We examine the basic hypothesis that the market for managerial talent rewards managers from firms with superior stock price performance. We identify a set of outside CEO hires in a set of large publicly traded firms and investigate the stock price performance of the prior employers of these executives. Using 5-year buy-and-hold returns as our basic performance measure, we find that the prior employers of our sample executives did, on average, exhibit superior performance compared to a variety of benchmarks. A conditional logit analysis confirms that superior firm performance increases the likelihood that an executive will get an outside CEO job. Our results are most pronounced for executives who jump immediately from their prior employer to the new employer (raids) and for executives who were more highly ranked at their prior employer.We also examine compensation contracts and find that executives are typically awarded large initial hiring grants composed of stock options, restricted stock, and cash signing bonuses. These grants are highly correlated with the value of the unvested option and restricted stock position the executive leaves behind at his old employer. The evidence also suggests that these grants are positively related to prior firm performance, even after controlling for the forfeited position at the prior employer.We interpret our findings as providing substantial support for the basic hypothesis that superior stock price performance enhances an executive's external labor market opportunities. In our view this is an interesting and important finding, as it supports the basic assumption underlying a large class of models concerning executive decision making and contracting in the presence of career concerns.

We study the job movements of senior executives across firms. We find that executives who jump to CEO positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit above-average stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an 'heir-apparent' on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance. Implications of these findings for issues related to managerial incentives, managerial retention, and incentive design are discussed.

International talent management has become a critically important topic for scholarly discussion, in policy debates, and among the business community. Despite this, however, research into talent management tends to lack theoretical underpinnings, especially from an international, multidisciplinary, and comparative perspective. This Research Handbook fills this gap, bringing together a range of leading researchers, scholars, and thinkers to debate and advance the conceptualization and understanding of this multifaceted subject.

The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Lukas Hengartner shows that both firm complexity and managerial power are associated with higher pay levels. This suggests that top managers are paid for the complexity of their job and that more powerful top managers receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders.

I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.

The Firm Divided blends the narrative of events involving particular firms and individuals with the insights of that academic research to present a coherent framework that ties the various strands of corporate governance-good and bad-together.

The family firm preparing generational change, the partnership that welcomes new partners, and the shareholders of a firm that chooses to go public are making decisions that will have an impact on strategy and management. Conversely, a change in strategy such as a move to diversify or a decision to take on more risk in a business can make the firm more attractive to some shareholders and less attractive to others and is therefore not ownership neutral. Opening the black box of agency theory, Korine and Gomez show how management and ownership interact to shape the strategy of the firm. In their view, the critical question to ask is not what is the best strategy, but rather, who is the strategy for? With numerous detailed examples, Strong Managers, Strong Owners is an invaluable resource for company owners, board members and executives, as well as their advisors in strategy and governance.