The connection between economics and ethics is as old as economics itself, and central to both disciplines. The essays included in the present volume provide an analysis of the connections between ethics and economics as viewed from several different - oft

The links between self-interest and morality have been examined in moral philosophy since Plato. Economics is a mostly value-free discipline, having lost its original ethical dimension as described by Adam Smith. Examining moral philosophy through the framework provided by economics offers new insights into both disciplines and the discussion on the origins and nature of morality. The Morality of Economic Behaviour: Economics as Ethics argues that moral behaviour does not need to be exogenously encouraged or enforced because morality is a side effect of interactions between self-interested agents. The argument relies on two important parameters: behaviour in a social environment and the effects of intertemporal choice on rational behaviour. Considering social structures and repeated interactions on rational maximisation allows an argument for the morality of economic behaviour. Amoral agents interacting within society can reach moral outcomes. Thus, economics becomes a synthesis of moral and rational choice theory bypassing the problems of ethics in economic behaviour whilst promoting moral behaviour and ethical outcomes. This approach sheds new light on practical issues such as economic policy, business ethics and social responsibility. This book is of interest primarily to students of politics, economics and philosophy but will also appeal to anyone who is interested in morality and ethics, and their relationship with self-interest.

Economics and moral philosophy have in recent years been considered to be distinct and separate fields. However, behavioural economics has started to reconcile various aspects of morality and economics, which has offered new conceptual opportunities to advance economics ethics and business ethics. This book aims to advance economic ethics and business ethics by combining normative principles and empirical evidence grounded on the key motivational forces in economic decision making. It has three core objectives: to assess order ethics as a theory of both economic ethics and business ethics, using behavioural economics methods and evidence; to identify cardinal virtues for modern business ethics; to to set up valuable guidelines for the implementation of economic ethics and business ethics.

In this elegant critique, Amartya Sen argues that welfare economics can be enriched by paying more explicit attention to ethics, and that modern ethical studies can also benefit from a closer contact with economies. He argues further that even predictive and descriptive economics can be helped by making more room for welfare-economic considerations in the explanation of behaviour.

Rational choice theory forms the core of the economic approach to human behaviour. It is also the most influential philosophical account of practical rationality. Yet there are persistent controversies about the scope of rational choice theory in philosophy and, increasingly, in economics as well. A leading critic is the philosopher and Nobel Laureate economist Amartya Sen, who put forward a trenchant critique of rational choice theory in his seminal paper 'Rational Fools'. Sen emphasizes the importance of commitment - those aspects of human behavior which dispose individuals to co-operate, follow norms, and identify with others. He argues that rational choice theory cannot accommodate commitment, and demands a more adequate account of rationality. The question of how to account for the rationality of commitment is very much an open issue and, if anything, even more pressing today than when Sen first raised it. In Rationality and Commitment, thirteen leading philosophers and economists discuss Sen's claims and propose their own answers to the question of how to account for the rationality of committed action. The volume concludes with a specially-written reply by Sen, in which he responds to his critics and provides a rich commentary on the preceding essays.

Economics as Moral Science investigates the problem of the ethical neutrality of "mainstream" economic theory within the context of the methodology of economics as a science. Against the conventional wisdom, the author argues that there are serious moral presuppositions to the theory, but that economics could still count as a scientific or rational form of inquiry. The basic questions addressed - the ethical implications of economics, its status as a scientific mode of theory-construction, and the relation between these factors - are absolutely fundamental ones for an understanding of contemporary economics, the philosophy of the human sciences, and our current market culture. Moreover, the study provides a thorough philosophical analysis of the critical issues at stake from the inside, from the credible perspective of a particular, but foundational economic theory - the neoclassical theory of rational choice.

When John Harsanyi came to Stanford University as a candidate for the Ph.D., I asked him why he was bothering, since it was most un likely that he had anything to learn from us. He was already a known scho lar; in addition to some papers in economics, the first two papers in this vol ume had already been published and had dazzled me by their originality and their combination of philosophical insight and technical competence. However, I am very glad I did not discourage him; whether he learned any thing worthwhile I don't know, but we all learned much from him on the foundations of the theory of games and specifically on the outcome of bar gaining. The central focus of Harsanyi's work has continued to be in the theory of games, but especially on the foundations and conceptual problems. The theory of games, properly understood, is a very broad approach to social interaction based on individually rational behavior, and it connects closely with fundamental methodological and substantive issues in social science and in ethics. An indication of the range of Harsanyi's interest in game the ory can be found in the first paper of Part B -though in fact his owncontri butions are much broader-and in the second paper the applications to the methodology of social science. The remaining papers in that section show more specifically the richness of game theory in specific applications.

An authoritative examination of the implications of conventional conceptions of rational economic man for all economic study as well as the role of rationality and morals in economics.

Since the days of Adam Smith, ethics and economics have been closely intertwined, and were nominally separated only with the advent of neoclassical economics in the beginning of the last century. This book features eleven essays by leading scholars in economics and philosophy who argue for a renewal of the bond between the two disciplines. Several of the contributors argue that the ethical content of economics and moral status of the market have been misunderstood, for better and for worse. Some recommend changes in the way that individual economic choice is modelled, in order to incorporate ethical as well as self-interested motivations. Finally, others question the way that societies assess economic policies that affect the welfare and dignity of their constituents. A wide range of philosophical perspectives is offered, drawing from the classic writings of Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and the ancient Stoics, to that of current scholars such as Amartya Sen, Elizabeth Anderson, and Christine Korsgaard. This book provides a comprehensive introduction to the cutting edge of interdisciplinary research between ethics and economics, and is sure to be an important resource for scholars in both fields. This book was published as a combination of the special issues Review of Political Economy and Review of Social Economy.

A key issue in economic discourse today is the relation (or lack of it) between economic behaviour and morality. Few (presumably) would want to deny that human beings are in some sense moral or ethical creatures, but the devil is in the detail. Should we think of economic behaviour as an essentially amoral process – a process adequately characterised by a means-ends rationality – into which any number of subjective ethical concerns or orientations may be intruded to give a particular action its determinate moral content? Or is it rather the case that our moral being runs deeper than this, in the sense that all of our behaviour – ‘economic’ or otherwise – is enabled or capacitated by a competence that is fundamentally ethical in character? With new analyses of the work of Hobbes and Smith, Dixon and Wilson offer a fresh approach to the debate surrounding economics and morality with a novel discussion of the self in economic theory. This book calls for a change in the way that the relation between economic behaviour and morality is understood – from an understanding of morality as a kind of preference that informs certain types of other-regarding behaviour (the way that modern economics understands the relationship), to an idea of morality as a competence that enables or, rather, conditions the possibility of all forms of human behaviour, other-regarding or not. Offering a new insight on homo economicus, this book will be of great interest to all those interested in the history of economics and of economic thought.