Israel’s military doctrine was aimed at defeating powerful Arab militaries, mostly those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In the years 1948-1982 Israel and Arab states had a series of wars i.e. high intensity wars. Israel, since 1948, also dealt with guerrilla and terror attacks. Since 1982 and mostly in the last 15 years Israel faced hybrid forces, Hamas and Hezbollah. Those groups are a mix between a conventional military and a guerrilla group. Israel fought against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, mostly in two wars, in 2008-2009 and in 2014. This book begins with explaining Israel’s national security policy. Then it focuses on how the IDF (Israel defense forces) had to adjust its doctrine and build up to confront hybrid forces, by examining Israel’s air and the ground corps and major issues such as offense and defense, infrastructure and manpower. The IDF can inflict heavy casualties and damages to a hybrid foe. Yet destroying the latter is a tall order because Hezbollah and Hamas are too elusive, they hide inside populated areas etc. However, compared with past wars against Arab states, there is much less danger to Israel let alone to its survival since even a coalition between Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups can’t defeat the IDF. Furthermore since fighting a hybrid force is less demanding than running a high intensity war against an Arab state, then Israel does not rely that much on the United States in receiving weapon systems, ammunition and spare parts.

This book discusses the existing literature on military doctrines in general, and offensive doctrines in particular, as well as on causes of their stagnation and sources of innovation. It provides the backdrop for an analytical historical review of Israel's offensive military doctrine.

Seeks to provide a contemporary picture of Israel's political-military doctrine. Focuses on its conditioning factors, such as Israel's view of the military threat to its security, the constraints under which it operates, and the assets it disposes of. Political-military elements of the doctrine include Israeli approaches to deterrence, war objectives, "defensible borders," and others; operational elements of the doctrine include emphasis on swift offensives, indirect approach, the special role of the Air Force and Armored Corps, and others. The study analyzes past posture and behavior, but discusses evolution and change only selectively with the purpose of elucidating the contemporary relevance of various themes and concepts.

A scathing and brilliant revisionist history, Defending the Holy Land is the most comprehensive analysis to date of Israel's national security and foreign policy, from the inception of the State of Israel to the present. Book jacket.

Since declaring independence in 1948, Israel has been involved in an intractable conflict with the Palestinians and its neighbors. While violence has ebbed and flowed over the years, the threat of terrorism has remained a constant factor, shaping Israeli security policy in a unique way. Boaz Ganor provides an authoritative analysis of Israel’s approach to counterterrorism throughout its existence. Drawing on unprecedented access to Israeli leaders, he offers a comprehensive insider’s account of the decision-making processes, challenges, and dilemmas at the core of counterterror activities. Beginning with infiltration attacks from neighboring states immediately after independence and proceeding through the formation of organized Palestinian terror organizations up to the present day, this book details distinct eras of terrorism and how the Israeli state has counteracted them. Ganor also highlights the dynamic nature of both terrorism and counterterrorism: Just as waves of terror rise, fall, and evolve, so too do the measures employed to respond to them. He distills the lessons of Israel’s experience into key tenets for other countries facing the challenge of terrorism. The book features revelatory personal testimony from senior Israeli decision makers who have played pivotal roles in counterterrorism strategy, including prime ministers, defense ministers, Israeli Defense Forces chiefs of staff, and directors of Mossad and Shin Bet. Israel’s Counterterrorism Strategy is indispensable reading for students, scholars, and practitioners alike.

This book suggests a general framework for the analysis of formative factors in military thought and offers an account of the Israel Defense Force’s state of intellectualism and modernity. This account is followed by an attempt to trace the factors that have shaped Israeli military thought. The explanations are a mixture of realist and non-realist factors, which can be found at both the systemic and the state level of analysis. At the systemic level, realist evaluations focus on factors such as the dominance of the technological dimension and the pervasiveness of asymmetrical, low-intensity conflict; whereas at the state level one can find realist explanations, cultural factors, and societal influences. Moral and legal constraints also factor into both the systemic and state levels.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The fact that the outcome of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige tarnished. This historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. The IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force. ¿An insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.¿ Illustrations.

A history of the IDF that argues that Israel is a nation formed by its army. The Israeli army, officially named the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), was established in 1948 by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, who believed that 'the whole nation is the army'. In his mind, the IDF was to be an army like no other. It was the instrument that might transform a diverse population into a new people. Since the foundation of Israel, therefore, the IDF has been the largest, richest and most influential institution in Israel's Jewish society and is the nursery of its social, economic and political ruling class. In this fascinating history, Bresheeth charts the evolution of the IDF from the Nakba to the continued assaults upon Gaza, and shows that the state of Israel has been formed out of its wars. He also gives an account of his own experiences as a young conscript during the 1967 war. He argues that the army is embedded in all aspects of daily life and identity. And that we should not merely see it as a fighting force enjoying an international reputation, but as the central ideological, political and financial institution of Israeli society. As a consequence, we have to reconsider our assumptions on what any kind of peace might look like.