From a pioneer in experimental economics, an expanded and updated edition of a textbook that brings economic experiments into the classroom Economics is rapidly becoming a more experimental science, and the best way to convey insights from this research is to engage students in classroom simulations that motivate subsequent discussions and reading. In this expanded and updated second edition of Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Charles Holt, one of the leaders in experimental economics, provides an unparalleled introduction to the study of economic behavior, organized around risky decisions, games of strategy, and economic markets that can be simulated in class. Each chapter is based on a key experiment, presented with accessible examples and just enough theory. Featuring innovative applications from the lab and the field, the book introduces new research on a wide range of topics. Core chapters provide an introduction to the experimental analysis of markets and strategic decisions made in the shadow of risk or conflict. Instructors can then pick and choose among topics focused on bargaining, game theory, social preferences, industrial organization, public choice and voting, asset market bubbles, and auctions. Based on decades of teaching experience, this is the perfect book for any undergraduate course in experimental economics or behavioral game theory. New material on topics such as matching, belief elicitation, repeated games, prospect theory, probabilistic choice, macro experiments, and statistical analysis Participatory experiments that connect behavioral theory and laboratory research Largely self-contained chapters that can each be covered in a single class Guidance for instructors on setting up classroom experiments, with either hand-run procedures or free online software End-of-chapter problems, including some conceptual-design questions, with hints or partial solutions provided

Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior combines a behavioral approach with active classroom learning exercises to stimulate student understanding of economic decisions and interactions in games and markets.

Die Spieltheorie betrachtet Entscheidungen als "Schachzüge" in einem Spiel, dessen Ausgang von den Entscheidungen aller Spieler bestimmt wird. Diese Theorie wird hier erstmals auf Investmentgeschäfte am Finanzmarkt angewendet. Nach der Definition der "Spielregeln" und der "Spieler" wird, basierend auf Formeln der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, ein Spielmodell entwickelt, das die Rentabilität von beliebigen Finanzaktionen wie Aktienkauf und -verkauf vorhersagt.

It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.

The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics. This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.

Useful Tools to Help Solve Decision Making ProblemsApplied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior demonstrates the use of various game theory techniques to address practical business, economic, legal, and public policy issues. It also illustrates the benefits of employing strategic thinking that incorporates the uncertainty surrounding the behavior of

Andreu Mas-Colell revolutionized our understanding of competitive markets, price formation, and the behavior of market participants. This volume presents the papers that solidified his standing as one of the preeminent economic theorists of our time. It also is invaluable for anyone wishing to study the craft of a master of economic modeling.

This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.

This book examines the extent to which Russia’s strategic behavior is the product of its imperial strategic culture and Putin’s own operational code. The work argues that, by conflating personalistic regime survival with national security, Putin ensures that contemporary Russian national interest, as expressed through strategic behavior, is the synthesis of a peculiar troika: a long-standing imperial strategic culture, rooted in a partially imagined past; the operational code of a counter-intelligence president and decision-making elite; and the realities of Russia as a hybrid state. The book first examines the role of structure and agency in shaping contemporary Russian strategic behavior. It then provides a conceptual understanding of strategic culture, and applies this to Tsarist and Soviet historical developments. The book’s analysis of the operational code, however, demonstrates that Putinism is more than the sum of the past. At the end, the book assesses Putin’s statecraft and stress-tests our assumptions about the exercise of contemporary power in Russia and the structure of Putin’s agency. This book will be of interest to students of Russian politics and foreign policy, strategic studies and international relations.