China has undergone a protracted stint in the nuclear domain from the time when Mao Zedong derided the bomb as a “paper tiger” in 1946, to the development of modern nuclear weapons and missiles, making it only obligatory to chronicle the policy changes within China that steered the leadership towards grasping that nuclear weapons will fundamentally redefine China’s quest for security. The Chinese leadership’s nationalistic ideology and concepts of force and diplomacy shaped its perceptions of the enduring dangers that confronted China. Initially, Beijing’s political corridors dismissed the dangers of a nuclear war while reaffirming the principles of a “people’s war”, however, later, witnessed Mao recasting the struggle into one with a military-technical emphasis that relied on assured nuclear retaliation to ensure effective deterrence. With China seeing a massive amount of political guanxi being expended, it comprehended that nuclear weapons shall play a fundamental role in its long-term aspirations to augment its position and role in global politics. Given that nuclear arsenals are increasingly viewed as a critical assurance of military supremacy and security, this book distils the evolving trends in China’s nuclear doctrine and strategy, and chronicles the journey of a nuclear China, assessing all pertaining facets, including a detailed analysis of the delivery vectors that focus on a high degree of mobility of assets, particularly the missiles and warheads, separately as well as complete weapon systems. During the 1960s, Beijing proceeded with its nuclear weapons programme mindful that it was vulnerable to decapitation, and this book’s narrative underscores that China seeks to improve the survivability and mobility of its existing strategic nuclear forces through a robust nuclear modernisation campaign, including nuclear weapon miniaturisation technology. This, subsequently, leads onto a pressing debate on whether China would aspire to modify, qualitatively and quantitatively, its nuclear posture without necessarily deposing its brand of nuclear minimalism, which has been the core of its nuclear strategy, at least for public consumption.

China has undergone a protracted stint in the nuclear domain from the time when Mao Zedong derided the bomb as a "paper tiger" in 1946, to the development of modern nuclear weapons and missiles, making it only obligatory to chronicle the policy changes within China that steered the leadership towards grasping that nuclear weapons will fundamentally redefine China's quest for security. The Chinese leadership's nationalistic ideology and concepts of force and diplomacy shaped its perceptions of the enduring dangers that confronted China. Initially, Beijing's political corridors dismissed the dangers of a nuclear war while reaffirming the principles of a "people's war," however, later, witnessed Mao recasting the struggle into one with a military-technical emphasis that relied on assured nuclear retaliation to ensure effective deterrence. With China seeing a massive amount of political guanxi being expended, it comprehended that nuclear weapons shall play a fundamental role in its long-term aspirations to augment its position and role in global politics. Given that nuclear arsenals are increasingly viewed as a critical assurance of military supremacy and security, this book distils the evolving trends in China's nuclear doctrine and strategy, and chronicles the journey of a nuclear China, assessing all pertaining facets, including a detailed analysis of the delivery vectors that focus on a high degree of mobility of assets, particularly the missiles and warheads, separately as well as complete weapon systems. During the 1960s, Beijing proceeded with its nuclear weapons programme mindful that it was vulnerable to decapitation, and this book's narrative underscores that China seeks to improve the survivability and mobility of its existing strategic nuclear forces through a robust nuclear modernisation campaign, including nuclear weapon miniaturisation technology. This, subsequently, leads onto a pressing debate on whether China would aspire to modify, qualitatively and quantitatively, its nuclear posture without necessarily deposing its brand of nuclear minimalism, which has been the core of its nuclear strategy, at least for public consumption.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation at cisac.stanford.edu/events/recording/7458/2/765.

In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for “tactical” nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a “special reminder” of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a “long-route” policy of providing Saigon with a “decent chance” of survival for a “decent interval” after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to unravel this intricate story of the October 1969 nuclear alert. They place it in the context of nuclear threat making and coercive diplomacy since 1945, the culture of the Bomb, intra-governmental dissent, domestic political pressures, the international “nuclear taboo,” and Vietnamese and Soviet actions and policies. It is a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.

