiojal behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations by : John C. Harsanyi
Author |
: Jeffrey Carpenter |
Publisher |
: MIT Press |
Total Pages |
: 725 |
Release |
: 2022-12-06 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780262047296 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0262047292 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (96 Downloads) |
Synopsis Game Theory and Behavior by : Jeffrey Carpenter
An introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. This introductory text on game theory provides students with both the theoretical tools to analyze situations through the logic of game theory and the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. It is unique among game theory texts in offering a clear, formal introduction to standard game theory while incorporating evidence from experimental data and introducing recent behavioral models. Students will not only learn about incentives, how to represent situations as games, and what agents “should” do in these situations, but they will also be presented with evidence that either confirms the theoretical assumptions or suggests a way in which the theory might be updated. Features: Each chapter begins with a motivating example that can be run as an experiment and ends with a discussion of the behavior in the example. Parts I–IV cover the fundamental “nuts and bolts” of any introductory game theory course, including the theory of games, simple games with simultaneous decision making by players, sequential move games, and incomplete information in simultaneous and sequential move games. Parts V–VII apply the tools developed in previous sections to bargaining, cooperative game theory, market design, social dilemmas, and social choice and voting. Part VIII offers a more in-depth discussion of behavioral game theory models including evolutionary and psychological game theory. Supplemental material on the book’s website include solutions to end-of-chapter exercises, a manual for running each chapter’s experimental games using pencil and paper, and the oTree codes for running the games online.
Author |
: Reinhard Selten |
Publisher |
: Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages |
: 319 |
Release |
: 2013-03-09 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9789401577748 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9401577749 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (48 Downloads) |
Synopsis Models of Strategic Rationality by : Reinhard Selten
The papers collected in this volume relate to game theory. They aim at the elaboration and discussion of basic con cepts, at the analysis of specific applied models and at the evaluation of experimental evidence. A game is a mathematical model of a situation where several actors with different goals are engaged in strategic inter action. Game theory explores the nature and the consequence. s of rational behavior in games. With respect to several papers in this volume, it seems to be appropriate to comment on later developments. A list of some important references is given at the end of the intro duction. References already included in the collected pa pers are not repeated here. In casual conversation colleagues sometimes observe that the author on the one hand goes to extremes in the elabora tion of the consequences of Bayesian rationality and on the other hand strongly emphasizes the limited rationality of actual decision behavior. This seeming discrepancy is also expressed in the collection presented here. The author thinks that a sharp distinction should be made between nor ~ative and descriptive game theory. This position of "methodological dualism" has been expressed in a comment to Aumann's paper "What is game theory trying to accomplish?" (Aumann, 1985, Selten 1985) Normative game theory has the important task to explore the nature and the consequences of idealized full rationality in strategic interaction. This requires a thorough discuss ion of first principles. Empirical arguments are irrelevant here.
Author |
: Paul Weirich |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 283 |
Release |
: 2009-12-01 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780199741458 |
ISBN-13 |
: 019974145X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (58 Downloads) |
Synopsis Collective Rationality by : Paul Weirich
Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action. The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.
Author |
: Russell Golman |
Publisher |
: MDPI |
Total Pages |
: 128 |
Release |
: 2021-01-07 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9783039437733 |
ISBN-13 |
: 3039437739 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (33 Downloads) |
Synopsis Behavioral Game Theory by : Russell Golman
How do interacting decision-makers make strategic choices? If they’re rational and can somehow predict each other’s behavior, they may find themselves in a Nash equilibrium. However, humans display pervasive and systematic departures from rationality. They often do not conform to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium, or its various refinements. This has led to the growth of behavioral game theory, which accounts for how people actually make strategic decisions by incorporating social preferences, bounded rationality (for example, limited iterated reasoning), and learning from experience. This book brings together new advances in the field of behavioral game theory that help us understand how people actually make strategic decisions in game-theoretic situations.
Author |
: John C. Harsanyi |
Publisher |
: Mit Press |
Total Pages |
: 378 |
Release |
: 1988 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0262582384 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780262582384 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (84 Downloads) |
Synopsis A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games by : John C. Harsanyi
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
Author |
: Jacob K. Goeree |
Publisher |
: Princeton University Press |
Total Pages |
: 322 |
Release |
: 2016-06-28 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780691124230 |
ISBN-13 |
: 069112423X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (30 Downloads) |
Synopsis Quantal Response Equilibrium by : Jacob K. Goeree
Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
Author |
: Francesco Farina |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 370 |
Release |
: 1996 |
ISBN-10 |
: 0198289812 |
ISBN-13 |
: 9780198289814 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (12 Downloads) |
Synopsis Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour by : Francesco Farina
The connection between economics and ethics is as old as economics itself, and central to both disciplines. The essays included in the present volume provide an analysis of the connections between ethics and economics as viewed from several different - oft