This book discusses the existing literature on military doctrines in general, and offensive doctrines in particular, as well as on causes of their stagnation and sources of innovation. It provides the backdrop for an analytical historical review of Israel's offensive military doctrine.

Israel’s military doctrine was aimed at defeating powerful Arab militaries, mostly those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In the years 1948-1982 Israel and Arab states had a series of wars i.e. high intensity wars. Israel, since 1948, also dealt with guerrilla and terror attacks. Since 1982 and mostly in the last 15 years Israel faced hybrid forces, Hamas and Hezbollah. Those groups are a mix between a conventional military and a guerrilla group. Israel fought against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, mostly in two wars, in 2008-2009 and in 2014. This book begins with explaining Israel’s national security policy. Then it focuses on how the IDF (Israel defense forces) had to adjust its doctrine and build up to confront hybrid forces, by examining Israel’s air and the ground corps and major issues such as offense and defense, infrastructure and manpower. The IDF can inflict heavy casualties and damages to a hybrid foe. Yet destroying the latter is a tall order because Hezbollah and Hamas are too elusive, they hide inside populated areas etc. However, compared with past wars against Arab states, there is much less danger to Israel let alone to its survival since even a coalition between Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups can’t defeat the IDF. Furthermore since fighting a hybrid force is less demanding than running a high intensity war against an Arab state, then Israel does not rely that much on the United States in receiving weapon systems, ammunition and spare parts.

Insiders view of the Army of Israel, its structure, its men and women and its most memorable actions.

An overview of offense-defense theory, which argues that the relative ease of offense and defense varies in international politics. Offense-defense theory argues that the relative ease of offense and defense varies in international politics. When the offense has the advantage, military conquest becomes easier and war is more likely; the opposite is true when the defense has the advantage. The balance between offense and defense depends on geography, technology, and other factors. This theory, and the body of related theories, has generated much debate and research over the past twenty-five years.This book presents a comprehensive overview of offense-defense theory. It includes contending views on the theory and some of the most recent attempts to refine and test it.

This comprehensive volume provides a thorough overview of 20th- and 21st-century military doctrines worldwide. Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook takes a thorough look at 20th- and 21st-century military doctrines around the world. It excerpts relevant English-language scholarly and governmental literature to paint a picture of how military doctrine has developed in recent history, what military doctrines are currently operating on the world stage, and where military doctrine is heading in the near future. The book casts a wide net, scanning the relevant government documents, international agreements, monographs, journals, conference papers, and Internet resources to present a thorough overview of the importance of military doctrine in today's highly unstable world. Because military institutions are important formulators of national military doctrine and not merely implementers, this book examines the roles played by military organizations around the world. With the proliferation of independent military scholars and the widespread influence of their work in the Internet age, the book also scans the "gray" literature and describes its effects on military doctrine.

Contents.