This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.

This book gathers carefully selected works in Mathematical Economics, on myriad topics including General Equilibrium, Game Theory, Economic Growth, Welfare, Social Choice Theory, Finance. It sheds light on the ongoing discussions that have brought together leading researchers from Latin America and Southern Europe at recent conferences in venues like Porto, Portugal; Athens, Greece; and Guanajuato, Mexico. With this volume, the editors not only contribute to the advancement of research in these areas, but also inspire other scholars around the globe to collaborate and research these vibrant, emerging topics.

Comprises 18 contributions on game theory and its applications. Representative topics include: the normalized Banzhaf value and the Banzhaf share function; game problems on rotation surfaces; an optimal stopping of random walks game with reflection; Nash- Hurwitz equilibrium for non-cooperative games; a survey on communication in cooperation games; and selectors of the core and consistency properties. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

The cooperation and contamination among mathematicians, statisticians and econometricians working in actuarial sciences and finance are improving the research on these topics and producing numerous meaningful scientific results. This volume presents new ideas in the form of four- to six-page papers presented at the International Conference MAF2022 – Mathematical and Statistical Methods for Actuarial Sciences and Finance. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the conference, to which this book is related, was organized in a hybrid form by the Department of Economics and Statistics of the University of Salerno, with the partnership of the Department of Economics of Cà Foscari University of Venice, and was held from 20 to 22 April 2022 in Salerno (Italy) MAF2022 is the tenth edition of an international biennial series of scientific meetings, started in 2004 on the initiative of the Department of Economics and Statistics of the University of Salerno. It has established itself internationally with gradual and continuous growth and scientific enrichment. The effectiveness of this idea has been proven by the wide participation in all the editions, which have been held in Salerno (2004, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2022), Venice (2008, 2012 and 2020 online), Paris (2016) and Madrid (2018). This book covers a wide variety of subjects: artificial intelligence and machine learning in finance and insurance, behavioural finance, credit risk methods and models, dynamic optimization in finance, financial data analytics, forecasting dynamics of actuarial and financial phenomena, foreign exchange markets, insurance models, interest rate models, longevity risk, models and methods for financial time series analysis, multivariate techniques for financial markets analysis, pension systems, portfolio selection and management, real-world finance, risk analysis and management, trading systems, and others. This volume is a valuable resource for academics, PhD students, practitioners, professionals and researchers. Moreover, it is also of interest to other readers with quantitative background knowledge.

Since the first Congress in Zürich in 1897, the ICM has been an eagerly awaited event every four years. Many of these occasions are celebrated for historie developments and seminal contributions to mathematics. 2002 marks the year of the 24th ICM, the first of the new millennium. Also historie is the first ICM Satellite Conference devoted to game theory and applications. It is one of those rare occasions, in which masters of the field are able to meet under congenial surroundings to talk and share their gathered wisdom. As is usually the case in ICM meetings, participants of the ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications (Qingdao, August 2(02) hailed from the four corners of the world. In addition to presentations of high qual ity research, the program also included twelve invited plenary sessions with distinguished speakers. This volume, which gathers together selected papers read at the conference, is divided into four sections: (I) Foundations, Concepts, and Structure. (II) Equilibrium Properties. (III) Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences. (IV) Computational Aspects of Games.

Written by leading scholars from various disciplines, this book presents current research on topics such as public choice, game theory, and political economy. It features contributions on fundamental, methodological, and empirical issues around the concepts of power and responsibility that strive to bridge the gap between different disciplinary approaches. The contributions fall into roughly four sub-disciplines: voting and voting power, public economics and politics, economics and philosophy, as well as labor economics. On the occasion of his 75th birthday, this book is written in honor of Manfred J. Holler, an economist by training and profession whose work as a guiding light has helped advance our understanding of the interdisciplinary connections of concepts of power and responsibility. He has written many articles and books on game theory, and worked extensively on questions of labor economics, politics, and philosophy.

This contributed volume contains fourteen papers based on selected presentations from the European Conference on Game Theory SING11-GTM 2015, held at Saint Petersburg State University in July 2015, and the Networking Games and Management workshop, held at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozvavodsk, Russia, also in July 2015. These papers cover a wide range of topics in game theory, including recent advances in areas with high potential for future work, as well as new developments on classical results. Some of these include A new approach to journal ranking using methods from social choice theory; A differential game of a duopoly in which two firms are competing for market share in an industry with network externalities; The impact of information propagation in the model of tax audits; A voting model in which the results of previous votes can affect the process of coalition formation in a decision-making body; The Selten-Szidarovsky technique for the analysis of Nash equilibria of games with an aggregative structure; Generalized nucleoli and generalized bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation; Bayesian networks and games of deterrence; and A new look at the study of solutions for games in partition function form. The maturity and vitality of modern-day game theory are reflected in the new ideas, novel applications, and contributions of young researchers represented in this collection. It will be of interest to anyone doing theoretical research in game theory or working on one its numerous applications.