"The present edition of 'Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence' supersedes 'Of Laws in General, ' edited by H.L.A. Hart and published by the Athlone Press in 1970, as a volume in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham."--Page xi.

Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence is part of the introduction to the projected penal code on which Bentham worked in the late 1770s and early 1780s. An editorial introduction explains the provenance of the work, which is fully annotated with textual and historical notes.

Gathering together an impressive array of legal scholars from around the world, this book features essays on Jeremy Bentham’s major legal theoretical treatise, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, reassessing Bentham’s theories of law as well as his impact on jurisprudence. While offering a suggestive picture of contemporary Bentham studies, the book provides a thorough examination of concepts such as legal discourse, legal norms, legal system, and subjective legal positions. The book compares Bentham’s approach with other landmark theories and the works of major legal philosophers including Austin, Hart and Kelsen, and explores Bentham’s treatise through major trends in contemporary legal thought, such as the imperative theory of law, deontic logic, Scandinavian and American legal realisms, the pure theory of law, and critical legal thought. Resisting any apologetic stance, the book elucidates how consistent with Bentham’s all-encompassing project of utilitarian reform ‘Limits’ turns out to be, and how this sheds light on contemporary modes of governance. The book will be great use and interest to scholars and students of contemporary jurisprudence, legal theory, 19th century philosophy, and public law.

Offers a comprehensive account of Bentham's mature, distinctive thought on democracy, courts, codification, and cosmopolitanism.

The new critical edition of the works and correspondence of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is being prepared and published under the supervision of the Bentham Committee of University College London. In spite of his importance as jurist, philosopher, and social scientist, and leader of the Utilitarian reformers, the only previous edition of his works was a poorly edited and incomplete one brought out within a decade or so of his death. Eight volumes of the new Collected Works, five of correspondence, and three of writings on jurisprudence, appeared between 1968 and 1981, published by the Athlone Press. Further volumes in the series since then are published by Oxford University Press. The overall plan and principles of the edition are set out in the General Preface to The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 1, which was the first volume of the Collected Works to be published. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham's best-known work, is a classic text in modern philosophy and jurisprudence. First published in 1789, it contains the important statement of the foundations of utilitarian philosophy and a pioneering study of crime and punishment, both of which remain at the heart of contemporary debates in moral and political philosophy, economics, and legal theory. Printed here in full is the definitive edition, edited by the distinguished scholars J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. An introductory essay by Hart, first published in 1982 and a widely acknowledged classic in its own right, is reprinted here. It contains an important analysis of Bentham's principle of utility, theory of action, and an account of the relationship between law and morality. A new introduction by the leading Bentham scholar F. Rosen, specially written for this Clarendon Paperback edition, provides students with a helpful survey of Bentham's main ideas and an extensive bibliographical study of recent critical work on Bentham. Professor Rosen's essay also contains a new analysis of the principle of utility in Bentham's philosophy which is compared with its use in Hume and J. S. Mill.

This book features essays on Jeremy Bentham's major legal theoretical treatise, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence. Gathering together an impressive array of legal scholars from around the world the book offers a chance to reassess Bentham's theories of law as well as his impact on jurisprudence. This volume offers a thorough guide to reading Bentham's legal theory giving a detailed account of Bentham's major contributions to the most important contemporary debates in jurisprudence.

Some of the most exciting and innovative legal scholarship has been driven by historical curiosity. Legal history today comes in a fascinating array of shapes and sizes, from microhistory to global intellectual history. Legal history has expanded beyond traditional parochial boundaries to become increasingly international and comparative in scope and orientation. Drawing on scholarship from around the world, and representing a variety of methodological approaches, areas of expertise, and research agendas, this timely compendium takes stock of legal history and methodology and reflects on the various modes of the historical analysis of law, past, present, and future. Part I explores the relationship between legal history and other disciplinary perspectives including economic, philosophical, comparative, literary, and rhetorical analysis of law. Part II considers various approaches to legal history, including legal history as doctrinal, intellectual, or social history. Part III focuses on the interrelation between legal history and jurisprudence by investigating the role and conception of historical inquiry in various models, schools, and movements of legal thought. Part IV traces the place and pursuit of historical analysis in various legal systems and traditions across time, cultures, and space. Finally, Part V narrows the Handbooks focus to explore several examples of legal history in action, including its use in various legal doctrinal contexts.

This collection of original essays brings together leading legal historians and theorists to explore the oft-neglected but important relationship between these two disciplines. Legal historians have often been sceptical of theory. The methodology which informs their own work is often said to be an empirical one, of gathering information from the archives and presenting it in a narrative form. The narrative produced by history is often said to be provisional, insofar as further research in the archives might falsify present understandings and demand revisions. On the other side, legal theorists are often dismissive of historical works. History itself seems to many theorists not to offer any jurisprudential insights of use for their projects: at best, history is a repository of data and examples, which may be drawn on by the theorist for her own purposes. The aim of this collection is to invite participants from both sides to ask what lessons legal history can bring to legal theory, and what legal theory can bring to history. What is the theorist to do with the empirical data generated by archival research? What theories should drive the historical enterprise, and what wider lessons can be learned from it? This collection brings together a number of major theorists and legal historians to debate these ideas.

This book presents a comprehensive investigation of the notion of obligation in Bentham’s thought. For Bentham, obligation is a fictitious – namely linguistic – entity, whose import and truth lie in empirical perceptions of pain and pleasure, ‘real’ entities. This work explores Bentham’s fictionalism, and aims to identify the general features that ethical fictitious entities (including obligation) share with other kinds of fictitious entities. The book is divided into two parts: the first examines the ontological and epistemological foundations of Bentham’s distinction between real and fictitious entities; the second part addresses the normative and motivational aspects of moral and legal notions. This book reveals the centrality of the following issues to Bentham’s legal reform: logic, theory of language, physics, metaphysics, metaethics, axiology, moral psychology, the structure of practical reasoning and action with reference to the law.