This collection of original essays brings together leading legal historians and theorists to explore the oft-neglected but important relationship between these two disciplines. Legal historians have often been sceptical of theory. The methodology which informs their own work is often said to be an empirical one, of gathering information from the archives and presenting it in a narrative form. The narrative produced by history is often said to be provisional, insofar as further research in the archives might falsify present understandings and demand revisions. On the other side, legal theorists are often dismissive of historical works. History itself seems to many theorists not to offer any jurisprudential insights of use for their projects: at best, history is a repository of data and examples, which may be drawn on by the theorist for her own purposes. The aim of this collection is to invite participants from both sides to ask what lessons legal history can bring to legal theory, and what legal theory can bring to history. What is the theorist to do with the empirical data generated by archival research? What theories should drive the historical enterprise, and what wider lessons can be learned from it? This collection brings together a number of major theorists and legal historians to debate these ideas.

Authors Costa and Zolo share the conviction that a proper understanding of the rule of law today requires reference to a global problematic horizon. This book offers some relevant guides for orienting the reader through a political and legal debate where the rule of law (and the doctrine of human rights) is a concept both controversial and significant at the national and international levels.

The theory of natural law grounds human laws in the universal truths of God’s creation. Until very recently, lawyers in the Western tradition studied natural law as part of their training, and the task of the judicial system was to put its tenets into concrete form, building an edifice of positive law on natural law’s foundations. Although much has been written about natural law in theory, surprisingly little has been said about how it has shaped legal practice. Natural Law in Court asks how lawyers and judges made and interpreted natural law arguments in England, Europe, and the United States, from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the American Civil War. R. H. Helmholz sees a remarkable consistency in how English, Continental, and early American jurisprudence understood and applied natural law in cases ranging from family law and inheritance to criminal and commercial law. Despite differences in their judicial systems, natural law was treated across the board as the source of positive law, not its rival. The idea that no person should be condemned without a day in court, or that penalties should be proportional to the crime committed, or that self-preservation confers the right to protect oneself against attacks are valuable legal rules that originate in natural law. From a historical perspective, Helmholz concludes, natural law has advanced the cause of justice.

From the trial of Socrates to the post-9/11 military commissions, trials have always been useful instruments of politics. Yet there is still much that we do not understand about them. Why do governments use trials to pursue political objectives, and when? What differentiates political trials from ordinary ones? Contrary to conventional wisdom, not all political trials are show trials or contrive to set up scapegoats. This volume offers a novel account of political trials that is empirically rigorous and theoretically sophisticated, linking state-of-the-art research on telling cases to a broad argument about political trials as a socio-legal phenomenon. All the contributors analyse the logic of the political in the courtroom. From archival research to participant observation, and from linguistic anthropology to game theory, the volume offers a genuinely interdisciplinary set of approaches that substantially advance existing knowledge about what political trials are, how they work, and why they matter.

Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives enable readers to gain a holistic appreciation of the law by presenting a broad collection of ideas concerning the nature of law. The author draws from a number of social disciplines to provide a rounded sense of what law really is and how it should work in society. The text discusses a wide range of theories and theorists, and also traces the historical developments of Western legal thought from ancient times to the present day. With a focus on the historical and contemporary role of philosophy in the interpretation of law, Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives provide a fascinating insight into the development of law and a comprehensive analysis of current legal thought. It is ideal for students of legal theory and jurisprudence, legal history, political philosophy, and legal practitioners and general readers interested in the theories underpinning our legal institutions and framework.

This updated and revised second edition, with contributions from renowned experts, provides a comprehensive scholarly framework for analyzing the theory and history of international law. Featuring an array of legal and interdisciplinary analyses, it focuses on those theories and developments that illuminate the central and timeless basic concepts and categories of the international legal system, highlighting the interdependency of various aspects of theory and history and demonstrating the connections between theory and practice.

Explores the ideological, political, and economic stakes of struggles over international law's history and its relation to empire and capitalism.

Questions of legal extraterritoriality figure prominently in scholarship on legal pluralism, transnational legal studies, international investment law, international human rights law, state responsibility under international law, and a large number of other areas. Yet many accounts of extraterritoriality make little effort to grapple with its thorny conceptual history, shifting theoretical valence, and complex political roots and ramifications. This book brings together thirteen scholars of law, history, and politics in order to reconsider the history, theory, and contemporary relevance of legal extraterritoriality. Situating questions of extraterritoriality in a set of broader investigations into state-building, imperialist rivalry, capitalist expansion, and human rights protection, it tracks the multiple meanings and functions of a distinct and far-reaching mode of legal authority. The fundamental aim of the volume is to examine the different geographical contexts in which extraterritorial regimes have developed, the political and economic pressures in response to which such regimes have grown, the highly uneven distributions of extraterritorial privilege that have resulted from these processes, and the complex theoretical quandaries to which this type of privilege has given rise. The book will be of considerable interest to scholars in law, history, political science, socio-legal studies, international relations, and legal geography.

Two broad competing normative conceptions of war can be distinguished in the history of legal and political thought. The first and nowadays more familiar belongs to the tradition of "just war." It sees war as an instrument of justice, indeed the most extreme form of supra-national lawenforcement, justified only in the most serious cases of violation of right. The second conception has been labelled "lawful", "legitimate", or "regular war", where war is not enforcement of justice, but a legally regulated procedure governing the pursuit of conflicting legitimate claims amongequal and autonomous political entities.This book sheds light on the relationship between law and morals in armed conflict, and can be read as a historical argument against the disappearance of the regular war concept. Kalmanovitz highlights three important contemporary challenges: the juridification of aggression and the "turn to ethics"in international law; the progressive individualization of war; and the predominance of asymmetrical warfare and armed nonstate actors.This study of the regular war tradition brings historical and theoretical perspective to these recent conceptual transformations, which undermine the fundamental and long-standing distinction between war and police action. It contributes to clarify the stakes in the erosion of internationalpluralism and the normative depoliticization of war. In revisiting the regular war tradition, a clearer sense of these ongoing transformations is realised, inspiring fresh perspectives on the justifiability of war.

Legal pluralism involves the coexistence of multiple forms of law. This involves state law, international law, transnational law, customary law, religious law, indigenous law, and the law of distinct ethnic or cultural communities. Legal pluralism is a subject of discussion today in legal anthropology, legal sociology, legal history, postcolonial legal studies, women's rights and human rights, comparative law, international law, transnational law, European Union law, jurisprudence, and law and development scholarship. A great deal of confusion and theoretical disagreement surrounds discussions of legal pluralismwhich this book aims to clarify and help resolve. Drawing on historical and contemporary studiesincluding the Medieval period, the Ottoman Empire, postcolonial societies, Native peoples, Jewish and Islamic law, Western state legal systems, transnational law, as well as othersit shows that the dominant image of the state with a unified legal system exercising a monopoly over law is, and has always been, false and misleading. State legal systems are internally pluralistic in various ways and multiple manifestations of law coexist in every society. This book explains the underlying reasons for and sources of legal pluralism, identifies its various consequences, uncovers its conceptual and normative implications, and resolves current theoretical disputes in ways that are useful for social scientists, theorists, jurists, and law and development scholars and practitioners.