Sunk Costs and Market Structure bridges the gap between the new generation of game theoretic models that has dominated the industrial organization literature over the past ten years and the traditional empirical agenda of the subject as embodied in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm developed by Joe S. Bain and his successors.

While online consumers are less concerned than traditional consumers about firm location, they may be more concerned about unobservable quality and, to signal this, online retailers rely more on advertising than traditional retailers. Imperfect price competition may arise because of vertical product differentiation, incomplete consumer awareness, and near-perfect information exchange between retailers. This paper evaluates alternative theories of competition and market structure in online retailing. Advertising, product development, and revenue data for the online book market reveal that consumers respond to advertising and website spending rather than low prices. As the market size expanded, during 1997-2001, these endogenous sunk costs escalated and there was no major new entry. Advertising-to-sales ratios and market-concentration ratios are much higher than for traditional bookselling. Using price and demand information for individual books over a number of weeks, we find counter-cyclical and cross-sectional price variation inconsistent with perfect price competition.

While online consumers are less concerned than traditional consumers about firm location, they may be more concerned about unobservable quality and, to signal this, online retailers rely more on advertising than traditional retailers. Imperfect price competition may arise because of vertical product differentiation, incomplete consumer awareness, and near-perfect information exchange between retailers. This paper evaluates alternative theories of competition and market structure in online retailing. Advertising, product development, and revenue data for the online book market reveal that consumers respond to advertising and website spending rather than low prices. As the market size expanded, during 1997-2001, these endogenous sunk costs escalated and there was no major new entry. Advertising-to-sales ratios and market-concentration ratios are much higher than for traditional bookselling. Using price and demand information for individual books over a number of weeks, we find counter-cyclical and cross-sectional price variation inconsistent with perfect price competition.

I discuss a model of endogenous innovation that brings to the forefront the in-house R&D activity of the modern corporation. In a symmetric oligopoly, firms undertake cost-reducing R&D subject to a research technology with incomplete spillovers. Concentration of sales and R&D resources determine the optimal scale and the efficiency of firms' R&D operations and, thus, the rate of productivity growth. In addition, R&D expenditures (a sunk cost) are one component of total fixed costs and determine the number of active firms in zero-profit equilibrium. This feed-back makes the price, investment, entry, and exit decisions interdependent. A rich characterization of the balanced growth path, defined as the rate of growth and the number of firms that the market supports in general equilibrium, emerges. Multiple equilibria may exist and firms' expectations about rivalry determine the economy's performance.

What is Sunk Cost In economics and business decision-making, a sunk cost is a cost that has already been incurred and cannot be recovered. Sunk costs are contrasted with prospective costs, which are future costs that may be avoided if action is taken. In other words, a sunk cost is a sum paid in the past that is no longer relevant to decisions about the future. Even though economists argue that sunk costs are no longer relevant to future rational decision-making, people in everyday life often take previous expenditures in situations, such as repairing a car or house, into their future decisions regarding those properties. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Sunk cost Chapter 2: Cognitive bias Chapter 3: Daniel Kahneman Chapter 4: Amos Tversky Chapter 5: Behavioral economics Chapter 6: Prospect theory Chapter 7: Supply and demand Chapter 8: Managerial economics Chapter 9: Loss aversion Chapter 10: Status quo bias Chapter 11: Endowment effect Chapter 12: Richard Thaler Chapter 13: Planning fallacy Chapter 14: Mental accounting Chapter 15: Escalation of commitment Chapter 16: Disposition effect Chapter 17: Reference class forecasting Chapter 18: Heuristic (psychology) Chapter 19: Thinking, Fast and Slow Chapter 20: Cognitive bias mitigation Chapter 21: David Gal (II) Answering the public top questions about sunk cost. (III) Real world examples for the usage of sunk cost in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Sunk Cost.

In an age of dwindling economic competition, instead of breaking up corporate giants, we need to compel them to share their technology, data, and knowledge

This volume examines the economics of platform structure and firm competition within and between online markets. It also details modern theoretical treatments of regulatory intervention in online markets and the consideration of forward-looking experimental analysis of demand for yet to be provided services. The volume is divided into three parts: innovation and competition in online markets; regulation, pricing and evaluation with real options; and empirical approaches to market analysis.