The Fund regularly assesses conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with the next formal review planned for 2011. This paper summarizes previous assessments of conditionality, outlines staff’s proposed approach to the forthcoming review, and seeks Directors’ early views on the approach.

Design of Fund-supported programs aims to address country specific needs while remaining even-handed and consistent with Fund policy. This paper examines the extent to which program design and conditionality have been appropriate in pursuing these goals, by seeking to answer several questions: has program design been consistent and evenhanded; has it addressed country specific needs and objectives appropriately; has it been based on reasonably good macroeconomic projections; and has it been flexible in the face of evolving country circumstances. The description and analysis focuses on the period between 2006 and September 2011, with some attention to the 2002-05 period.

This paper examines the effects of Fund-supported programs initiated during 2002-11, with special emphasis on programs started after the onset of the recent global economic crisis. The paper investigates the effects of Fund-supported programs on key macroeconomic variables and, data restrictions permitting, on social variables (social government spending, unemployment and social outcome indicators). Further, it analyzes the contribution of fiscal and external accommodation in helping program countries get through the recent global crisis. The assessment of the impact of Fund-supported programs is necessarily incomplete to the extent that the global financial crisis is ongoing and the most recent crisis programs such as the March 2012 program for Greece are not included. The Crisis Program Review provides detailed analysis of recent GRA-supported programs.

The review generally yields positive findings on conditionality and design in Fund-supported programs. Programs in the review period internalized lessons from the past, for example with program design incorporating the lessons of the Asian crisis, and the approach to conditionality being modified to take into account the recommendations made in the 2007 report on structural conditionality by the Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). (Box 1 also summarizes recommendations from the previous Review of Conditionality and follow-up.) These findings hold for the substantial majority of programs supported under both the Fund’s General Resources Account and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (hereafter GRA programs and PRGT programs, respectively)

This paper reviews the design of conditionality in Fund-supported programs from 2002 to end-September 2011, with an emphasis on recent years. It focuses on the content and application of program conditionality—especially structural conditionality—in relation to the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), the Staff Statement on Principles Underlying the Guidelines on Conditionality, and subsequent revisions to operational guidance on conditionality. The analysis is based on the five key interrelated principles guiding the design of conditionality: national ownership of programs, parsimony in program-related conditions, tailoring to country circumstances, effective coordination with other multilateral institutions, and clarity in the specification of conditions. In particular, the principle of parsimony requires that program-related conditions be critical (or the minimum necessary) to achieve program objectives and goals, critical for monitoring program implementation, or necessary for implementing specific provisions under the Articles of Agreement (the "criticality criterion"). Beyond assessing compliance with these guidelines and principles, the paper also examines the implementation of conditionality

This section provides the background studies relating to dimensions of Fund policy on conditionality. Appendix 1 provides a review of Fund experience with coordination, both in a low-income country (LIC) setting (in African programs) and in an emerging market and advanced economy setting in the European Union (EU) and Euro Area (EA). Appendix 2 summarizes the recent changes to debt limits in LICs and provides an assessment of the implementation of this policy in the early stages (up to mid-February 2011). Appendix 3 reviews the experience of countries with the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and Precautionary Credit Line (PCL)-supported programs. Appendix 4 examines the impact of the 2009 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation on program design

With single-digit inflation and substantial financial deepening, developing countries are adopting more flexible and forward-looking monetary policy frameworks and ascribing a greater role to policy interest rates and inflation objectives. While some countries have adopted formal inflation targeting regimes, others have developed frameworks with greater target flexibility to accommodate changing money demand, use of policy rates to signal the monetary policy stance, and implicit inflation targets.

The twenty-one contributions in this book assess the controversy surrounding the Fund and provide judgments about the criteria for Fund lending which should help readers understand and analyze both its ongoing role in smoothing adjustment to international payments imbalances and its currently critical position in responding to the debt crisis.

This report seeks to help the IMF enhance its effectiveness by identifying major recurring issues from the IEO’s first 20 evaluations and assessing where they stand. The IMF’s core areas of responsibility are surveillance, lending, and capacity development. The aim of this report is to strengthen the follow-up process by focusing on key issues that recurred in IEO evaluations, rather than on specific recommendations on their implementation. The IEO believes that a framework of reviewing and monitoring recurring issues would be useful in establishing incentives for progress, strengthening the Board’s oversight, and providing learning opportunities for the IMF.

The audited consolidated financial statements of the International Monetary Fund as of April 30, 2019 and 2018