This is the fifth in a series on the spread of nuclear weapons. Through these reports, the Endowment seeks to increase public awareness of the fact and the danger of nuclear proliferation and to stimulate greater attention to this vital issue by policy makers, the media, and the scholarly community.The series was initiated with the publication of N

This book offers an empirically rich study of Chinese nuclear weapons behaviour and the impact of this behaviour on global nuclear politics since 1949. China's behaviour as a nuclear weapons state is a major determinant of global and regional security. For the United States, there is no other nuclear actor -- with the exception of Russia-- that matters more to its long-term national security. However, China's behaviour and impact on global nuclear politics is a surprisingly under-researched topic. Existing literature tends to focus on narrow policy issues, such as misdemeanours in China's non-proliferation record, the uncertain direction of its military spending, and nuclear force modernization, or enduring opaqueness in its nuclear policy. This book proposes an alternative context to understand both China's past and present nuclear behaviour: its engagement with the process of creating and maintaining global nuclear order. The concept of global nuclear order is an innovative lens through which to consider China as a nuclear weapons state because it draws attention to the inner workings --institutional and normative-- that underpin nuclear politics. It is also a timely subject because global nuclear order is considered by many actors to be under serious strain and in need of reform. Indeed, today the challenges to nuclear order are numerous, from Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions to the growing threat of nuclear terrorism. This book considers these challenges from a Chinese perspective, exploring how far Beijing has gone to the aid of nuclear order in addressing these issues.

A powerful exposé that calls into question Edward Snowden's hero status and uncovers how vulenerable our national security systems have become. Edward Snowden. Hero, traitor, whistleblower, or spy? In the wake of his 2013 NSA leak, public opinion has been divided over the former IT analyst. In How America Lost Its Secrets, Edward Jay Epstein draws on his extensive journalistic experience and investigative acumen to investigate the Snowden scandal--why, and how, it happened, and what the implications will be. This is a crucial book for anyone hoping to understand national security in the digital age, and what Snowden's revelations mean for America (and Putin's Russia).

This book is a comprehensive study of the development of China’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It offers insights into the secretive world of nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles of the Chinese (PLA) Navy and studies how these are likely to grow in the next two decades. The volume examines the technological origins of the design and development of Chinese nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and their naval construction capabilities. It provides an analysis of the underlying Chinese nuclear doctrine, China’s maritime geographical constraints for submarine operations, and the credibility of its sea-based deterrence. It draws upon strategy, nuclear policy, technology, geography, and operational considerations to holistically predict the likely SSBN force levels of the PLA Navy for various scenarios. The book also assesses the spectrum of threats likely from the undersea domain for India and other nations in the Indo-Pacific region. A key text on an obscure but vital facet of Chinese defence studies, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers of strategic affairs, international relations and disarmament studies, peace and conflict studies, geopolitics, foreign policy, Indo-Pacific studies, and diplomacy.

This collection examines the extent to which nuclear weapons modernization has become a significant point of concern and consideration in international security. Recent statements and substantial investments by nuclear weapon possessor states in the upkeep and modernization of their nuclear postures – particularly the United States, Russia and China – illustrate a return of primacy and the salience of nuclear forces in international politics. The upgrading of systems, the introduction of new capabilities, the intermingling of new technologies, and the advancement of new strategic models, are all indicative of their elevation in importance and reliance. With contributions from leading thinkers in the nuclear weapons domain, this book elucidates the global strategic and policy implications such modernization efforts by the above-mentioned states will have on international security. In unpacking and conceptualizing this developing source of potential (in)security and tension, the collection not only provides a technical context, but also frames the likely effects modernization could have on the relations between these nuclear weapon powers and the larger impact upon efforts to curb nuclear weapons – both in terms of horizontal and vertical proliferation. The chapters have been arranged so as to inform a variety of stakeholders, from academics to policy-makers, by connecting analytical and normative insights, and thereby, advancing debates pertaining to where nuclear modernization sits as a point of global security consternation in the 21st century.