The 2000-02 comprehensive review of the Fund’s conditionality culminated in the adoption of a set of conditionality guidelines by the Executive Board on September 25, 2002. The 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (the “guidelines”) replace the 1979 Conditionality Guidelines and the Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality of September 18, 2000. A review of experience with the guidelines, looking at how they have been implemented and at their impact, is conducted periodically; summary statistics on conditionality have been prepared annually since 2008.

This paper reviews the design of conditionality in Fund-supported programs from 2002 to end-September 2011, with an emphasis on recent years. It focuses on the content and application of program conditionality—especially structural conditionality—in relation to the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), the Staff Statement on Principles Underlying the Guidelines on Conditionality, and subsequent revisions to operational guidance on conditionality. The analysis is based on the five key interrelated principles guiding the design of conditionality: national ownership of programs, parsimony in program-related conditions, tailoring to country circumstances, effective coordination with other multilateral institutions, and clarity in the specification of conditions. In particular, the principle of parsimony requires that program-related conditions be critical (or the minimum necessary) to achieve program objectives and goals, critical for monitoring program implementation, or necessary for implementing specific provisions under the Articles of Agreement (the "criticality criterion"). Beyond assessing compliance with these guidelines and principles, the paper also examines the implementation of conditionality

This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.

This report seeks to help the IMF enhance its effectiveness by identifying major recurring issues from the IEO’s first 20 evaluations and assessing where they stand. The IMF’s core areas of responsibility are surveillance, lending, and capacity development. The aim of this report is to strengthen the follow-up process by focusing on key issues that recurred in IEO evaluations, rather than on specific recommendations on their implementation. The IEO believes that a framework of reviewing and monitoring recurring issues would be useful in establishing incentives for progress, strengthening the Board’s oversight, and providing learning opportunities for the IMF.

The Seventh PMR includes: (i) a discussion of progress made over the last year on the actions corresponding to four Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) that were classified as still “in progress” in the previous PMR; and (ii) an assessment of the progress made in achieving the high-level objectives in three areas directly related to those MIPs. In addition, an update on substantive issues related to five older MIPs agreed since 2007 is provided at the end of the report. Three new evaluations have been completed by the IEO since March 2014. In July and August 2015, Management issued the MIPs in response to these evaluations. Given that only a short time has passed since their completion, progress in addressing the actions contemplated in those MIPs will be discussed in the next PMR.

The Fund regularly assesses conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with the next formal review planned for 2011. This paper summarizes previous assessments of conditionality, outlines staff’s proposed approach to the forthcoming review, and seeks Directors’ early views on the approach.

This evaluation assesses how well IMF-supported programs helped to sustain economic growth while delivering adjustment needed for external viability over the period 2008–19. The evaluation finds that the Fund’s increasing attention to growth in the programs has delivered some positive results. Specifically, it does not find evidence of a consistent bias towards excessive austerity in IMF-supported programs. Indeed, programs have yielded growth benefits relative to a counterfactual of no Fund engagement and boosted post-program growth performance. Notwithstanding these positive findings, program growth outcomes consistently fell short of program projections. Such shortfalls imply less protection of incomes than intended, fuel adjustment fatigue and public opposition to reforms, and jeopardize progress towards external viability. The evaluation examines how different policy instruments were applied to support better growth outcomes while achieving needed adjustment. Fiscal policies typically incorporated growth-friendly measures but with mixed success. Despite some success in promoting reforms and growth, structural conditionalities were of relatively low depth and their potential growth benefits were not fully realized. Use of the exchange rate as a policy tool to support growth and external adjustment during programs was quite limited. Lastly, market debt operations were useful in some cases to restore debt sustainability and renew market access, yet sometimes were too little and too late to deliver the intended benefits. The evaluation concludes that the IMF should seek to further enhance program countries’ capacity to sustain activity while undertaking needed adjustment during the program and to enhance growth prospects beyond the program. Following this conclusion, the report sets out three recommendations aimed at strengthening attention to growth implications of IMF-supported programs, including the social and distributional consequences.

With single-digit inflation and substantial financial deepening, developing countries are adopting more flexible and forward-looking monetary policy frameworks and ascribing a greater role to policy interest rates and inflation objectives. While some countries have adopted formal inflation targeting regimes, others have developed frameworks with greater target flexibility to accommodate changing money demand, use of policy rates to signal the monetary policy stance, and implicit inflation targets.

Periodic Monitoring Reports (PMRs) were established by the Executive Board in January 2007 to ensure the systematic monitoring of those IEO recommendations that the Board has endorsed. The first PMR was discussed by the Executive Board in January 20081 and the second PMR was discussed by the Evaluation Committee (EVC) in November 2008.2 This third report updates the status of the performance benchmarks related to IEO evaluations covered in the first and second PMRs and listed in Periodic Monitoring Report on the Status of Implementation Plans in Response to Board-Endorsed IEO Recommendations, Table 5. It also updates the implementation status of the management implementation plan (MIP) for Board-endorsed recommendations stemming from the IEO evaluation of "Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs."

This book is both breathtaking in its scope and impressive in its attention to legal and institutional detail in situating developing countries in the evolving body of international economic law. Essays in this volume canvas most important areas of international economic law, including international trade law, international financial regulation, the regulation of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations, foreign aid, the enforcement of human rights standards and core international labour standards on multinational corporations, international enforcement of anti-corruption conventions, international competition law, international intellectual property rights, and international environmental law. A pervasive theme, compellingly developed, in most of these papers is the asymmetric structure of international institutions that generate rules in these various areas, in which developing countries are mostly rule takers, rather than equal participants. The current global financial crisis may provide a welcome opportunity for re-evaluating these institutional asymmetries. In any such re-evaluation, this book will provide a veritable cornucopia of constructive new insights.