Raids Rewards And Reputations In The Market For Managerial Talent
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Author |
: C. Edward Fee |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: |
Release |
: 2003 |
ISBN-10 |
: OCLC:1291251516 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (16 Downloads) |
Synopsis Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent by : C. Edward Fee
We study the job movements of senior executives across firms. We find that executives who jump to CEO positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit above-average stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an 'heir-apparent' on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance. Implications of these findings for issues related to managerial incentives, managerial retention, and incentive design are discussed.
Author |
: Charles J. Hadlock |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 56 |
Release |
: 2001 |
ISBN-10 |
: OCLC:1290403461 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (61 Downloads) |
Synopsis Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for CEO Talent by : Charles J. Hadlock
We examine the basic hypothesis that the market for managerial talent rewards managers from firms with superior stock price performance. We identify a set of outside CEO hires in a set of large publicly traded firms and investigate the stock price performance of the prior employers of these executives. Using 5-year buy-and-hold returns as our basic performance measure, we find that the prior employers of our sample executives did, on average, exhibit superior performance compared to a variety of benchmarks. A conditional logit analysis confirms that superior firm performance increases the likelihood that an executive will get an outside CEO job. Our results are most pronounced for executives who jump immediately from their prior employer to the new employer (raids) and for executives who were more highly ranked at their prior employer.We also examine compensation contracts and find that executives are typically awarded large initial hiring grants composed of stock options, restricted stock, and cash signing bonuses. These grants are highly correlated with the value of the unvested option and restricted stock position the executive leaves behind at his old employer. The evidence also suggests that these grants are positively related to prior firm performance, even after controlling for the forfeited position at the prior employer.We interpret our findings as providing substantial support for the basic hypothesis that superior stock price performance enhances an executive's external labor market opportunities. In our view this is an interesting and important finding, as it supports the basic assumption underlying a large class of models concerning executive decision making and contracting in the presence of career concerns.
Author |
: Yipeng Liu |
Publisher |
: Edward Elgar Publishing |
Total Pages |
: 489 |
Release |
: 2019 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9781786437105 |
ISBN-13 |
: 1786437104 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (05 Downloads) |
Synopsis Research Handbook of International Talent Management by : Yipeng Liu
International talent management has become a critically important topic for scholarly discussion, in policy debates, and among the business community. Despite this, however, research into talent management tends to lack theoretical underpinnings, especially from an international, multidisciplinary, and comparative perspective. This Research Handbook fills this gap, bringing together a range of leading researchers, scholars, and thinkers to debate and advance the conceptualization and understanding of this multifaceted subject.
Author |
: Lukas Hengartner |
Publisher |
: Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages |
: 224 |
Release |
: 2007-12-31 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9783835093911 |
ISBN-13 |
: 3835093916 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (11 Downloads) |
Synopsis Explaining Executive Pay by : Lukas Hengartner
Lukas Hengartner shows that both firm complexity and managerial power are associated with higher pay levels. This suggests that top managers are paid for the complexity of their job and that more powerful top managers receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders.
Author |
: Orley Ashenfelter |
Publisher |
: Elsevier |
Total Pages |
: 1141 |
Release |
: 2010-12-14 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780444534521 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0444534520 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (21 Downloads) |
Synopsis Handbook of Labor Economics by : Orley Ashenfelter
A guide to the continually evolving field of labour economics.
Author |
: Bjørn Espen Eckbo |
Publisher |
: Elsevier |
Total Pages |
: 605 |
Release |
: 2011-10-13 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780080932118 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0080932118 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (18 Downloads) |
Synopsis Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance by : Bjørn Espen Eckbo
This second volume of a two-part series examines three major topics. First, it devotes five chapters to the classical issue of capital structure choice. Second, it focuses on the value-implications of major corporate investment and restructuring decisions, and then concludes by surveying the role of pay-for-performance type executive compensation contracts on managerial incentives and risk-taking behavior. In collaboration with the first volume, this handbook takes stock of the main empirical findings to date across an unprecedented spectrum of corporate finance issues. The surveys are written by leading empirical researchers that remain active in their respective areas of interest. With few exceptions, the writing style makes the chapters accessible to industry practitioners. For doctoral students and seasoned academics, the surveys offer dense roadmaps into the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work. - Nine original chapters summarize research advances and future topics in the classical issues of capital structure choice, corporate investment behavior, and firm value - Multinational comparisons underline the volume's empirical perspectives - Complements the presentation of econometric issues, banking, and capital acquisition research covered by Volume 1
Author |
: Sydney Finkelstein |
Publisher |
: Strategic Management |
Total Pages |
: 480 |
Release |
: 2009 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780195162073 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0195162072 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (73 Downloads) |
Synopsis Strategic Leadership by : Sydney Finkelstein
This book integrates and assesses the vast and rapidly growing literature on strategic leadership, which is the study of top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic premise is that in order to understand why organizations do the things they do, or perform the way they do, we need to deeply comprehend the people at the top-- their experiences, abilities, values, social connections, aspirations, and other human features. The actions--or inactions--of a relatively small number of key people at the apex of an organization can dramatically affect organizational outcomes. The scope of strategic leadership includes individual executives, especially chief executive officers (CEOs), groups of executives (top management teams, or TMTs); and governing bodies (particularly boards of directors). Accordingly, the book addresses an array of topics regarding CEOs (e.g., values, personality, motives, demography, succession, and compensation); TMTs (including composition, processes, and dynamics); and boards of directors (why boards look and behave the way they do, and the consequences of board profiles and behaviors). Strategic Leadership synthesizes what is known about strategic leadership and indicates new research directions. The book is meant primarily for scholars who strive to assess and understand the phenomena of strategic leadership. It offers a considerable foundation on which professionals involved in executive search, compensation, appraisal and staffing, as well as board members who evaluate executive performance and potential, might build their tools and perspectives.
Author |
: Noam Wasserman |
Publisher |
: Princeton University Press |
Total Pages |
: 490 |
Release |
: 2013-04 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780691158303 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0691158304 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (03 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Founder's Dilemmas by : Noam Wasserman
The Founder's Dilemmas examines how early decisions by entrepreneurs can make or break a startup and its team. Drawing on a decade of research, including quantitative data on almost ten thousand founders as well as inside stories of founders like Evan Williams of Twitter and Tim Westergren of Pandora, Noam Wasserman reveals the common pitfalls founders face and how to avoid them.
Author |
: Graeme Alexander Guthrie |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 353 |
Release |
: 2017 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780190641184 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0190641185 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (84 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Firm Divided by : Graeme Alexander Guthrie
The Firm Divided blends the narrative of events involving particular firms and individuals with the insights of that academic research to present a coherent framework that ties the various strands of corporate governance-good and bad-together.
Author |
: Matthias Kiefer |
Publisher |
: Matthias Kiefer |
Total Pages |
: 262 |
Release |
: 2015-01-01 |
ISBN-10 |
: |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Synopsis An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework by : Matthias Kiefer
I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.